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Executive summary 
In 2003 the Immigration Appeal Tribunal began issuing guidance 
cases to lay down authoritatively what is happening in different 
asylum-seeker producing countries so that asylum decision making 
would be more consistent. This report examines whether those 
guidance cases, Country Guideline cases, are fulfilling this function 
and whether in a fair and reasonable way. 
The report concludes that many of the Country Guideline cases are 
deeply flawed in a number of key respects: 
• Lack of proper referencing of the evidence considered, meaning 
cases cannot be challenged. 
• Based on incomplete country information, with important and up-
to-date evidence either not considered or ignored. 
• Reasoning is sometimes obscure and it is difficult to fathom how 
the evidence considered led to the ultimate conclusion. 
• Parties restrict themselves to submitting evidence and argument 
on the facts of the particular case. Some guidance cases go 
beyond these facts and are based on flimsy foundations. 
• Thorough and definitive country guidance requires resources. 
These resources have not hitherto been provided by parties to all 
guideline cases so the Tribunal needs to be more pro-active. 
• Expert evidence is routinely rejected rather than assimilated into 
an overall judgment. 
A fundamental change of approach is required if the IAT is to 
produce effectively comprehensive guidance which is benign and 
practical rather than, as at present, inimical to individual justice. 
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Methodology 
The Research and Information Unit at IAS provides IAS staff with fully 
researched court bundles for use in asylum and immigration appeals before the 
Immigration Appellate Authority, including the Tribunal, on a case by case 
basis. The bundles include an analytical summary of all relevant information 
whether it goes for or against the claimants case. Determinations from the 
Tribunal and higher courts regarding country conditions are a key plank of such 
research. The three full-time researchers, with the help of interns, produce an 
average of 50 such bundles per month. Through this work, the researchers 
became aware of several Tribunal decisions which purported to give guidance 
on country conditions but which appeared seriously flawed and/or were based 
on very incomplete country information. Following the success of the analysis of 
the Home Office country reports,1 and bearing in mind the potential injustices 
that would be caused by poor country guidance from the Tribunal, the project to 
examine the Country Guideline cases was initiated. 
Initially, four workshops were organised on the topic for practitioners  two in 
London in July 2004 and two in Leicester in September 2004. Those who 
attended included a wide cross-section of the sector, including barristers, 
solicitors, NGO-workers, and members of the judiciary. We are very grateful for 
the lively participation and thoughtful comments that emanated from these 
discussions, and to those who were happy to continue the debate by email 
subsequently. In November, we presented our preliminary concerns to the vice-
presidents of the Tribunal in an informal setting. We were very happy to note 
their openness to criticism and were grateful to hear their comments on those 
initial concerns. Whilst this report is the formal culmination of this consultative 
process, the recommendations and criticisms found in it are made in light of this 
ongoing discussion. 
1 Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Assessments: An Analysis IAS (September 2003) and 
Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004). 
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Out of the 300-odd Country Guideline cases existing in September and 
November 2004, around half were read or re-read specifically with the 
parameters of the project in mind. IAS staff and other practitioners, along with 
those who had participated in the workshops, were asked to highlight any 
Country Guideline cases they felt to be of specific concern.  
A thematic approach was adopted rather than considering the cases country by 
country. By adopting a thematic approach, the writers wish to emphasise that 
criticisms and recommendations are not limited to the cases examined in detail 
in this report. Rather, the highlighted cases were chosen because they 
exemplified common themes and the same criticisms could be made of many of 
the Country Guideline cases. It would not be an adequate response simply to 
remove the cases which are highlighted as being seriously flawed as the 
problems are structural rather than individual. 
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Introduction 
Country Guideline cases became ubiquitous in 2004. On 4th January 2005, 292 
had been promulgated.2 The Tribunal expects practitioners to be familiar with 
any relevant Country Guideline case and to trawl through the poorly constructed 
IAA website to find them, or to use the EIN subscription service. If a set of facts 
arising in the particular case before the Tribunal has previously been addressed 
in a Country Guideline case the Tribunal expects there to be argument on why 
the outcome of the Country Guideline case in question should not be followed. 
This report analyses the theory and practice behind the making of Country 
Guideline cases through the prism of S and Others [2002] INLR 416, other 
judicial guidance and through first principles. The authors have found that many 
of the cases examined simply do not meet the high standards required. Rather 
than simply criticising, however, and in the knowledge that the practice of 
making factual precedents is likely to continue under the new Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal (AIT) from April 2005, we have sought to be constructive 
and have included recommendations. It is imperative that the highest and most 
rigorous standards of analysis are applied to what becomes a Country 
Guideline case and we seek to stimulate debate on how the current Tribunal 
and the new AIT may overcome a number of obstacles to accomplish this 
difficult task. 
The first chapter examines the problems arising from and surrounding the 
concept of legal certainty in the asylum jurisdiction. The second chapter 
examines whether the Tribunal has fulfilled its duty to be effectively 
comprehensive, as required by the Court of Appeal in S and Others v SSHD
when the Tribunal is setting a factual precedent. The third chapter looks at the 
challenges presented in seeking to set effectively comprehensive factual 
2 80% are in favour of the Home Office, 2% were remitted, leaving 18% in favour of the asylum 
claimant. These statistics include both asylum claimant and Home Office appeals. These figures 
are commensurate with overall success rates for asylum claimants but it is not possible easily to 
analyse whether the Country Guideline determinations favouring the Home Office tend to touch 
on broader issues affecting greater numbers of claimants than the Country Guideline 
determinations  favouring asylum claimants. 
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precedents in an adversarial environment. The fourth and final chapter analyses 
the Tribunals approach to expert evidence, specifically identified in S and 
Others as being crucial to setting sound precedents. 
There are several themes underlying this report and emerging repeatedly in the 
different chapters. Perhaps the most important is that many of the problems 
discussed are inevitable in an adversarial legal environment where a binary 
yes/no decision is always required. Far too many of the Country Guideline 
cases examined, however,  make the mistake of elevating these unavoidable 
and regrettable problems into unnecessary and damaging evils by attaching 
precedent value to entirely inappropriate determinations. The Tribunal has all 
too often failed to observe the rigours required by S and Others, a decision that 
is frequently referred to in this report and is the benchmark against which 
Country Guideline determinations have to be measured. 
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 -- CHAPTER ONE -- 
Certainty, consistency and justice 
Colin Yeo∗
This chapter looks at the concept of legal certainty and its application in Country 
Guideline cases. The first part examines the search for certainty by the Tribunal 
and the mechanisms it has adopted to try and impose greater consistency of 
decision-making on adjudicators by insisting on greater legal certainty with 
regards to country conditions. The chapter goes on to look at the concept of 
legal certainty and offers a reminder of the often misunderstood approach to 
certainty and fact-finding in asylum cases laid down in the leading case of 
Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 271, before moving on to consider the 
potential for conflict between judicial desire for greater legal certainty and the 
need for individual justice, a conflict explicitly and carefully considered in the 
case of S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416. The problems arising from 
purporting to establish definitive facts at a given date in a constantly changing 
world are then examined. The chapter finishes by looking at the way that 
artificial certainty is cascaded by the Country Guideline system even where the 
Tribunal has stated that its findings are based on a lack of evidence or where a 
case has been used inappropriately to determine issues beyond the facts of the 
particular case. Several of these issues recur in later chapters but are examined 
here in the specific context of considering how the Tribunals desire to achieve 
greater legal certainty and consistency of decision-making is affecting individual 
justice in other cases. 
1.1 The search for certainty 
The Immigration Appeal Tribunal has shown an increasing tendency under the 
Presidencies of Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Ouseley to seek to exert a 
high degree of control over the decision-making of adjudicators. In a series of 
∗ Colin Yeo is Head of Higher Appeals at the Immigration Advisory Service and has previously 
published articles in the International Journal of Refugee Law, Tolleys and the IAS Digest and 
Update publications. 
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judgments, culminating most recently in P and M v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 
1640, the Court of Appeal has chastised the Tribunal for interfering too readily 
in adjudicators findings.3 In P and M the Court re-emphasises the test 
formulated in Subesh v SSHD [2004] Imm AR 112 to be applied before the 
Tribunal can intervene and substitute its own decision for that of the adjudicator: 
The true distinction is between the case where the appeal court might 
prefer a different view (perhaps on marginal grounds) and one where it 
concludes that the process of reasoning and the application of the 
relevant law, require it to adopt a different view. 
This test applies to cases determined under the 1999 Act appeals regime when 
the Tribunal still enjoyed a full appellate jurisdiction rather than the more limited 
error of law jurisdiction introduced by the 2002 Act, but it also clearly holds 
lessons for the Tribunal about the nature of an error of law, a concept the 
Tribunal has interpreted remarkably liberally when overturning appeals allowed 
by adjudicators. Ultimately, this interventionist tendency has proven self-
destructive and resulted in the Tribunals abolition. Like Agamemnon, murdered 
in his bath after eventually returning victorious from Troy, it could be said the 
Tribunals hubris has been its downfall. 
Frustrated by the shortcomings of intervening in individual cases, the Tribunal 
adopted two principle means of control: the starred determinations, principally 
on legal issues, and Country Guideline cases, coupled with the organisation of 
the Tribunal into country groups. The starred determinations have a longer 
pedigree, the first being Haddad v SSHD (00/HX/00926) 15 February 2000. The 
concept of a country guideline case first really emerged with the Tribunals 
decision in SSHD v S (01/TH/00632) 1 May 2001, later S and Others v SSHD
[2002] INLR 416 in the Court of Appeal, a case extensively referred to in this 
report, then later still SK v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 05613 (starred), again in the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal, chaired by the then President, Mr Justice Collins, sought 
to reach a definitive conclusion on the treatment of Serbs in Croatia in the year 
3 See also, for example, Oleed v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 1906, Koci v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 
1507, Subesh v SSHD [2004] Imm AR 112, CA v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1165, Ndlovu v 
SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1567, Pisa v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1443, Nirmalanathan v SSHD 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1380.
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2001 by joining together several cases and using the mixed facts to examine a 
range of risk issues. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision on appeal in 
the judgment S and Others because two important reports had been overlooked 
and the Tribunal had therefore failed in its duty to be effectively comprehensive 
when seeking to establish what the Court of Appeal calls a factual precedent, 
even though there was much force in the Secretary of States contention that 
the reports made no difference to the outcome of the case. 
The Tribunal took S and Others and its later approval in Shirazi v SSHD [2003] 
EWCA Civ 1562 to be a green light to go ahead with other similar precedent 
cases, and the current system of designated Country Guideline cases emerged 
soon afterwards. When the designation was introduced, the Tribunal also 
trawled through its back-catalogue to pick out some of its old favourites in order 
to elevate them retrospectively to Country Guideline status. The criteria for 
designating individual cases as having Country Guideline status have never 
been published, if such criteria exist at all, but it is known that the Tribunal has 
organised itself into country groups, believed to be chaired informally by a 
Tribunal Vice-President, to whom interesting-looking cases are perhaps referred 
or who co-ordinates the work of the group in some other way, including de-
designating cases that are deemed no longer to be appropriate as Country 
Guideline cases. The membership of the groups is believed to rotate.4
Greater transparency and consultation would have been helpful to the 
Tribunals Country Guideline project. It is difficult to trust or have faith in the 
decision-making process when one is so unaware of what it is or what it 
involves, particularly when so many cases markedly favour the Home Office 
view of country conditions. 
The most authoritative judgment on the subject of factual precedents is very 
clearly S and Others, in which the implications are carefully and explicitly 
considered, unlike in previous judgments. S and Others is also cited with 
approval in Shirazi and Indrakumar v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1677. It could be 
4 Information from conversations with members of the Tribunal and others in the sector. 
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argued, however, that S and Others is of limited relevance now because of the 
jurisdictional change under the 2002 Act. The judgment refers to binding 
precedents and errors, but that was while a factual error was sufficient for the 
Tribunal to intervene. Assuming that S and Others continues to support the 
proposition that factual precedents can be binding under the 2002 Act 
jurisdiction, it lays down very clear standards that have to be applied.5 As is 
examined below, the majority of Country Guideline cases do not meet those 
exacting standards. 
1.2 Certainty and justice 
In S and Others, Laws LJ explicitly recognises the potential conflict between 
certainty and individual justice at paragraph 26: 
Now, the notion of a judicial decision which is binding as to fact is foreign 
to the common law, save for the limited range of circumstances where 
the principle of res judicata (and its variant, issue estoppel) applies  
This principle has been evolved  we put the matter summarily  to avoid 
the vice of successive trials of the same cause or question between the 
same parties.  By contrast, it is also a principle of our law that a party is 
free to invite the court to reach a different conclusion on a particular 
factual issue from that reached on the same issue in earlier litigation to 
which, however, he was a stranger.  The first principle supports the 
public interest in finality in litigation.  The second principle supports the 
ordinary call of justice, that a party have the opportunity to put his case: 
he is not to be bound by what others might have made of a like, or even 
identical case. 
He goes on to comment that the Tribunals creation of a factual precedent that 
is binding on future similar cases to an extent sacrifices the second principle to 
the first but that as long as a claimant can present new evidence and argue that 
his facts are different to those in the precedent, the sacrifice is not complete. He 
then continues: 
5 This assumption may well eventually prove to be mistaken. The Court of Appeal has certainly 
endorsed the principle of the Tribunal offering country guidance and it seems unlikely that the 
Court would entirely resile from this position. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Court 
ever envisaged the formalised system the Tribunal has devised, the carelessness with which 
some of the guidance cases have been decided or the way in which guidance cases are used at 
LSC, adjudicator and Tribunal levels. The extent to which the Country Guidance cases should 
be considered binding is considered below. 
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28. While in our general law this notion of a factual precedent is exotic, 
in the context of the IATs responsibilities it seems to us in principle to be 
benign and practical.  Refugee claims vis-à-vis any particular State are 
inevitably made against a political backdrop which over a period of time, 
however long or short, is, if not constant, at any rate identifiable.  Of 
course the impact of the prevailing political reality may vary as between 
one claimant and another, and it is always the appellate authorities duty 
to examine the facts of individual cases.  But there is no public interest, 
nor any legitimate individual interest, in multiple examinations of the state 
of the backdrop at any particular time.  Such revisits give rise to the risk, 
perhaps the likelihood, of inconsistent results; and the likelihood, perhaps 
the certainty, of repeated and therefore wasted expenditure of judicial 
and financial resources upon the same issues and the same evidence. 
29. But if the conception of a factual precedent has utility in the context of 
the IATs duty, there must be safeguards.  A principal safeguard will lie in 
the application of the duty to give reasons with particular rigour.  We do 
not mean to say that the IAT will have to deal literally with every point 
canvassed in evidence or argument; that would be artificial and 
disproportionate.  But when it determines to produce an authoritative 
ruling upon the state of affairs in any given territory it must in our view 
take special care to see that its decision is effectively comprehensive.  It 
should address all the issues in the case capable of having a real as 
opposed to fanciful bearing on the result, and explain what it makes of 
the substantial evidence going to each such issue.  In this field opinion 
evidence will often or usually be very important, since assessment of the 
risk of persecutory treatment in the milieu of a perhaps unstable political 
situation may be a complex and difficult task in which the fact-finding 
tribunal is bound to place heavy reliance on the views of experts and 
specialists. 
The Court of Appeal concludes that although there is a risk that individual 
justice may be compromised by the concept of a factual precedent, as long as 
safeguards are followed  namely the duty on the Tribunal to be effectively 
comprehensive and the right of an individual claimant to distinguish his case 
from any precedent  then factual precedents can be useful to all concerned. 
The safeguards are paramount in S and Others, which is why the appeal was 
remitted back to the Tribunal despite the fact the Courts tacit admission that the 
reports in question would make little or no difference to the ultimate outcome.  
S and Others is not the only judgment of the Court of Appeal to consider the 
idea of a factual precedent, although it is certainly the most careful and 
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thorough analysis of the issue. In the earlier case of Manzeke v SSHD [1997] 
Imm AR 524 the Court had commented favourably on the idea: 
It will be beneficial to the general administration of asylum appeals for 
Special Adjudicators to have the benefit of the views of a Tribunal in 
other cases on the general situation in a particular part of the world, as 
long as that situation has not changed in the meantime.  Consistency in 
the treatment of asylum seekers is important in so far as objective 
considerations, not directly affected by the circumstances of the 
individual asylum seeker, are involved. 
In Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562 the Court went considerably further 
and actually criticised the Tribunal for allowing inconsistent lines of cases to 
develop: 
[29] The differentials we have seen are related less to the differences 
between individual asylum-seekers than to differences in the Tribunal's 
reading of the situation on the ground in Iran. This is understandable, but 
it is not satisfactory. In a system which is as much inquisitorial as it is 
adversarial, inconsistency on such questions works against legal 
certainty. That does not mean that the situation cannot change, or that 
an individual's relationship to it does not have to be distinctly gauged in 
each case. It means that in any one period a judicial policy (with the 
flexibility that the word implies) needs to be adopted on the effect of the 
in-country data in recurrent classes of case. 
These cases need to be read with two extremely important provisos in mind. 
Firstly, the cases were decided while the Tribunal still enjoyed a very wide 
jurisdiction (specifically referred to in Manzeke) and, secondly, the Court of 
Appeal in both cases explicitly states that flexibility is needed, strongly implying 
that there would be no error of law in failing to follow such precedents if reasons 
are given. The parentheses at the end of the above quotation from Shirazi
makes this abundantly clear. In Manzeke, the Court also made it clear that 
guideline cases were relevant to future determinations but were certainly not 
determinative: 
[In Senga], the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the situation 
generally.  The decision was made in the context of the facts of that 
particular case.  This must always be remembered.  However, 
consideration of those facts was dependent upon material placed before 
it from various bodies who were aware of the situation in Zaire at that 
time.  The Tribunal's views as to those facts would be of assistance and 
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provide useful guidance to other Special Adjudicators and other 
Tribunals who were faced with similar situations.  The fact that one 
Tribunal comes to a conclusion on the facts before it does not mean that 
any other Tribunal is bound to come to the same decision, but any later 
tribunal is entitled to have regard to the views of a decision, such as that 
given by the Tribunal in the Senga case  The matters which had been 
decided in the Senga case were at least relevant to the decision which 
the Special Adjudicator and the Tribunal had to reach in this case. 
Despite the caution with which the Court of Appeal has endorsed the idea of 
country guidance, the Tribunal considers the formal Country Guideline cases to 
be binding,6 although from the practice of the Tribunal it seems clear that this 
means binding on adjudicators rather than the Tribunal itself, as the record of 
Country Guideline cases abounds with examples of contradictory findings and 
one case superseding another.7 The proposition that a determination of the 
facts of an individual case can lay down a legal precedent with which to 
disagree would amount to an error of law is a controversial one and must be 
read alongside the exhortations for flexibility in Manzeke and Shirazi and the 
safeguards emphasised in S and Others. 
The frequent failure by the Tribunal to be effectively comprehensive in Country 
Guideline determinations is examined in depth in another chapter but the 
example of VD (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00115 (Trafficking) illustrates 
concisely the damage the imposition of artificial certainty through a Country 
Guideline determination can do to justice in individual cases. In this case, as is 
later examined in some detail, the Tribunals analysis of the evidence before it is 
woefully incomplete and the Tribunal also goes on to make findings on issues 
that were not pertinent to the specific case before it and would not therefore 
6 In SSHD v AF (Afghanistan) [2004] UKIAT 00284 (CG) a panel of the Tribunal chaired by Mr 
Freeman rather stridently opined that failure by an adjudicator to follow a Country Guideline 
determination would amount to an error of law. This is unusual in being so explicit but it is clear 
from the text of the CG determinations and from the Tribunals practice in hearing argument in 
individual cases that the Tribunal considers CG cases binding on adjudicators.  
7 See, for example, the series of Turkish cases concerning immediate risk on return concluding 
with SSHD v IK [2004] UKIAT 00312 (CG) and the recent previous definitive cases it replaced: 
HO (National Records) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00038, SA (GBTS records) Turkey CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00177, LT (Internal flight - Registration system) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00175, AG 
(GBTS, "tab" and other records) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00168, KK (GBTS - Other information 
systems - McDowall) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00177, MS (GBTS information at borders) 
Turkey [2004] UKIAT 00192, CE (KK confirmed - McDowall report) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 
00233. 
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have been prepared by the representative (the general risk of trafficking to a 
woman in Albania rather than the risk to the claimant). These findings have 
been elevated to Country Guideline status and must have been used in 
countless other Tribunal, adjudicator and Legal Services Commission decisions 
since, yet the methodology behind the original determination is highly 
questionable. The problem of cascading the artificial notion of certainty that is 
being peddled by the Tribunal in many Country Guideline determinations is 
revisited in the final section of this chapter. 
1.3 Ravichandran and flux 
As any practitioner in the field of asylum law will be very well aware, the risk to 
an asylum seeker is to be assessed as of todays date, whenever that might be. 
The principle dates back to the seminal case of Ravichandran [1996] Imm AR 
97 and in its current incarnation is enshrined in law at s.85(4) of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This means that country conditions are 
always to be examined at todays date, assuming there is an extant appeal on 
the facts.8
Country Guideline cases are therefore, by their very nature, out of date on the 
day they are promulgated. The situation is even worse if the case was itself 
based on old, obsolete material, which is far from unknown. In NL v SSHD 
(Pakistan CG) [2002] UKIAT 04408 (Mental illness  Support for family), for 
example, the source relied upon almost exclusively is the CIPU Pakistan 
Country Assessment from October 2001. However, as the hearing date was in 
August 2002, the edition of CIPU presented by the Home Office should have 
been that published in April 2002. The Tribunal must have been aware that a 
more recent report was available but no explanation is given in the 
determination as to why the more recent version was not used.9 There is no 
information given in this report specifically on mental health services in 
8 The principle is somewhat complicated by the Court of Appeals decision in CA v SSHD [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1165, which requires the Tribunal, under the 2002 Act appeals regime, to decide 
there was an error of law before it can make its own factual findings on appeal. 
9 Presumably it was not presented by either party but this is hardly a sound basis for a Country 
Guideline case, as is discussed further in the later inquisitorial quality chapter. 
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Pakistan, nor indeed on medical services. The overlooked April 2002 report 
does, however limited, contain three paragraphs on medical services.10
Further analysis of the sections of the CIPU report examined by the Tribunal in 
this case reveals the true extent to which the information presented was 
obsolete. Section 5.3.88 of the CIPU report is referred to in paragraph four of 
the determination. This section is taken from a single source numbered [12c] 
which, according to Annex D of the report, is Women in Pakistan Research 
Directorate of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board. Source [12c] was 
published in June 1994 although it was completed in January 1994, eight years 
prior to the hearing date. Paragraph five of the determination refers to section 
5.3.97 of the CIPU report. This section also comes from a single source 
numbered [2b], which Annex D links to the Pakistan Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices for 2000 US Department of State published in February 
2001.11 Whilst the report itself was published in February 2001  eighteen 
months before the hearing date  the material within the report refers to 2000, 
over two years before the hearing date. Finally, section 5.4.38 of the report, 
referred to in paragraph nine of the determination, derives from source [20b] 
which is the final report of a Country of Origin Information Workshop in 
Bratislava held in December 1999 UNHCR/ACCORD  published in May 2000. 
Again the publication date of this report is over two years prior to the hearing 
date whereas the material within the report refers to events in 1999 or before. 
Matching the sources paraphrased by the CIPU report and referred to in the 
determination it becomes clear that the country information before the Tribunal 
was far from current. The two sources within the CIPU report upon which the 
Tribunal assesses the level of support services available to Pakistani women 
(paragraphs twelve-thirteen) are eight years and two years old respectively. The 
information quoted in rejecting the availability of an internal flight alternative for 
women in Pakistan  not, it should be added, on the basis of its outdated nature 
10 Country Assessment for Pakistan CIPU (April 2002), 4.72-4.74. 
11 Pakistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000 US Department of State, 
(February 2001)  
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(paragraph 9)  is three years old. The case is nevertheless a Country 
Guideline case, considered by the Tribunal to be binding on adjudicators.12
Of course, the burden rests with the claimant to prove his or her case. In some 
cases, recent information simply will not be available to the Tribunal and the 
determination will of necessity be based on potentially obsolete material. 
However, the Tribunal is compounding a necessity into an evil by elevating such 
cases to Country Guideline status and must, if injustice is not to be 
unnecessarily imposed on other claimants, be far more cautious about which 
cases are designated as being binding and be willing to de-designate aging 
cases. Indeed, as is argued in the inquisitorial quality chapter, there is a strong 
case to suggest the Tribunal is under a duty, particularly when setting a factual 
precedent, to examine the latest information. 
The problem of rapidly dating decisions was recognised by the Court of Appeal 
in S and Others, and the Court observed that it is important that future 
adjudicators or tribunals are aware of the limitations of a factual precedent and 
are receptive to new evidence of changed country conditions: 
[27]  an applicant will of course be heard on any facts particular to his 
case, and (as the IAT made clear) evidence as to any deterioration in the 
state of affairs in Croatia would be listened to. 
Some of the more recent Country Guideline determinations carry a form of 
health warning at the beginning to stress this point. The text reads 
approximately as follows: 
This case is a country guideline (CG) case on the issue of whether failed 
asylum seekers per se face a real risk of serious harm upon return to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As such it is intended as definitive 
unless there is a change of circumstances materially affecting the 
treatment of failed asylum seekers upon return to the DRC.13
12 See the When section of the effectively comprehensive chapter for further examples, 
including one involving information dating to 1960 in a Country Guideline case: WO (Nigeria 
CG) [2004] UKIAT 00277 (Ogboni cult). 
13 VL (Risk - Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo [2004] UKIAT 00007 (CG), 
paragraph 1 
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The backdated Country Guideline cases do not, of course, include an 
equivalent warning paragraph. Although the warning hardly solves the problems 
discussed, it is important that the Tribunal explicitly recognises in Country 
Guideline cases that country conditions can and do change and that it specifies 
the actual issue on which it is to be considered binding  many Country 
Guideline cases make a whole range of factual findings which appear to be 
quite specific to the claimant before them, effectively and rather absurdly 
elevating all those findings into binding guidelines.14 The brief descriptors or 
labels attached to Country Guideline cases, usually just three or four words, are 
not an adequate explanation of the specific country findings that the Tribunal 
has elevated to binding status. The vast majority of cases can be compared 
unfavourably in this respect with paragraphs 1 to 3 of the original SSHD v S
(01/TH/00632) 1 May 2001 or paragraphs 1 to 10 of VL (Risk - Failed Asylum 
Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007. 
By their nature, Country Guideline cases necessarily place a burden on the 
future claimant to distinguish his or her own case from the earlier one, yet the 
way the determinations have been written can make this virtually impossible. If 
the claimant does not know what evidence the Tribunal used to make its earlier 
decision, he or she cannot possibly point a future adjudicator or tribunal to 
different or new evidence and persuade them to depart from the earlier case. 
Sadly, the Tribunal routinely omit to reference their decisions properly, as is 
discussed in the effectively comprehensive chapter. This is extremely effective 
in insulating such cases from future challenge by other claimants as well as 
breaching the enhanced duty to give reasons discussed in S and Others. 
Unfortunately, it is the experience of practitioners that there is also a fairly 
widespread tendency to use Country Guideline cases as a shortcut to 
14 There are many, many examples to choose from and the following are selected at random. In 
AA (Vulnerable Female  Article 3) Ethiopia CG [2004] UKIAT 00184 the Tribunal examines 
whether it would be a breach of Article 3 on the facts of the individual case for the claimant to be 
returned to Ethiopia. It is difficult to see how the case has general application or sets an 
effectively comprehensive factual precedent of any value. In FD (Sufficiency of protection-
Roma-Munteanu) Romania CG [2004] UKIAT 00001 the Tribunal holds that the claimant had 
not exhausted potential domestic remedies therefore it was not established on the facts that 
there was insufficient protection. Again, it is difficult to see how this case carries precedent 
value. It is simply an ordinary determination of the Tribunal. 
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determining a case as opposed to providing a useful and semi-authoritative 
description of country conditions. The judiciary operate under severe time 
constraints and a reference to a Country Guidance case is sometimes used as 
an alternative to giving reasons rather than as an aide to decision-making. If the 
facts are vaguely analogous with a Country Guideline case then the case will be 
dismissed unless the claimant can prove otherwise  as, of course, the vast 
majority of cited Country Guideline cases are against the claimant. This 
tendency extends right down the decision-making process even to the Legal 
Service Commission merits test for appeal funding. It is not unknown for the 
LSC or representatives with devolved powers to refuse funding on the basis of a 
Country Guideline case, rendering the cases eerily and dangerously self-
protecting. 
There is an eminently practical issue arising about what happens to old Country 
Guideline cases and when they actually become old or are superseded.15
Given the fast pace of change in almost all asylum seeker producing countries, 
it might be thought to be absurd to be forcing claimants to distinguish their 
cases from a factual precedent that is two or three years, or even one year, old 
and which may itself have been based on evidence that was old at that time. 
Country conditions will inevitably have changed quite considerably, there will be 
new evidence and reports and there is a clear duty on any decision-maker to 
apply anxious scrutiny and examine the latest reports. However, the approach 
adopted by many adjudicators and panels of the Tribunal is to require the 
claimant to demonstrate that new country information contradicts an old case. In 
doing so, the Immigration Appellate Authority is clearly going further than the 
Court of Appeal intended in S and Others and is sacrificing individual justice on 
the false altar of legal certainty. 
15 At the time of writing, for example, FJ (Risk-return-Tuni) Somalia CG [2003] UKIAT 00147 
and MM (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 00129 appear to have been significantly superseded by 
MN (Somalia CG) [2004] UKIAT 00224, which was based on additional and better evidence, but 
continue to be Country Guideline cases. Similarly, SA (Somalia CG) [2002] UKIAT 06665 
appears to have been superseded (indeed, contradicted) by NG (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 
00011 yet remains a CG case. In none of these cases is reference made to the earlier 
decisions, unlike in other examples of cases being superseded, such as the string of Turkish 
cases culminating in IK (Turkey CG) [2004] UKIAT 00312 or Gulati [2002] UKIAT 02130, K 
(Afghanistan) [2003] UKIAT 00057 and the more recent IB and TK (Afghanistan CG) [2004] 
UKIAT 00150 (Sikhs  Risk on return  Objective evidence). 
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For example, the author is aware that the backdated Country Guideline decision 
of RG (Risk-Return-Sikh) Afghanistan CG [2002] UKIAT 02130 has been cited 
and relied upon on a number of occasions in unreported Tribunal 
determinations and in many adjudicator hearings. Over-reliance on this old 
decision actually formed a ground of appeal in the reported (but not Country 
Guideline) case of IB and TK Afghanistan [2004] UKIAT 00150, where the 
adjudicators were alleged not to have made independent findings of their own 
or made an assessment of the most up-to-date country information. The 
Tribunal implicitly upholds this complaint and gives careful consideration to a 
range of sources. At paragraph 39 the Tribunal finds that RG and another 
much-cited earlier case are effectively superseded as there is newer and more 
up-to-date evidence available which renders the earlier decisions unsafe. This 
raises the question of exactly when RG became redundant and how often it was 
relied upon by adjudicators and the Tribunal after it had become redundant. 
Worse, RG remains a Country Guideline case but IB and TK does not have this 
status. 
Country Guideline cases should be fixed with an expiry date of six months and 
should be de-designated or removed when that date passes, although they 
have to be left on the record as reported determinations. Without this kind of 
safeguard the Tribunal imposes an unreasonable additional burden on 
claimants (particularly given the failings of the Country Guideline cases 
themselves) and irrevocably undermines the Ravichandran principle. At the very 
least the Tribunal should make known its policy on removing Country Guideline 
cases. Some cases had been removed towards the end of 2004 but many old 
cases remain, some being retrospective Country Guideline cases dating back to 
2002. The rationale, if there is one, is elusive and the process appears quite 
random to the interested observer. 
The Tribunals reply to this general point is presumably that it is the duty of 
future claimants and their representatives to place more comprehensive 
evidence before a future panel of the Tribunal, in which case the new material 
will be considered. Such a response represents a dereliction of the Tribunals 
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enhanced duty in Country Guideline cases and demonstrates an entirely 
unrealistic understanding of the capacity of claimants and representatives to 
challenge self-insulating precedents, given considerations on competence, 
funding and the Tribunals own extremely poor referencing. The legal and 
practical arguments in favour of adopting a more inquisitorial approach are 
discussed in depth in a later chapter. 
1.4 Artificiality of legal certainty 
The concept of certainty lies right at the heart of Country Guideline cases. The 
whole purpose of a Country Guideline case is to impose a degree of certainty 
on an uncertain and often rapidly changing country situation. This is an artificial 
certainty, however, a legal construct akin to the elevation of probabilities to 
certainties by the standard of proof device: when the requisite standard is 
reached, that standard being more probable than not in a normal civil case, 
facts proven to that standard somehow become established. This is 
something of a quaint notion to anyone versed in an academic discipline other 
than the law.16 The adversarial nature of the common law legal system requires 
the preferring of one version of the facts over another and the winner takes all. 
An asylum case cannot be partially won: either the asylum seeker is granted 
asylum or he is not. 
In asylum cases the fact-finding exercise is supposed to be very different and 
follow the approach laid down in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 271. This 
point is examined in more detail in later chapters, but it is important to note now 
and in this context that the Court of Appeal was clearly alive to the problem of 
artificial certainty in S and Others, hence the caution with which the Court 
endorses the principle of a factual precedent.17 Many Country Guideline panels 
of the Tribunal appear to be blind to the issue. 
16 For an excellent discussion of the conflict in approach between lawyers and others, see 
Anthony Good, Expert Evidence in Asylum and Human Rights Appeals: an Experts View (2004) 
IJRL vol. 16, no. 3, 358, in particular paragraphs 29 to 46. 
17 See the effectively comprehensive chapter and the expert evidence chapter in which the 
proper approach is discussed and regarding the desirability, particularly in Country Guideline 
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The artificiality of the concept of legal certainty really matters in what Laws LJ 
called the exotic notion of a factual precedent. On a case by case basis, there 
is no avoiding the need for a judge or tribunal to make what become concrete 
factual findings despite only being, say, 51% sure that they are true  truth also 
being a somewhat quaint notion in itself to a non-lawyer.18 In SSHD v
Sivakumaran [1988] Imm AR 147 the House of Lords held that a claimant 
needed to demonstrate to a reasonable degree of likelihood that their fear was 
well-founded to succeed in a refugee claim. In Karanakaran the Court of Appeal 
developed this further by agreeing with the Tribunals view in Kaja [1995] Imm 
AR 1 that the Sivakumaran approach imbues uncertainty with a positive role in 
an asylum case. Facts do not need to be proven as such; the decision maker 
must somehow assess, without the device of a standard of proof and using all 
relevant evidence, whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood of future 
persecution.19
In setting a factual precedent, the judge or tribunal will not only impose this 
artificial certainty on the individual case  an unfortunate necessity in a legal 
context  but also on all subsequent similar cases. For example, in SK v SSHD
[2002] UKIAT 05613 the Tribunal held that Serbs are not generally persecuted 
in Croatia. SK in fact includes a thorough examination of the issues and 
evidence, but many Country Guideline determinations do not.20 The uncertainty 
of the original findings in many of the Country Guideline determinations, 
something this report seeks to highlight, is quickly forgotten by subsequent 
decision-makers, who take the decision to be definitive.21 The Tribunal need to 
be acutely conscious of the problem in designating any case a Country 
cases, of seeking evidential synthesis rather than the simplistic preferring of one opinion or 
report over another. 
18 See Anthony Good paper, supra. 
19 Karanakaran is one of the most misused, misquoted and misunderstood cases in the asylum 
jurisdiction. It does not, as seems to be commonly thought, impose a lower standard of proof. 
Rather, it suggests a sort of balancing exercise, where all relevant information and evidence is 
taken into consideration. 
20 See the effectively comprehensive chapter for examples. 
21 For an example of the danger of cascading artificial certainty, see RG (Risk-Return-Sikh) 
Afghanistan CG [2002] UKIAT 02130 and IB and TK Afghanistan [2004] UKIAT 00150, 
examined below. 
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Guideline case and subsequent users of the precedent must also be aware of 
the problem and be willing to and able to challenge a factual precedent. 
1.5 Cascading artificial certainty 
In any system where the burden rests on the claimant to establish his claim, 
there will inevitably be individual cases where the claimant is simply unable to 
do so for wont of evidence. As is discussed in the chapter on the adversarial 
system, it has been recognised at paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook and 
repeatedly in case law that this is a particular problem for asylum seekers. 
Several worrying examples of poor factual findings in Country Guideline cases 
are highlighted in later chapters. For instance, the Tribunals reliance on a 
misrepresented quote by CIPU from a US Department of State report in SSHD 
v MG (Angola CG) [2002] UKIAT 07360  the difference between the words 
routinely in the original and frequently by CIPU  is used as what seems to be 
the sole evidence to justify a finding that has been elevated to a factual 
precedent and is therefore considered to be binding on future decision 
makers.22 The dubious preference given to the evidence of one rather 
questionable source over all other sources in SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG)
[2003] UKIAT 00057 (Risk  Sikh  Women) is also considered by the Tribunal 
to be binding.23 In these cases and many others, the Tribunal has failed to apply 
S and Others and Karanakaran, has made controversial findings and has then 
imposed these findings on all future decision makers. Artificial notions of 
certainty are very clearly being cascaded. 
In a number of Country Guideline cases, the Tribunal has found that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a claimants contention and has therefore been 
forced in the individual case to dismiss the appeal. This is unavoidable in some 
22 A related discussion of the Tribunals use of semantic distinctions to undermine expert 
evidence is contained in the chapter on expert evidence. 
23 The Tribunals thoughtful and thorough decision in NS (Social Group  Women  Forced 
marriage) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 goes some way to reversing the earlier Country 
Guideline case. The subsequent case only serves to highlight the extreme inadequacies of the 
earlier determination, however, and causes one to wonder how many claims were dismissed in 
the meantime. 
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cases. Bizarrely, however, the Tribunal has then taken that lack of evidence and 
elevated its negative findings to Country Guideline status, thereby seeking to 
bind the IAA to a factual precedent based on the absence of evidence rather 
than the analysis of evidence. This is hardly what the Court of Appeal had in 
mind in S and Others. 
For example, in FE (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 00115 (Risk-minority group-
Yemeni background) the Tribunal designates the case as being a Country 
Guideline one despite the central findings that: 
There was no mention [in the CIPU report] of the Yemeni minority clan 
or the Ridaaci  The Tribunal have not been pointed to any particular 
background evidence relating to the Ridaaci or a minority group 
comprising Yemeni Somalis to show that they are at any particular risk.  
Similarly, MB (Latvia CG) [2003] UKIAT 00209 (Homosexual  Military Service) 
is based on the absence of evidence, but the Tribunal goes further by 
commenting that it would expect there to be some from an organisation with 
unknown funding and resourcing and that certainly does not exist to meet the 
United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunals evidential needs in determining 
asylum claims: 
16. No evidence has been provided by the Appellant that a gay man, 
either in the military, or in prison, would receive worse treatment than a 
man who is not gay. We have been asked to simply accept that as true. 
We are not prepared to do that. Evidence is required and there is none. 
Had there been a serious problem we would have expected evidence to 
be forthcoming, in particular from the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association 
 
18. In our view there is no sufficient evidence, even on the Appellant's 
own account, that he is at real risk of persecution, or ill-treatment 
amounting to a breach of Article 3 when he is returned to Latvia. We 
have found that there is little likelihood that he will be required to do his 
national service, or if he were, but refused, that he would be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment. Even if we are wrong about that there is no 
evidence before us that the treatment the Appellant, as a gay man, would 
receive, either in the army or in prison, would amount persecution or a 
breach of his rights under Article 3. We cannot assume, with no 
evidence, that to be the case. 
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A little research reveals that ILGA is a coalition of 400 organisations worldwide, 
of which one is based in Latvia.24  ILGA have a request form for information and 
provide email, telephone and postal contact details. The Latvian organisations 
website is entirely written in Latvian, reasonably enough. It may well be the 
case that there is specific information available, but that neither the claimants 
representative nor the Tribunal has checked. The Tribunals passivity is 
regrettable but perhaps inevitable in an ordinary case, but it is very damaging in 
a Country Guideline case which imposes an additional burden of proof on future 
claimants. 
In WO (Nigeria CG) [2004] UKIAT00277 (Ogboni cult) the Tribunal goes a lot 
further and states that it would definitely expect to find information about a 
secret society in unspecified types of objective documentary evidence: 
[20] It is a central feature of the Appellant's claim that the Ogboni were 
able to launch with impunity a series of direct, physical attacks upon him, 
his father, uncle, political associate, employees, home and other 
property, and that the final straw came when he apprehended that the 
Ogboni were intent upon having him taken into custody and murdered. If 
these were truly the sorts of activities in which the Ogboni are engaged in 
Nigeria, it frankly beggars belief that there would not be, amongst the 
objective documentary evidence, some express acknowledgement of the 
fact. Yet there is none. 
The claimants representative pointed out in this case that such murders could 
easily be hidden in the high numbers of politically-motivated murders and the 
various abuses committed by the police. The Tribunal addresses the point by 
going on to find that: 
If any political violence in Nigeria has an Ogboni element, the objective 
materials would say so. Given the restricted ambit of the cult and the 
virile nature of the Nigerian press, silence on the issue cannot be 
ascribed to fear. 
Worse is the case of TB (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00159, where the Tribunal 
holds that the absence of objective evidence on blood feuds arising from traffic 
24 See www.ilga.org/aboutilga.asp. The Latvian organisations website is at: www.gay.lv. 
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accidents means that such blood feuds do not exist.25 This was despite expert 
evidence before the Tribunal that traffic accidents have caused blood feuds and 
a comment in the 2002 Refugee Women and Domestic Violence Country Study 
on Albania that: 
A blood feud can start over any number of causes  an toward advance 
to a woman or the killing of a sheep dog  Even drivers responsible for 
traffic accidents have been killed by their victims families.26
It is unknown whether this report was before the Tribunal. The Tribunals 
comments are clearly not definitive and it is highly questionable whether the 
Tribunal should seek to impose its view of what conclusions to draw from an 
alleged lack of evidence. As with the other examples, the Tribunal assumes that 
evidence would be available without any recognition of the unlikelihood of such 
specific objective evidence existing, but here actually rejects expert evidence 
on this basis. The example also highlights the problems arising from an 
adversarial environment and the Tribunals approach to claimants expert 
evidence, dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
The Tribunals own answer to the use of these examples would presumably be 
that if evidence is produced, it will be considered. This does not explain why 
such cases have been elevated to Country Guideline status, though, where the 
duty to be effectively comprehensive applies. The function of these negative 
findings is elusive and it is difficult to see what the Tribunal has added here to 
the determinations of adjudicators in individual cases. A precedent appears to 
have been set for its own sake. 
The examples also highlight a common problem with Tribunal (and adjudicator) 
determinations, Country Guideline or not. The Tribunal sometimes slips into 
assuming that the world revolves around its evidential needs. The above 
comments indicate a profound lack of awareness on the part of the Tribunal of 
25 [25] if there were any significant instances of blood feuds arising in the capital city of 
Albania, Tirana, following vehicular accidents of a kind with which we are here concerned, the 
Tribunal considers that there would be specific objective evidence of these. 
26 Refugee Womens Resource Project, Refugee Women and Domestic Violence: Country 
Studies: Albania (September 2001, updated March 2002) 
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the kinds of evidence that are actually available for certain countries and 
covering certain issues. Tribunal members are accustomed to evidence being 
presented to them and may well as a result have a good knowledge of issues 
and events in many countries. This issue is more fully explored in the chapter 
on expert evidence, but it is crucial that the Tribunal is aware of the limits on its 
own knowledge and experience. Presumably, Tribunal members have little or 
no professional training or experience in researching and finding country 
evidence, nor do they have proper research resources.27 Trained and 
professional human rights and academic researchers may be aware through 
hard-won experience of the kinds of evidence that are available but, with 
respect, the Tribunal is not. Reading the evidence presented to it in a bundle or 
even occasionally looking up internet reports from major human rights bodies 
does not impart research skills and this limited experience does not entitle the 
Tribunal to make judgments about the types of evidence that might be available. 
In its misplaced enthusiasm to set factual precedents on common asylum 
issues, the Tribunal has rushed headlong into selecting inappropriate cases, 
has proceeded to determine them in ways that do not meet the stringent 
standards of S and Others and has ignored the realities of the adversarial 
system (discussed in depth in later chapters). These flawed cases then become 
binding and future claimants have to distinguish their own cases, despite the 
fact that the Country Guideline case is based on no submissions and often 
drastically incomplete evidence. This is at a time when the Legal Services 
Commission imposes strict limits on case preparation time and the number of 
unrepresented claimants is rising. The Country Guideline determinations load 
the already weighty burden of proof further against future claimants with similar 
facts. Country Guidance cases should not be lightly issued and should not be 
issued at all where the findings are as speculative and incomplete as is the 
case with the above examples. 
27 Research resources ought to include proper internet research skills, access to academic 
databases and to a number of subscription-only information sources. Even database sites like 
EIN and ECOI.net are far from comprehensive. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
The Tribunal, adjudicators and representatives need to be more aware of the 
artificiality of the whole concept of legal certainty in asylum cases and the 
danger that Country Guideline cases will propagate artificial notions of certainty 
that are actually based on no evidence, incomplete evidence and/or out-of-date 
evidence, findings made on points that did not arise in the appeal in question 
and, on top of all this, inadequate analysis of the evidence that is presented to 
the Tribunal in an individual Country Guideline case. S and Others recognised 
that the exotic notion of a factual precedent carried dangers with it. The 
Tribunal has failed, spectacularly so in some cases, to respect the careful and 
considered guidance given by the Court of Appeal. 
The Tribunal needs to be willing to remove CG designation from cases when it 
is appropriate to do so and keep the Country Guideline cases under active 
review. It also needs to be far more willing not to go ahead and designate an 
individual case as having Country Guideline status if it transpires during or 
before the hearing that for one of many reasons it would not be appropriate to 
do so. 
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-- CHAPTER TWO -- 
An effectively comprehensive analysis? 
Natasha Carver∗
...when [the Immigration Appeal Tribunal] determines to produce an 
authoritative ruling upon the state of affairs in any given territory, it must in our 
view take special care to see that its decision is effectively comprehensive. It 
should address all the issues in the case capable of having a real, as opposed 
to fanciful, bearing on the result and explain what it makes of the substantial 
evidence going to each such issue. 
S & Others [2002] INLR 416, 29
When the Court of Appeal approved in S & Others of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal (IAT) producing factual precedent determinations regarding country 
conditions rather than more conventional legal precedents, it specified that the 
IAT would need to take particular care to be thorough in its examination of the 
issues  the key phrase being effectively comprehensive. This approach was 
accepted and approved by the Tribunal in SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of 
Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007 (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) where the 
Tribunal quotes from S & Others and comments that having been tasked with 
reaching an authoritative decision on this issue, we saw it as essential to ensure 
we took cognisance of all materials having a bearing on the issue.28 However, 
the analysis of the materials before the IAT in the majority of the three hundred-
odd Country Guideline cases29 frequently falls considerably short of 
comprehensive. This is partly explained by the practice of retrospectively 
making cases into Country Guideline cases. It is also applicable to many of the 
decisions heralded even before their hearings as Country Guideline cases. 
One of the two primary reasons given for the practice of Country Guideline 
cases is to ensure consistency in decision-making (the other being to save 
∗ Natasha Carver is Senior Research Officer at the Immigration Advisory Service (currently on 
maternity leave). She has previously worked representing IAS clients at the Immigration 
Appellate Authority. She edited the IAS analyses of the Home Office Country Reports 
(September 2003 and September 2004), and has contributed articles to the International 
Journal of Refugee Law, the Immigration Law Digest and the Refugee Councils Inexile. 
28 SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007, paragraph 1 
29 There were just under 300 at the time of writing. This figure varies as cases are promulgated 
and some are removed. 
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public time and money by avoiding the need to revisit country conditions 
repeatedly). As the Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, stated in Manzeke v SSHD 
[1997] Imm AR 524, consistency in the treatment of asylum seekers is 
important in so far as objective considerations, not directly affected by the 
circumstances of the individual asylum seeker are involved.30 This was further 
elucidated by the Court of Appeal in S & Others: such revisits give rise to the 
risk, perhaps the likelihood, of inconsistent results; and the likelihood, perhaps 
the certainty, of repeated and, therefore, wasted expenditure of judicial and 
financial resources upon the same issues and the same evidence.31 In Shirazi v 
SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562 the Court of Appeal was highly critical of the 
Tribunal for allowing the development of lines of very different findings based on 
similar facts. The relevant paragraph from the judgment of Laws LJ is worth 
quoting in full: 
I accept readily that it is not a ground of appeal that a different 
conclusion was open to the tribunal below on the same facts, nor 
therefore that another tribunal has reached a different conclusion on very 
similar facts. But it has to be a matter of concern that the same political 
and legal situation, attested by much the same in-country data from case 
to case, is being evaluated differently by different tribunals. The latter 
seems to me to be the case in relation to religious apostasy in Iran. The 
differentials we have seen are related less to the differences between 
individual asylum-seekers than to differences in the Tribunal's reading of 
the situation on the ground in Iran. This is understandable, but it is not 
satisfactory. In a system which is as much inquisitorial as it is 
adversarial, inconsistency on such questions works against legal 
certainty. That does not mean that the situation cannot change, or that 
an individual's relationship to it does not have to be distinctly gauged in 
each case. It means that in any one period a judicial policy (with the 
flexibility that the word implies) needs to be adopted on the effect of the 
in-country data in recurrent classes of case.32
It seems safe to assume that the Court is here and elsewhere encouraging 
consistently good decision making, which is behind the enhanced duty to be 
effectively comprehensive discussed in S & Others. In order for the IAT to 
establish credibly that the Country Guideline cases promote consistency and 
that this is a positive virtue, it must produce cases characterised by a thorough 
30 Bambagu Manzeke v SSHD [1997] Imm AR 524, decision of Lord Woolf, MR. 
31 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 28. 
32 Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562, paragraph 29. 
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and meticulous approach to the country of origin materials. If there is no 
consistency in the quality of analysis, consistency in decision-making becomes 
injurious rather than virtuous. 
The central premise on which S & Others reached the Court of Appeal was that 
the Tribunal had failed to take into account two reports by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation in Croatia. The submission by Nicholas Blake QC 
for the claimants was that the two reports were material of very considerable 
importance in the context of these appeals, cutting across the grain of other 
material on which the IAT particularly chose to rely  [I]t was incumbent on the 
IAT to state in express terms what it made of them.33 The Court of Appeal 
agreed with this submission, clarifying that while the reports were merely one 
piece of evidence and there was no obligation to refer to every piece of 
evidence, this particular case was different because the Tribunal intended it to 
be determinative i.e. to be a Country Guideline case, and as such they had an 
added duty to make sure the decision was effectively comprehensive.34 The 
Court of Appeal went on to give guidance on what constitutes effectively 
comprehensive analysis of material. The key factors can be summarised as 
follows and are addressed in the following distinct sections:  
2.1 What?  Referencing of materials in determinations.  
2.2 When?  Using the most recent reports. 
2.3 Why?  Giving reasons for preference of one source over another. 
2.4 How?  Relationship between the materials considered and the 
conclusions reached.  
Many Country Guideline cases fail to meet these four requirements for an 
effectively comprehensive analysis. In particular, the Tribunal systematically 
fails in its duty to scrutinise country of origin evidence with even-handed 
33 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 16. 
34 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraphs 24-32. 
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thoroughness. The Tribunal frequently ignores the most recent and most 
relevant material in preference for material submitted by the Secretary of State, 
to which it rarely gives any scrutiny whatsoever. This preference persists even 
when the source material of the Secretary of State is before the Tribunal and it 
conflicts with the Secretary of States interpretation or spin. It is often difficult 
and sometimes impossible to see how conclusions were reached based on the 
material in question. Lastly, it is common to find evidence submitted on behalf of 
the claimant rejected out of hand with little or no explanation.  
2.1 What?  Referencing of materials in determinations 
In order for the Tribunal to establish that it has given comprehensive 
consideration to the objective materials before it, the first simple step is to list 
those materials. There are several Country Guideline cases where this is done 
and this simple recitation immediately informs the practitioner of the breadth of 
material considered by the Tribunal.35 This practice also has the added value of 
highlighting to other representatives what material was not in front of the 
Tribunal.36 In S & Others, no reference whatsoever to the two key reports of the 
Special Rapporteur had been made at Tribunal level. Nicholas Blake QC for the 
claimants noted that it appeared from the determination that the IAT had not 
read the reports at all.37 This was in effect the sole basis for the Court of 
Appeals decision to remit the case to be re-heard by the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal itself has criticised Adjudicators for failing to reference the 
evidence on which the decision is based. In SSHD v FM (Kosovo CG) [2004] 
UKIAT 00081 (FIA  Mixed Marriage  Albanian  Ashkaelian) the Tribunal 
comments the Adjudicator not only failed to identify the sourcing of the 
35 See for example NM v SSHD (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 04263 (MDC). 
36 Although it should be noted that the Tribunal have encouraged Adjudicators to refer to certain 
key human rights reports (they list UNHCR, US Department of State, and Amnesty 
International) even if their attention has not been drawn specifically to them: [there is] 
documentation which all Adjudicators should pay regard to in every asylum appeal which comes 
before them whether their attention is drawn to it or not. They are aware of it and therefore must 
take it into account. If they do not do so they have not give the appeal that anxious scrutiny 
which is required in every determination. Sukhera 13018 (23 February 1996), quoted in Symes, 
M. and Jorro, P., The Law Relating to Asylum in the UK (London 2000), p.688-689. 
37 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 12. 
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objective material upon which she relied but failed to correlate her assessment 
of the background material to her conclusion that the respondent would be at 
risk on return.38 However, the same criticism can be levelled at the Tribunal 
itself, even in cases that it has deemed sufficiently comprehensive to elevate to 
Country Guideline status. In A v SSHD (Ethiopia CG) UKIAT 00046 (Ethnicity  
Eritrean  Country Conditions) the Tribunal provided what appears to be a 
complete list at the outset, but then engaged in substantial analysis of an 
unnamed article which claimed that the peace process between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea had broken down:39
Mr. McCarthy submitted that the word "breakdown" in this article is 
significant. We do not, however, consider that the evidence is that the 
peace process has "broken down", although we accept that there are 
problems with the peace process.  It is presumptuous to suggest that, 
simply because the article on page 146 uses the word "breakdown", this 
means that the peace process has indeed broken down.40
As can be seen above, this discussion was heavily semantic in nature. The 
Tribunal decided that the use of the phrase breakdown with reference to the 
peace process did not actually mean the peace process had broken down, 
thereby dismissing a key plank of evidence submitted on behalf of the 
claimant.41 The article in question is not listed at the outset nor is any full 
information on its provenance supplied in the body of the determination.42 This 
is far from the worst example and at least the Tribunal did attempt to list 
relevant material at the outset, unlike in many other Country Guideline cases. It 
could be argued that a list of materials before the Tribunal is unnecessary if the 
Tribunal makes it clear which documents it is relying on when it reaches its 
conclusions and gives its reasons for attaching less weight to those it does not 
rely on. However, this fails to present the complete picture to the future claimant 
or practitioner, who will not be able to tell whether the case can be challenged 
38 SSHD v FM (Kosovo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00081 (FIA  Mixed Marriage  Albanian  
Ashkaelian), paragraph 24 and see 19. 
39 See A v SSHD (Ethiopia CG) UKIAT 00046, paragraphs 9, 30-32. 
40 A v SSHD (Ethiopia CG) UKIAT 00046, paragraph 31. 
41 Further examples of the Tribunals use of semantic distinctions are discussed a 
42 It seems likely, following some clues in the determination and an internet search, that this 
article is Clash on tense Horn border BBC News (3 November 2003), however, this cannot be 
confirmed with any confidence. 
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because the materials before the Tribunal were not comprehensive. It also 
undermines faith in whether the Tribunal has reached a fair decision.  
2.2 When?  Using the most recent reports 
The two reports of the UN Special Rapporteur stood out for consideration in S & 
Others not just because of their provenance, but because they constituted the 
most recent material before the Tribunal. The Court of Appeal commented:  
In the circumstances we entertain no doubt but that, if the IATs duty to 
give reasons in a determination of this kind is of the nature and quality 
we have sought to describe, its failure to explain what it made of the 
[Special Rapporteur] reports means that the duty has not been fulfilled. 
The position is the more stark given the IATs own observation at 
paragraph 25 of the S determination, [s]ince the situation is somewhat 
fluid and improvements are undoubtedly occurring, it is necessary to look 
particularly at the most recent reports.43
This comment goes right to the core of the IATs somewhat unusual judicial 
powers in that it is not only able to consider material that was not before the 
Adjudicator, but indeed has an obligation to consider the most recent material 
available. Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97 established this principle, 
which was then enshrined in law at s.77 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999, and then at s.85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
In VD v SSHD (Albania CG) UKIAT 00115 (Trafficking) a complete list of the 
material before the IAT is helpfully provided. This included a report from the 
European Commission dated 30th March 2004. The case was heard on the 5th
April 2004 and this report was the most recent before the Tribunal. Indeed, 
apart from the US Department of State report of February 2004 (on conditions 
in 2003), it was the only report before the Tribunal from 2004. There is no 
further reference to this report in the text of the determination and it seems clear 
from the text that its contents were not considered, just as was the case with 
Special Rapporteur reports in S & Others. Faith in the Tribunals conclusions 
that there is sufficiency of protection for victims of trafficking is inevitably 
43 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 31. 
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severely undermined by this; a very recent report from a very respectable 
source which directly addresses the issues under discussion (the rule of law in 
Albania, practical realities and government strategies) is not even quoted once. 
Instead the Tribunal chose to rely largely on the CIPU (Country Information and 
Policy Unit) report (dated October 2003, over six months before the hearing and 
quoting largely from reports produced earlier that year) and the US Department 
of State report. Faith in this determination is lost even further upon reading the 
European Commission report, as it provides information on the state of policing, 
corruption and impunity that paints a far more negative picture of the availability 
of protection than that given in the CIPU report,44 and clarifies the views of the 
US Department of State.45 Obviously it is arguable whether a thorough reading 
of the report would have made for a different conclusion, but the fact that it was 
not even considered or referenced means that VD v SSHD (Albania CG) UKIAT 
00115 (Trafficking) is not sufficiently authoritative to warrant Country Guideline 
status and comply with the decision in S & Others. 
A further issue which arises in relation to the Ravichandran principle is the 
complete absence of recent material at a hearing. It is a clear failure of duty to 
44 The sections on trafficking in the Albania Country Assessment CIPU (October 2003) were 
specifically criticised by UNHCR Tirana, which urged CIPU to add to paragraph 6.113 
Particularly problematic was the governments reluctance to recognise that Albania continues to 
be a major country of origin and at 6.115 to add prosecution of traffickers continued to be the 
weakest link in the system and that the absence of a witness protection system [..] hindered 
investigations. See CIPU response to APCI Consultation reply, Consultee: UNHCR Tirana: 
received 30 January 2004 Advisory Panel on Country Information: 2nd Meeting (2 March 2004), 
Annex http://www.apci.org.uk/
45 For example: On Policing and Corruption: The police remain weak. Training activities have 
not yet had the expected impact and need to be continued. Community policing has to be 
strengthened. [4.4.4]; At the present stage, the police are not able to satisfactorily guarantee 
consistent enforcement of the law in accordance with international standards, and public 
confidence in the police remains low. [4.4.4]; Corruption in Albania remains a serious problem. 
According to the 2003 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Albania has a 
score of 2.5 out of 10 (where a country free of perceived corruption receives 10 points on the 
scale), ranking 92 out of 133 countries. [2.1.2]. On Prosecution/Impunity: The rule of law in 
Albania remains deficient. Albanian law enforcement bodies do not yet guarantee consistent 
enforcement of the law, in accordance with international standards. Widespread corruption and 
organised crime continue to be serious threats to the stability and progress of the country. 
Further efforts are needed to ensure respect of human rights. [2.1]; The overall performance of 
the judicial system is poor, as is its perception amongst the general public. [2.1.2]; Little 
progress has been made in Albania as regards general respect for the rule of law. The rule of 
law remains adversely affected by the weaknesses of the judicial system and public 
administration as well as organised crime and corruption. [2.1.2]; Prosecution is slow. [4.4.5] 
See Albania: Stabilisation and Association Report 2004 European Commission (30 March 
2004). 
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set a binding factual precedent based on out-of-date material. In many cases 
the material is two or three years old, with the worse offender using material 
over forty years old.46
2.3 Why?  Reasons for preferring one source over another 
The Court of Appeal stated in S & Others that the Tribunal would need to 
explain what it makes of the substantial evidence going to each  issue when 
setting factual precedents. This approach was again implicitly and explicitly 
accepted in SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 
00007: in seeking to assess the new evidence to hand since M, we have asked 
ourselves the following question. What sources among the many placed before 
us can we attach most weight to and why?47 However, the Tribunal frequently 
fails to take this crucial step in explaining what it makes of the evidence before it 
on each of the central issues. For example, in AM v SSHD (Afghanistan CG)
[2004] UKIAT 00004 (Risk  Warlord  perceived Taliban) the relevant section 
reads: 
Mr Keating sought to persuade us that materials before the Adjudicator 
other than the CIPU October 2002 report and the Human Rights Watch 
did compel a different conclusion. We fail to see this.48
There is no further discussion of these other materials, what they were, what 
they said, why the Tribunal felt that they led to the same conclusion or anything 
else relating to this. Whilst this level of comment might be acceptable in an 
ordinary Tribunal case, it is not sufficient in a case which sets factual 
precedents and does not meet the standards required by the Court of Appeal.  
In S & Others the Court of Appeal indicated that reports from prominent bodies 
should be examined and reasons should be given why, if this is the case, one 
source may be preferred over another. Furthermore, if a source is found to be 
deficient in some way, case law has it that the source should not be discarded 
46 See WO v SSHD (Nigeria CG) [2004] UKIAT 00227 (Ogboni cult), discussed later. 
47 SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007, paragraph 51. 
48 AM v SSHD (Afghanistan CG) [2004] UKIAT00004 (Risk  Warlord  perceived Taliban), 
paragraph 19. 
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in its entirety, but that less weight should be attributed to the report and the 
conclusions should be reached taking all the evidence together as a whole.49
The Tribunal must seek a synthesis of the evidence, not simply prefer one 
report over another. This point was made by Laws J in R v Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal, ex p Demisa: 
not necessarily to decide which of conflicting documentary evidence 
was to be preferred but where there were divergent opinions from 
reputable human rights organisations about the conditions in a country 
this may well be sufficient to indicate the presence of a risk of 
persecution. Rather we must examine in depth whether the documents 
are inconsistent and assess for ourselves whether there is a serious 
possibility that documents apparently inconsistent may nevertheless be 
credible. In other words we must apply the Kaja test to the documentary 
evidence as much as to the other evidence.50
As Sedley LJ said in Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271, everything capable of 
having a bearing has to be given the weight, great or little, due to it.51 The 
Country Guideline cases examined below reveal a shocking disregard for this 
approach. The material of the Secretary of State is consistently given 
preference over all other material, even when it is lacking in relevance, detail 
and/or is older than other material before the Tribunal. When sources are 
considered by the Tribunal to have applied the wrong test or to have an axe to 
grind, their evidence is usually rejected altogether. The Secretary of States 
evidence appears to be regarded as unimpeachably neutral. 
Treatment of reports from the Home Office Country Information and Policy 
Unit (CIPU) 
Discussion over the country material relating to each central issue of a case will 
necessarily involve some consideration of the provenance of that material. 
Interpreting from the starred decision A v SSHD (Pakistan) [2002] UKIAT 
49 The joint judgement observed that giving greater weight to one matter indicated that less 
weight was being given to another, but that attribution of lesser weight was not the equivalent of 
rejection. Brooke LJ commenting on the Australian case of Wu Shan Liang [1996] 185 CLR 259 
in Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271, paragraph 82. 
50 Quoted in Hassen (15558), quoted in Symes, M. and Jorro, P., The Law Relating to Asylum in 
the UK (London 2000), p.728 
51 Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271, paragraph 137. 
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00439,52 the Court of Appeal in Farshid Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1562 
commented that, when considering documents produced on behalf of the 
claimant, in the majority of cases the issue is not whether the document in 
question is forged or authentic, but whether it is reliable or not. This distinction 
is vital. Documents produced may be on the right paper, even with the right 
stamps or signature but may be unreliable because of the way in which they are 
procured.53 In the same manner, this point embraces so-called objective 
country materials so that a source of information, be it an expert, a human rights 
organisation or a news article, has to prove not authenticity, but reliability. As 
stated by the Tribunal in SSHD v S: 
In all cases, we have to distil the facts from the various reports and 
documents. Bodies responsible for producing reports may have their own 
agenda and sources are not always reliable: People will sometimes 
believe what they want to believe and, aware of that, those with axes to 
grind may feed willing recipients. Many reports do their best to be 
objective. Often and inevitably they will recount what is said to have 
happened to individuals. They will select the incidents they wish to 
highlight. Such incidents may be wholly accurately reported, but not 
always. This means that there will almost always be differences of 
emphasis in various reports and sometimes contradictions. It is always 
helpful to know what sources have been used, but that may be 
impossible since, for obvious reasons, sources are frequently anxious 
not to be identified. We are well aware of criticisms that can be and have 
been levelled at some reports and are able to evaluate all the material 
which is put before us in this way.54
Whilst this approach is applied scrupulously to material submitted on behalf of 
the claimant, the same cannot be said for that submitted by the Secretary of 
State. The CIPU (Country Information and Policy Unit, part of the Immigration 
and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office) Assessments, Reports and 
Bulletins have previously been accepted without question as reliable 
documents, despite the fact that they are produced by one side in an 
adversarial process. In the starred determination Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] 
UKIAT 00702, the Tribunal panel deconstructed a report adduced on behalf of 
the claimant from the Medical Foundation and specifically found that it could not 
52 Previously Tanveer Ahmed. 
53 Farshid Shirazi v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ1562, paragraph 62. 
54 SSHD v S (01/TH/00632) 1 May 2001, paragraph 19.  
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be regarded as objective evidence because it was written as a response to 
Home Office refusals of Sri Lankan claimants: 
We must also add that this Report is structured as a reply to (or rebuttal 
of) the Home Office's reasons for refusing many Tamil asylum claims. 
Nobody could regard the whole report as anything other than partisan. It 
is written against the Respondent, by those who have taken the side of 
Appellants. In its proper place, it is none the worse for that. But it should 
not under any circumstances be regarded as 'objective evidence'.55
This was then compared directly with the Home Office material submitted on 
behalf of the Secretary of State: 
We note that the CIPU Bulletin is also a partisan document, in that it 
comes from an organ of the Respondent. It is, however, little more than a 
compendium of material from other published sources, which are listed in 
the bibliography. They range from reports of international organs, 
through various governmental bodies in Britain and abroad, to news 
reports around the world. The Bulletin is arranged in such a way that the 
source of each statement in it can readily be traced.56
Another example can be found in Badzo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04946 where 
the Tribunal stated that it considered counsel for the claimant to be wrong to 
stigmatise the CIPU report in the grounds of appeal as being self-serving. In 
the Tribunal's opinion, the CIPU report offers a balanced, objective and 
proportionate summary of evidence provided from a wide variety of sources, 
often with different viewpoints. The quotations are properly cited and can be 
checked against the references given.57 In this instance CIPU was being 
compared against selective quotations from academics or journalists without 
indication of their viewpoint or background, or from Roma or Roma related 
sources that cannot be considered as entirely objective.58
Both of these cases were heard before the first substantial critical appraisal of 
the CIPU reports was produced by IAS (the first in September 2003 and the 
55 Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 (13 March 2002), paragraph 74. 
56 Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 (13 March 2002), paragraph 75. 
57 Badzo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04946 (23 October 2002), paragraph 16. 
58 Badzo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04946 (23 October 2002), paragraph 15. 
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second in September 2004).59 Following these reports and the subsequent work 
of the Secretary of States Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) it can 
no longer be asserted with any faith that the source of each statement in [CIPU] 
can readily be traced or that CIPU reports offer a balanced, objective and 
proportionate summary of evidence. Indeed, despite major improvements seen 
between the April 2003 Country Assessments and the April 2004 Country 
Reports, it was still found that 12 out of the 23 Reports assessed were too 
unreliable to be used with any confidence. The Tribunal and wider judiciary 
continue, however, to rely on CIPU reports as if CIPU were an independent 
body and, often, as though the material contained in the reports was of 
impeccable quality.60
Following the production of these two critical analyses by IAS, it has become 
more common to see the claimants representative raising objections to the 
CIPU report. Within the Country Guideline cases a pattern emerges that 
suggests the Tribunal will only adopt an approach of doubt towards the CIPU 
report (although rarely even then at the same level of scrutiny applied to 
material submitted on behalf of the claimant) if such a doubt is raised as an 
issue. The following cases are illustrative.  
SSHD v DM (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00059 (Sufficiency of Protection  PSG 
 Women  Domestic Violence): 
In this connection we have been referred by Miss Brown to the latest 
October 2003 Albania Country Report produced by the Country 
Information and Policy Unit. This is a fully sourced report. It was before 
Mrs Charlton-Little. She did not seek to make any submissions to us that 
it was not to be relied on.61
59 See Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Assessments: An Analysis IAS (September 2003) 
and Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004). The 
points made in this research have been taken up by the Advisory Panel on Country Information, 
see www.apci.org.uk
60 This is seen implicitly in the many Country Guideline cases cited below, and also on 
occasions explicitly, see for example Saber v SSHD (Ct of Sessions) [2004] INLR 222-231 If for 
example, an adjudicator were to accept evidence from an appellant that was expressly 
contradicted by all sources of independent information such as the CIPU assessments, the 
Tribunal might well disturb the adjudicators finding. 
61 SSHD v DM (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00059 (Sufficiency of Protection  PSG  Women  
Domestic Violence), paragraph 15 (emphasis added) 
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HF v SSHD (Somalia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05520 (Persecution  Discrimination  
Yibir  Occupation  Caste): 
Mr Rhys-Davies criticised the Adjudicator for her heavy reliance upon 
the CIPU material, but as Mr Ekagha observed, Mr Rhys-Davies himself 
relied upon the CIPU material quite extensively in his submissions to us. 
The reason of course is that the CIPU reports draw upon many other 
sources, representing a variety of opinions and is properly sourced so 
that the conclusions can be evaluated in the light of their provenance. 
That is why CIPU reports are so useful and why they are so often 
quoted.62
SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007 (Risk  
Failed Asylum Seekers): 
Mr Buckley also sought support from the latest CIPU materials, the April 
2003 and October 2003 Assessments in particular. The criticism made of 
CIPU that it had not appended the Dutch and Belgian reports with their 
Bulletin was misplaced: the Bulletin was referenced and in any event 
both documents had been provided to the Tribunal. [..] Regarding the 
criticism made that CIPU was selective, even if that were true (which he 
did not accept) the Tribunal in this case had been provided with all the 
relevant source documents themselves.63
The above case forms an exception, in that it is very rare for the Tribunal to 
have in front of it the source material that the CIPU reports rely on.64 Without 
these primary sources, a Tribunals scrutiny of CIPU reports, if it does occur, is 
necessarily shallow. For example in AW v SSHD (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 
00111 (Article 3  Risk  General Situation), where the Tribunal does consider 
the Home Office to be a partisan source, it states: 
Nevertheless, it is clear from its terms that it is well-researched and fully 
sourced throughout. It attempts to provide a balanced assessment of the 
current position in Somalia, drawing for its information on a number of 
normally reliable and impartial sources. We are therefore satisfied that it 
62 HF v SSHD (Somalia CG) [2004] UKIAT 05520 (Persecution  Discrimination  Yibir  
Occupation  Caste), paragraph 12. 
63 SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007, paragraph 22 
64 A frequent exception to this is the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the US 
Department of State.  
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provides a reliable, reasonably impartial and up-to-date assessment of 
the current general position in Somalia.65
The Tribunal may observe that the report is sourced, but it is not in a position to 
know or investigate just how poorly sourced the report may be.66 The Tribunal 
may observe that the report carries a range of opinions from reputable sources, 
which indeed it does, but it is not in a position to know or investigate how 
selectively these sources have been quoted, often to the extent of complete 
misrepresentation.67 The Tribunal may observe that a particular sentence in a 
65 AW v SSHD (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 00111 (Article 3  Risk  General Situation), 
paragraph 25.  
66 Paragraph 1.2 of the Scope of the Document [CIPU April 2004] states that: a) All 
information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to original source material Paragraph 
1.4 of the Scope of the Document states that: b)The great majority of the source material is 
readily available in the public domain and Copies of other source documents, such as those 
provided by government offices, may be provided upon request. Paragraph 1.5 of the Scope of 
the Document states that: c) All sources have been checked for currency, and as far as can be 
ascertained, contain information, which remained relevant at the time this Report was issued. 
Some source documents have been included because they contain relevant information not 
available in more recent documents. Paragraph 1.6 of the Scope of the Document states that: 
d) Where sources identified in this Report are available in electronic form the relevant link has 
been included. None of the above statements is accurate for any of the 23 Country 
Reports checked by IAS. In the Report of Advisory Panel on Country Information consultation 
exercise on CIPU Country Reports October 2003 CIPU respond to this criticism by commenting 
Although errors of this kind do not, in our view, compromise the fundamental integrity of the 
Reports, they may undermine confidence in them and must be eradicated as far as possible. 
While IAS is very happy to note CIPUs determination to rid the report of these sourcing errors, 
we still believe that when a considerable amount of the material in a given Report is wrongly 
sourced, this completely undermines the integrity of that Report. [..] If an expert before the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal were to produce a report claiming that conditions in detention in 
France, for example, amounted to a breach of Article 3, and the IAT found that over 50% of the 
material did not come from the credible source that the expert had cited, the court would be 
unlikely to give much weight to the evidence of the expert, and the thesis that detention 
conditions in France were inhuman and degrading would remain unproven. When it is found 
that these credible sources actually state the opposite, as is often the case in CIPU Reports, the 
expert report would have to be considered as fundamentally flawed, lacking in integrity and 
would therefore be rejected in its entirety. The same would apply to a journalist writing an 
article, an academic writing a research paper or a student writing an essay. It is extremely 
difficult to understand why CIPU maintains that such errors do not affect the overall reliability of 
the reports. Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 
2004), pp.12-13 (emphasis added). 
67 In the [CIPU April 2004] Nigeria Country Report, on five separate occasions, CIPU have 
added sentences that give a significantly better impression of internal security than that 
contained in the source material. Three of these statements give evidence to the effect that the 
Nigerian police reacted in a timely and fair manner, one that the police were justified in their use 
of force, and the other that the government relies less than previously on the armed forces. On 
all of these occasions, it is claimed that this is the opinion of a particular source. However, not 
only was this opinion not offered by these sources, the opposite was true: the sources all 
testified to the inefficiency of the police, their unjustified use of force and the increase of reliance 
on the armed forces. This is such a serious breach of objectivity that it means the Nigeria 
Country Report is not a reliable document on which to assess asylum claims if those claims 
involve the question of availability of state protection, or police or state abuse.  Carver, N. (Ed.) 
Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004), pp.7-8 (original emphasis). 
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CIPU report emanates from a particular source, but it is not in a position to 
know whether this is actually the case (IAS found around 30% of the material 
from the April 2004 reports did not in fact come from the source claimed).68 The 
Tribunal may observe the date of the sources used by CIPU, but it is not in a 
position to know or investigate how often the CIPU report misrepresents the 
date of the document in question.69 A quote from the starred decision of Kacaj
[2002] Imm AR 21370 could well be applied to the CIPU reports: 
The so-called summary is in fact a distillation of all the observations 
favourable to Ms. Kacaj's claim rather than an objective summary. We 
deprecate the submission of a document in such a form since it is 
misleading and the adjudicator persuaded by it to find it unnecessary to 
look at the source documents to which it refers. Naturally, 
representatives are entitled to identify and draw attention to passages in 
reports which assist their case, but they must make it clear that this is 
what they are doing.71
The CIPU reports summarise country conditions in a manner that is misleading 
and favourable to the Secretary of State, making country conditions appear 
more positive than the sources of the report indicate.72 This is done in such a 
manner that the judiciary in general find it unnecessary to look at the source 
documents to which the reports refer. The reports do contain a disclaimer which 
reads: This Country Report has been produced by the Country Information and 
68 All reports contain unattributed statements. Some of these are literally left without a source, 
others have been credited to a source which does not give the relevant material as claimed. In 
some Country Reports this is so endemic as to give the reader serious doubts about the validity 
of the report. In the Iran Country Report in sections five and six alone there are 35 mis-sourced 
statements and 12 unsourced statements. In the Angola Country Report (sections 5, 6 and 
Annexes) there are 27 mis-sourced statements. In the Somalia Country Report there are 15 
mis-sourced statements. In the Iraq Country Report, mis-sourcing or misunderstanding the 
source accounts for 30% of the information checked. [..] Of particular concern is Serbia and 
Montenegro (including Kosovo) which is so badly sourced and edited as to raise serious doubts 
about the validity of the whole report. Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An 
Analysis IAS (September 2004), p.13. 
69 In the Nigeria Country Report, there were many times when the footnote had been amended 
to make the material from the US Department of State report for 2003, when in actual fact it was 
a direct quote from 2002 or 2001. With regard to Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo) 
there have been 21 documents released on the Amnesty International website on these 
countries since last year and not one of them is used or referenced in CIPUs April 2004 Report. 
Use of out of date material is also particularly problematic in the Algeria and Iran Country 
Reports. Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004), 
p.14. 
70 SSHD v Klodiana Kacaj; Klodiana Kacaj v SSHD [2002] Imm AR 213. 
71 Kacaj [2002] Imm AR 213, paragraph 31. 
72 Of the April 2004 CIPU reports of particular concern are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, China, 
Colombia, Congo (Republic of), Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe. See Carver, 
N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004). 
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Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, for use by 
Home Office officials involved in the asylum / human rights determination 
process.73 The fact that the reports are produced for their own officials, 
however, appears rarely to register with the Tribunal. Under a guise of balanced 
reporting and objectivity, the case for the Secretary of State is made.74 If the 
Tribunal perseveres in its assumption that CIPU is accurate and balanced then 
the only way to dislodge this blind faith is for the claimants representative to 
conduct hours of painstaking research. This is, of course, difficult if not 
impossible within Legal Services Commission funding restrictions.75 What the 
Tribunal could do is apply the same standard of doubt to the CIPU reports as is 
applied to other sources. Despite the criticisms raised by IAS and the 
overwhelming evidence presented to and highlighted by the Advisory Panel on 
Country Information on the matter of bias in CIPU reports,76 the Tribunal 
persists in accepting the Secretary of States word as verbatim truth, unless 
specifically challenged with strong evidence by the claimants representative. 
This often equates to the CIPU report being given the most weight out of all the 
reports before a Tribunal in any one case, even when that same Tribunal has 
accepted it to be wrong in particular instances.77 The same cannot be said for 
the reports of experts and many other bodies  as soon as one mistake has 
been made (i.e. to apply the wrong test), the Tribunal dismisses the evidence 
of the whole report, or give it so little weight as to render it worthless. 78 To 
return to the Tribunals language in SSHD v S, CIPU, just like any other report 
producing-body, have their own agenda and sources [which] are not always 
reliable. They may do their best to be objective but they will select the 
incidents they wish to highlight.79
73 Country Reports CIPU (April 2004), s.1.1 Scope of Document. 
74 The Secretary of State has openly declared his case to reduce the number of asylum 
seekers. See Home Office Autumn Performance Report 2004 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/autumnperformreport2004.pdf
75 As the Tribunal itself stated as long ago as Thivagurajah Balachandran v SSHD (17 
December 1999) 20262 It is for the parties to put before the Tribunal the material upon which 
they seek to rely in order to persuade the Tribunal that they have a good case. 
76 See information under 2nd and 3rd meetings on www.apci.org.uk
77 Dr Hugo Storey, Vice-president to the IAT, speaking at the IAS Conference in Leicester 
(September 2004) confirmed that even when particular passages of the CIPU report were found 
to be lacking, the Tribunal was still entitled in his opinion, to rely on other parts of the CIPU 
report.  
78 See the discussion in the chapter in expert evidence. 
79 SSHD v S (01/TH/00632) 1 May 2001, paragraph 19.  
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Given the above, Country Guideline cases that rely solely or mainly on CIPU 
reports have to be viewed in an extremely critical light, especially those that rely 
on the CIPU Assessments produced prior to October 2004, when some 
improvements were noticeably made. Due to resource constraints, it has not 
been possible to establish just how many of these there are, nor to research the 
issues in all of these cases, but a few examples serve to illustrate their diversity 
and frequency.  
In SSHD v MG (Angola CG) [2002] UKIAT 07360 the Tribunal appears only to 
have had the CIPU Assessments of Angola of April and October 2002 before it 
by way of country of origin material. In assessing prison conditions in Angola it 
relies solely on the CIPU reports which in turn rely exclusively on the US 
Department of State report for 2001. The case was heard on 19th December 
2002, some twelve months, therefore, after the period of assessment ended. 
Far worse, the US Department of State report has been selectively quoted and 
several key sentences have been omitted by CIPU. Language has also been 
altered so that where the US Department of State reads prison officials 
routinely beat detainees,80 the CIPU reports read prison officers  frequently
beat inmates.81 Whilst such a subtle change may appear innocuous to a lay 
person, those involved in asylum and human rights law are aware that this is a 
significant difference. Routinely could imply systematic, regular beatings and 
even official sanctioning, whereas frequently suggests that such activity 
happens often but at random and on the whim of an individual prison guard.82
The determination is now a factual precedent for the proposition that prison 
conditions in Angola are not bad enough to meet the Article 3 threshold. 
80 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 US Department of State (March 2002), 
Angola, s.1c. 
81 Angola Country Assessment CIPU (April 2002), s.4.40 ; and Angola Country Assessment 
CIPU (October 2002), s.5.26. 
82 This is a controversial area of law but the leading case is Batayav [2003] EWCA Civ 1489. 
See also Harari [2003] EWCA Civ 807 and for the Tribunals view see BE (Iran) [2004] UKIAT 
00183: It is clear that in order to show prison conditions would give rise to a real risk of serious 
harm, it is necessary to show a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of the 
human rights of prisoners. 
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Another example is found in WO v SSHD (Nigeria CG) [2004] UKIAT 00227 
(Ogboni cult). The basis for the decision that there is no evidence of murderous 
activities by the Ogboni, that it does not have significant power in Nigerian civil 
society and it only operates within the Yoruba tribe, is the CIPU report of April 
2004. Out of the five paragraphs in this report which deal with the Ogboni, four 
of them rely on  as cited by CIPU  The Yoruba Ogboni Cult in Oyo Peter 
Morton Williams.83 No date is given for this report by CIPU, but in fact it is dated 
1960.84 The other two sources used in the five paragraphs, both from the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, are dated May 1991 and May 1993. 
The Tribunals findings on these matters in this case are primarily based on a 
report written in 1960, with supportive evidence from reports which were 
thirteen years and eleven years old at the date of the hearing. This case is a 
current Country Guideline case which today (December 2004) sets the 
benchmarks by which similar cases stand or fail. 
In SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214 (Kosovo  
Roma) the grounds of appeal included the point that the Adjudicator failed to 
take note of the relevant CIPU report, and hence the Tribunal concentrates on 
that report.85 It goes on, however, to base its conclusions almost entirely on that 
report, at the expense of relevant material from other bodies such as UNHCR, 
Human Rights Watch and the Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of 
Europe. In the CIPU report, the Tribunal reads evidence from two reputable 
sources  the US Department of State report and the UN Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo  that the number of incidents of violence against minorities 
had decreased significantly and that whilst there was still a low level 
background of inter-ethnic violence, most crime was now considered to be 
83 Country Report on Nigeria CIPU (April 2004), Annex D  References to Source Material, 
source 85. 
84 Morton-Williams, P. The Yoruba Ogboni cult in Oyo AFRICA, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (1960), pp. 
362-374.  
85 The Secretary of State's grounds of appeal allege, in summary, that there was a failure by 
the Adjudicator to consider some of the relevant background material, in particular the relevant 
CIPU Paper on Serbia and Montenegro which was in the bundle before him on the Secretary of 
State's behalf. It was also said that he had not made credibility findings on a number of relevant 
issues. [..] We accept that first point and Miss Chuni could scarcely resist it. The Adjudicator's 
consideration of the background material was inadequate; he had ignored the relevant CIPU 
Paper. He gave no reason for doing so. We have accordingly examined all the background 
material. SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraphs 11-12. 
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economically motivated.86 Both of these are reported accurately, but CIPU have 
not updated the material  the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
dated October 2002 (CIPU used the July 2002 report) notes that there were 
again ethnically motivated crimes.87  CIPU asserts that inter-ethnic violence 
was of a low-level and this translates into the Tribunals conclusion that the 
incidence of attacks against the Roma does not appear to be high.88 In a non-
exhaustive list of selective security incidents involving minorities, UNHCR listed 
136 separate incidents between January 2003 and April 2004 (with the March 
violence contained in a separate appendix).89 It might be the case that the 
Tribunals conclusions could be justified. As with many other Country Guideline 
findings, however, the failure to analyse and engage with the evidence in a 
critical manner leaves the reader confident neither that the conclusions reached 
are justified nor justifiable (see below for further discussion on this point). 
The CIPU report in question in FD is credited by the Tribunal for draw[ing] on a 
wide range of sources including UNHCR and Amnesty International90 and yet, 
rather contrarily, the opinion of UNHCR was actually rejected by the Tribunal91
and other sources presented by the claimants representative were ignored in 
the Tribunals analysis or openly dismissed (see below). The Tribunals criticism 
of the Adjudicator concerning his use of the CIPU report is as follows: 
The Secretary of State's grounds of appeal allege, in summary, that 
there was a failure by the Adjudicator to consider some of the relevant 
background material, in particular the relevant CIPU Paper on Serbia and 
Montenegro which was in the bundle before him on the Secretary of 
State's behalf. It was also said that he had not made credibility findings 
on a number of relevant issues.  We accept that first point and Miss 
Chuni could scarcely resist it. The Adjudicator's consideration of the 
background material was inadequate; he had ignored the relevant CIPU 
86 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 25, based on 
Serbia and Montenegro Country Assessment CIPU (October 2003), s.K.6.31. 
87 Report of the Secretary General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United 
Nations (9 October 2002). 
88 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 50. 
89 Update on the Kosovo Roma, Ashkaelia, Egyptian, Serb, Bosniak, Gorani and Albanian 
communities in a minority situation' UNHCR  (1 June 2004) Appendix 1: Non-exhaustive list of 
selected security incidents involving minorities, January 2003  April 2004 
90 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 43. 
91 See SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 54. 
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Paper. He gave no reason for doing so. We have accordingly examined 
all the background material.92
The Tribunal appears to be specifically criticising the Adjudicator for taking the 
information straight from the horses mouth, rather than through the CIPU 
distillation. It is not clear why a selective compilation of parts of sources such as 
UNHCR would be more reliable than those sources themselves. Nor is it clear 
why weight should be placed on those sources which are effectively approved 
by CIPU but not on those which it has ignored. 
Similarly, in SSHD v YP (Sri Lanka CG) [2003] UKIAT 00145 (Maintenance  
Detention records), the Tribunal criticises the Adjudicator for choosing not to 
rely on the CIPU report: 
[The Adjudicators] analysis  starts with the observation that "the CIPU 
report of April 2002 suggests that peace process is in place and 
therefore it is safe to return Tamils to Sri Lanka. This document is 
general in nature and only has a small section on the peace process." He 
then appears to ignore what was in the CIPU report but devoted a 
number of pages of the determination to a summary of a report from the 
Refugee Council of the United Kingdom. In the light of this he concluded 
that "The peace process, if there is one, is fragile; many previous peace 
agreements were dishonoured by the Singhala government; therefore 
asylum seekers may be unwilling to trust the Singhala government any 
more... the Armed Forces of the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE on the 
ground level do not appear to observe the letter let alone the spirit of the 
agreement; there continues to be violations of human rights by both the 
combatants; the Respondent will be a returnee on temporary documents 
indicating a failed asylum seeker; therefore I find it is reasonably likely 
that he will be stopped, interrogated and/or detained."93
There were other failings with regard to the Adjudicators determination, but 
there is nothing in the quoted passage to indicate that the Adjudicator's 
reasoning here at least was flawed. The objection of the Tribunal appears to be 
nothing other than its preference for the CIPU report over other reports, in this 
case a report of the Refugee Council, even though the CIPU report contained 
little information of relevance to the issue. 
92 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraphs 11-12. 
93 SSHD v YP (Sri Lanka CG) [2003] UKIAT 00145 (Maintenance  Detention records), 
paragraph 6. 
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In HR v SSHD (Colombia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05736 (UP  FARC) the Tribunal 
concludes from the absence of references to problems for UP [Unión Patriótica] 
members since 1997 that the claimant (a UP member) is not at significant 
risk'.94 This conclusion, along with a lack of other up to date information, is 
based on the CIPU report of April 2002 which states that since 1999 the UP 
has faded from any position of political significance and has not featured as 
being active in any news report.95 This statement is hugely misleading and is 
repeated in the April 2004 CIPU report and those in between.96 Despite the lack 
of prominent political activity, members of the UP continue to be killed and 
disappeared and are at risk, according to the US Department of State, the UN 
High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Amnesty International, and 
UNHCR. The US Department of State and Amnesty International both go on to 
give specific examples of individuals disappeared,97 as well as concurring with 
the UN report that the political persecution of members of some parties 
continued, especially members of the Unión Patriótica, who suffered 
assassinations and threats.98 UNHCR state that UP members remain at 
heightened risk and that in spite of a government protection programme 
instigated in 2001, some 100 members were killed in the last two years [2000-
2002].99
Treatment of reports from the US Department of State  
In several of the cases where the Tribunal relies on documentation other than 
the CIPU report, this includes or is often primarily the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices produced by the US Department of State.100 Reading 
many Country Guideline cases, it quickly becomes clear that the Tribunal has  
in common with the CIPU reports  great faith in the US Department of State 
reports, despite the fact that they are unsourced. In Lahori v SSHD [1998] 
94 HR v SSHD (Colombia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05736 (UP  FARC), paragraph 11. 
95 HR v SSHD (Colombia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05736 (UP  FARC), paragraph 10. 
96 No report was produced for Colombia in October 2004. 
97 Urgent Appeal UA 101/03 Amnesty International (16 April 2003) 
98 Report of the UNHCHR on the human rights situation in Colombia United Nations (24 
February 2003), 114.  
99 International protection considerations regarding Colombia asylum-seekers and refugees 
UNHCR (September 2002)  
100 See VD v. SSHD (Albania CG) UKIAT 00115. 
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G0062 the Tribunal stated that it place[s] the US State Department reports at a 
particularly high level of reliability as a very careful review of how the reports 
are prepared, on what basis, who is consulted and the use to which the reports 
are put, can all be found in the Foreword and Appendix to each volume.101 This 
much is certainly true; the Preface to the reports for 2004 specifies that: 
Throughout the year, our embassies collect the data contained in it 
through their contact with human rights organizations, public advocates 
for victims, and others fighting for human freedom in every country and 
every region of the world. Investigating and verifying the information 
requires additional contacts, particularly with governmental authorities. 
Such inquiries reinforce the high priority we place on raising the profile of 
human rights in our bilateral relationships and putting governments on 
notice that we take such matters seriously. Compiling the data into a 
single, unified document allows us to gauge the progress that is being 
made. The public release of the Country Reports sharpens our ability to 
publicize violations and advocate on behalf of victims. And submission of 
the reports to the Congress caps our year-round sharing of information 
and collaboration on strategies and programs to remedy human rights 
abuses  and puts us on the path to future progress.102
The preface, however, exposes several weaknesses not considered in Lahori. 
The reason for producing the reports is made clear above and, in much more 
detail, in the Overview and Acknowledgements section. The reports are written 
for a political purpose, as part of a global agenda to enhance and further the 
spread of democratic capitalism across the world. They are explicitly used by 
the US government for shaping policy, conducting diplomacy and making 
assistance, training and other resource allocations.103 Following the 
information-gathering role of the embassies, they are scrutinised by the various 
bodies of the State Department in Washington.104 This political aspect to the 
report has been remarked upon several times by US domestic observers. Most 
notably, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has expressed reservation 
with respect to the reporting of human rights issues in a number of particularly 
sensitive countries where the United States itself now has reason to feel 
101 Lahori v SSHD [1998] G0062 
102 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 US Department of State (25 February 
2004), Preface. 
103 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 US Department of State (25 February 
2004), Overview and Acknowledgements. 
104 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 US Department of State (25 February 
2004), Overview and Acknowledgements. 
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vulnerable to international criticism.105 Human Rights Watch comment on 
specific country reports where they feel the US political agenda has clouded 
any objective vision.106 But perhaps most significantly of all, the US courts 
have noted their concerns about the lack of objectivity shown in the reports, 
significantly in cases which involved asylum or deportation issues.107
The second weakness revealed in the Preface and Overview and 
Acknowledgements to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is the 
methodology used. Both of these sections specify that the reports are reliant on 
the United States embassy in the given country for the first crucial stage of 
information gathering. No mention is made of what process is used in countries 
where the United States does not have an embassy. It has become apparent 
during the debate over the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq over the 
last two years, and over the initial response to the events of 11th September 
2001 when it emerged that that the FBI and CIA lacked Arabic, Farsi and 
Pashto speakers, that US on-the-ground knowledge is strikingly weak in 
countries where it does not have an embassy.108 In several cases, particularly 
where the government of the country concerned is hostile to US policy (see for 
105 A Review of the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices before the 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Non-
Proliferation and Human Rights Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (30 April 2003).  
106 Of the 2002 reports, Human Rights Watch specifically mention: Afghanistan, for overstating 
human rights progression since the fall of the Taliban; China, with reference to the sections on 
AIDS/HIV and Tibet; Colombia; Nigeria, for insufficiently addressing impunity for security forces; 
Pakistan. See Critique of State Departments Human Rights reports Human Rights Watch (4 
April 2003). Of the 2001 reports, Human Rights Watch criticise the reports on Afghanistan, for 
failure to give sufficient attention to past and present abuses by the Northern Alliance; 
Colombia, for inflating the militarys progress in cutting ties with the paramilitaries; DRC; 
Israel/Palestine; and Nigeria, for the lack of cover of the Nigerian governments failure to 
prevent or investigate human rights abuses by security forces.) US State Department reports 
critique Human Rights Watch (4 March 2002). 
107 There is perennial concern that the [State] Department softpedals human rights violations by 
countries that the United States wants to have good relations with Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 
620 (7th Cir.1997); and  such letter [sic] from the State Department do not carry the guarantee 
of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but official, discussion of 
the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not always compatible with the high duty to 
maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with nations throughout the world No hearing 
officer or court has the means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment in light of which 
the statements must be weighed. Kasravi v INS, 400 F 2d 675, 677 n.l (9th Cir 1968). Both 
quoted in Symes, M. and Jorro, P., The Law Relating to Asylum in the UK (London 2000), 
p.726. 
108 See Norton-Taylor, R. and Hopkins, N. Secret services struggle to get up to speed The 
Guardian (16 October 2001); Campbell, D. and Connolly, K. FBI failed to find suspects named 
before hijackings The Guardian (25 September 2001); and Beaumont, P. CIA gets go ahead 
for a return to murderous Cold War tactics The Guardian (23 September 2001). 
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example the report on Iraq for 2002 or the current Iran report), the tendency is, 
arguably, to over-emphasise the level of human rights abuses, most likely the 
result of over-reliance on dissidents and exiles with their own agendas. In other 
cases, however, this means a frightening reliance on the government of the 
particular country.109 In all of the reports, it must be remembered, the 
information is not just scrutinised by Washington, but the information is verified 
through in-country governmental contacts.110
Treatment of primary source material 
The Tribunal consistently approaches reports other than those of CIPU and the 
US Department of State with thorough scrutiny. Given that Country Guideline 
cases seek to impose certainty on precarious situations which are often 
impossible to view entirely objectively, all of the reports under consideration will 
have some kind of subjective slant. This idea was aired by the Tribunal itself  
Lahori v SSHD [1998] G0062 states:  
No document is absolutely unbiased, except that we would prefer, to re-
phrase it, to say every report proceeds from some viewer stand point. 
Once one knows that stand point, it is then much easier to assess the 
weight of the statement in relation to other evidence. There are cases of 
clear bias where the "axe to grind" affects objectivity to a serious 
degree.111
This point is also made in NM v SSHD (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 04263 
(MDC) where it was agreed at the outset that in considering this evidence we 
should take into account the purpose of the reports.112 The previously quoted 
109 The clearest example of this is the US Department of State report for Georgia for 2000 
which, with no presence on the ground, was strongly supportive of the Georgian government 
perspective on the breakaway region of Abkhazia. This is in complete opposition to a report 
from a UK Parliamentary delegation, which, having visited the region largely supported the 
claims of the Abkhazians. The US Department of State in turns out, far from being unable to 
send officials to Abkhazia, chose not to, in case this was misconstrued as some sort of 
recognition of Abkhazias de facto independence. See Post-war developments in the Georgian-
Abkhazian dispute UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group (June 1996), 12. 
110 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 US Department of State (25 February 
2004), Preface: Investigating and verifying the information requires additional contacts, 
particularly with governmental authorities. 
111 Lahori v SSHD [1998] G0062 
112 NM v SSHD (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 04263 (MDC), paragraph 12. The reports 
referred to were: Zimbabwe Country Assessment CIPU (April 2002), Zimbabwe: What Next? 
55 
comments of the Deputy President with regard to material from the Medical 
Foundation in Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 confirm this rigorous 
scepticism, at least in relation to evidence submitted by claimants. In the better 
cases, sound reasoning is given for why a particular report from a particular 
organisation may be found to be wanting, and no objections can be raised.113
However, the norm is for reports to be dismissed out of hand with no more than 
cursory reasoning.  
Such cursory reasoning is most often displayed in relation to campaigning 
organisations. The Tribunal indicates that because a report comes from a 
source which has first-hand involvement in the subject matter, it cannot be 
reliable. Hence in Badzo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04946 reports from Roma or 
Roma-related sources cannot be considered as entirely objective.114 The logic 
runs: Tom is a paraplegic residing in Bath, ergo, Tom cannot be a reliable 
source of information on facilities for paraplegics in Bath. Of course, the 
purpose of the organisation in question and of the information produced should 
always be borne in mind, as the Tribunal frequently reminds itself in relation to 
claimant evidence, but just because an organisation has first-hand involvement 
in the subject matter does not mean it is automatically biased or cannot shed 
light on the situation.115 In cases concerning Roma such as Badzo there is no 
International Crisis Group (14 June 2002), "We Will Make Them Run" Physicians for Human 
Rights of Denmark (21 May 2002), Political Violence Reports Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum (19 March 2002 and 28 March 2002), and a letter from the Home Office indicating that 
returns of failed asylum seekers to Zimbabwe continued to be suspended. 
113 See for example the examination of the material from Bail for Immigration Detainees in 
SSHD v VL (Democratic Republic of Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007. 
114 Badzo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04946 (23 October 2002), paragraph 15. 
115 It is also the case that when the report writers have a particular advocacy objective (apart 
from those from governmental sources), the Tribunal approaches them with caution. Perhaps 
the most excessive example is found in the criticism of Amnesty International in Lahori: 'There 
are cases of clear bias where the "axe to grind" affects objectivity to a serious degree. An 
example sometimes quoted has been that Amnesty International, in its total opposition to capital 
punishment. This is an example of the sort of axe to grind which even Adjudicators have from 
time to time allowed to influence their attitude to Amnesty International, but having identified 
this, an evaluation of Amnesty International reports can be made.' (Lahori v SSHD [1998] 
G0062) That the UK Government abolished the death penalty for murder in 1965, and went on 
to make an international commitment to the permanent abolition of the death penalty on 20 May 
1999, through ratification of Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, does not 
prevent the Tribunal here from imbuing Amnesty International with a political opinion that 
amounts to extremism (having an axe to grind). Thankfully the views of the Tribunal in Lahori
can be nullified by that of Buxton LF in R v Special Adjudicator, ex p K (FC3 1999/5888/4; 4 
August 1999) who commented that Amnesty International was recognised as a responsible, 
important and well-informed body and that Immigration tribunals would always give 
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justification for ignoring evidence from Roma-related sources simply because 
they are Roma-related. In instances where bias is evident due to the nature of 
the organisation, the correct approach is for less weight to be given to the 
evidence, although the evidence should still be considered116  and, as argued 
above, this approach should also be applied to government sources. The Home 
Offices openly declared interest to reduce the number of asylum-seekers is as 
relevant, if not more relevant, than the Medical Foundations interest to 
document and support survivors of torture.117 The norm in approach to such 
organisations, however, is for complete rejection, rather than qualified 
assessment.  
In SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057 (Risk  Sikh  Women) the 
Tribunal preferred the evidence of the (male) Norwegian Ambassador on 
changes to Afghan womens lives in the post-Taliban era, to that of the Chief of 
the Afghan Womens Association: 
the Chief of the Afghan Women's Association (AWA) said  that no 
serious changes in the lives of women have taken place and that women 
are still being mistreated for not wearing a burka. AWA are quoted as 
saying that there is no security for women at any level, that if women go 
to the bazaar without wearing a burka, they risk threats or - if nobody 
interferes - actual physical punishment. These assertions by AWA run 
counter to the objective evidence and what is known about the 
situation of women under Taliban rule. It is also at odds with the 
observation of the Norwegian Ambassador  that he believed that he 
had noticed significant changes in the overall street picture in the last 6 
consideration to their reports. Buxton LF refusing permission to move for judicial review in R v 
Special Adjudicator, ex p K (FC3 1999/5888/4; 4 August 1999) quoted in Symes, M. and Jorro, 
P., The Law Relating to Asylum in the UK (London 2000), p.726. See also Mario (16307; 6 
March 1998): We have to say that in so far as there is a conflict between the report of the State 
Department and the AI and Human Rights Watch reports (and we do not think there is a major 
division of opinion here), we to an extent feel more comfortable with the well documents and 
source reports of the Non Governmental Organisations. The US State Department is not 
sourced. 
116 Needless to say, as the High Court of Australia observed in Wu Shan Liang, when 
assessing the future, the decision-maker is entitled to place greater weight on one piece of 
information rather than another. It has to reach a well-rounded decision as to whether, in all the 
circumstances, there is a serious possibility of persecution for a Convention reason, or whether 
it would indeed be unduly harsh to return the asylum-seeker to the allegedly "safe" part of 
his/her country. This balancing exercise may necessarily involve giving greater weight to some 
considerations than to others, depending variously on the degree of confidence the decision-
maker may have about them, or the seriousness of their effect on the asylum-seeker's welfare if 
they should, in the event, occur. Brooke LJ in Karanakaran v SSHD IATRF-990759-C (25 
January 2000), paragraph 103. 
117 With reference to Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 (13 March 2002). 
57 
months as regards the situation of women. Other sources are quoted as 
saying that the situation of women in Afghanistan has improved. 
(emphasis added)118
The highlighted sentence claims that the assertions of the Afghan Womens 
Association run counter to the objective evidence. The Tribunal in this case 
had only three reports before it, two from the Danish Immigration Service and 
the CIPU Afghanistan Country Report of April 2003.119 All three therefore were 
from bodies whose openly declared objectives are to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers.120 Notwithstanding that, the Tribunals claim is not true anyway 
 not only is no mention is made of what objective evidence the AWA 
statements run counter to, but the evidence from all three reports actually 
corroborates what the AWA claimed. Indeed, the first of these had even been 
quoted earlier by the Tribunal: 
• CIPU report as quoted by the Tribunal: even in Kabul, women face 
constant threats to their personal security from other civilians as well as 
from armed men belonging to various political factions.121
• Danish Immigration Service May 2002 Report: The human rights advisor for 
UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan) judged that the 
physical safety for women in most areas of Afghanistan is extremely 
difficult [and] pointed out that women still wear a burka for their own 
safety, which also applies for urbanised wealthy women. All five sources 
consulted for the section on conditions for women in this report stated that 
women had to wear a burka for their own safety.122
118 SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057 (Risk  Sikh  Women), paragraph 14.10 
(emphasis added). 
119 Both the quote from the Norwegian Ambassador and AWA are found in Report on fact-
finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan 22 
September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003).  
120 See Blairs asylum pledge defended BBC News Online (10 February 2003); and Home 
Office Autumn Performance Report 2004 where the Home Secretary David Blunkett confirms 
that the Home Office have been meeting their targets to reduce the intake of asylum seekers; 
and Denmark: hard times for asylum seekers and refugees Statewatch (13 February 2002) 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/feb/13denmark.htm
121 SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057 (Risk  Sikh  Women), paragraph 14.8; 
and Afghanistan Country Report CIPU (April 2003), s.6.68. 
122 Report on fact-finding mission to Islamabad and Peshawar, Pakistan and Kabul, Afghanistan 
5  19 May 2002 Danish Immigration Service (10 September 2002), s.IV.3.1.  
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• Danish Immigration Service October 2002: The Director of the Secretariat of 
the human rights commission and the Commissioner estimated that it would 
take a very long time to develop a system which protects young girls and 
women against violations. In general, the situation of women continues 
to be very bad. The Deputy Minister for Women's Affairs said that the 
authorities are unable to guarantee the security of women  but that applies 
equally to the security of men. However, it is not possible for single women 
to return to Afghanistan.123
The final report quoted also contains detailed evidence from UNHCR Kabul 
stating unequivocally that families with a female sole provider  now have no 
protection124 and also gives several examples of the justice system being 
deeply ingrained with gender-specific abuse.125 Indeed, the only evidence in the 
three reports before the Tribunal that runs counter to the assessment of the 
AWA is the opinion of the Norwegian Ambassador. No indication is given by the 
Tribunal as to why a male foreign Ambassador living in a compound in Kabul 
might be more knowledgeable or more aware of the situation for women in post-
123 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003), s.4.8 and 
4.81. The report also states that the Deputy Minister for Womens Affairs said that women were 
not allowed to go out alone let alone with or without a burka. Report on fact-finding mission to 
Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 
2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003), 4.4. 
124 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003), 4.5.1. 
125 For example: The source had several examples of families where the men who had given 
information about such situations [human rights violations] had been subjected to mass rapes of 
their wives and daughters as reprisals [4.1]; Councils of elders rule on many cases involving 
property disputes and sexual matters. One example quoted was the case of a married woman 
who had been raped, where it was ruled that the offenders family should give the victims family 
a young woman as compensation. the sources  thought it would take a long time to build up 
a system that protects girls against such injustices. [4.4]; The Deputy Minister for Womens 
Affairs said that in cases where a woman is caught in adultery, the spouse decides the 
punishment. [4.4]; [T]he source mentioned a case where a police officer on several occasions 
imprisoned the father of a young woman he wanted to marry, but who did not wish to marry the 
police officer. The family complained, and the Minister of Justice referred the matter to court, but 
without doing anything else. A month later, the girl had still not received any decision by the 
court against the man, and the father was still being detained (illegally). [4.4]; The British 
embassy advised that a delegation of UK Members of Parliament had inspected a prison for 
women, and that the women were said to have been imprisoned for acts which are not 
considered to be an offence in Western countries, such as leaving their husband [4.8]; Report 
on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan 22 
September  5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003). 
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Taliban Afghanistan than an organisation which specifically exists for women in 
Afghanistan and is (and has been since 1965) involved in womens rights at an 
ideological level as well as being involved in social work.126 Nor is there any 
information given in the quoted report on the experience of the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Afghanistan, any interviews he may have conducted with 
women, or relevant trips he may have made. The report does contain detailed 
information on the work of the AWA.127 How the assertions of AWA alter from 
what is known about the situation of women under Taliban rule is not specified 
and cannot be substantiated  and therefore also cannot be contradicted by 
later claimants.  
At the end of the same paragraph the Tribunal asserts that other sources are 
quoted as saying that the situation of women in Afghanistan has improved.128
Three sources, other than the Norwegian Ambassador, stated that the situation 
had improved for women, but all three qualified their statements with indications 
that this improvement was only relative to the absolutely dire situation for 
women under the Taliban, meaning that the situation for women was still 
extremely poor.129 Other sources, including AWA, an unnamed international 
source, International Crisis Group and UNHCR indicated either that the situation 
had not improved or had improved negligibly.130 Once again, it is difficult to 
have confidence in the Tribunals conclusions when the findings appear to 
126 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003) 
127 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003) 
128 SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057 (Risk  Sikh  Women), paragraph 14.10. 
129 The EUs special representative said that there has been some improvement in the situation 
of women since the fall of the Taliban. However, the same source also found it difficult to say 
whether the development can be expected to continue in a positive direction  The source said 
that the development might not necessarily be heading in the right direction and pointed out that 
a department had been set up within the Ministry for Islamic Affairs for the promotion of virtue 
and the combat of vice, something which recalls unpleasant associations with the religious 
police of the same name under the Taliban.; The programme manager with DACAAR [Danish 
Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees] found that there had been certain improvements for 
women [..] but in general the source believed that the situation of women in Afghanistan is only 
marginally better; ACBAR [Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief] believed that the 
situation for women in Afghanistan has improved but pointed out that many women are still 
wearing a burka for security reasons. Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-
Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish 
Immigration Service (March 2003), 4.8. 
130 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003), 4.8. 
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conflict with the evidence and the prima facie conflict is not at least addressed 
by the Tribunal.  
If the AWA had been found to be biased in some manner (and the Norwegian 
Ambassador had also been assessed and been found to be more reliable), then 
the correct approach would have been to consider evidence from both sources 
within the wider picture of information supplied by other sources. As Simon 
Brown LJ observed in Ravichandran, the question of whether someone was at 
risk of persecution for a Convention reason should be looked at in the round, 
and all the relevant circumstances taken into account.131 Or, similarly, Brooke 
LJ in Karanakaran: attribution of lesser weight was not the equivalent of 
rejection.132 The Norwegian Ambassador stands out as a lone voice in the 
evidence before the Tribunal in this case, however, and yet the evidence of 
AWA was rejected completely. 
Sometimes the rejection of information from campaigning organisations is more 
subtle. In SSHD v BS (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 06461 (Liberty Party  CIO 
 Airport) there had been evidence before the Adjudicator from the Zimbabwe 
Association with regard to the procedure of returning failed asylum seekers. The 
evidence quoted in the IAT decision was:  
The passport of the deportee is put in an envelope addressed to the 
Chief Immigration Officer (Harare), together with a passenger list. These 
documents are taken to immigration before the passengers disembark. 
The Central Intelligence Organisation at Harare see the passenger list in 
the Chief Immigration Officers office before the passengers come into 
immigration. For deportees the passport will be with the Chief 
Immigration Officer, meaning that the CIO will have knowledge of the 
deportee. This results in the deportees being in a very vulnerable 
position. The Central Intelligence Organisation have an office at the 
airport, they watch arrivals and departures, they have free access to 
every office at the airport. The Chief Immigration Officer is also directed 
by the Central Intelligence Organisation.133
131 Ravichandran [1996] Imm AR 97, paragraph 109. 
132 Brooke LJ commenting on the Australian case of Wu Shan Liang [1996] 185 CLR 259 in 
Karanakaran v SSHD IATRF-990759-C (25 January 2000), paragraph 82. 
133 SSHD v BS (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 06461, paragraph 6. 
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The IAT found that the Adjudicator had been wrong to find this statement of any 
significance as it merely confirmed a standard procedure for the return of 
deportees.134 Whilst it may have been evidence that the Tribunal could 
conclude did not put the individual claimant at risk on return, considering the 
case is a Country Guideline case about risk on return to a failed asylum seeker 
being deported and passing through immigration controls, it cannot rationally be 
said to have no significance to the issues at stake. 
As with experts, sources are also criticised by the Tribunal for applying the 
wrong test and their evidence is accordingly rejected. Whilst the case might 
conceivably be arguable for experts familiar with legal proceedings, it is 
particularly unreasonable to apply this approach to reports written by human 
rights bodies, NGOs and others. On several occasions, the Tribunal appears to 
forget that such reports were not written specifically for the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal. They are normally written with an entirely different audience in mind 
and many of these organisations may not be aware that their reports are used 
in this specific context. Indeed, it is only the CIPU reports which are written for 
the purpose of examining asylum claims.135
An example of this is found in SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] 
UKIAT 00214. The Tribunal comments that it does not give the same weight [as 
to CIPU and UNHCR] to the disputed claims of the ERRC, nor to the 
recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which 
seems to require "guarantees" of safety, which is not the relevant test.136
Discussion of the Tribunals expectation that experts and others use the 
relevant legal test or language and the tendency to reject evidence (despite the 
language of weight deployed by the Tribunal in doing so) rather than seek to 
assimilate it into a proper analysis is found in the chapter on expert evidence. 
Suffice it to say here, the Tribunals assertion that the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe required guarantees of safety is based on a 
misreading of the document. The quoted passage  Roma constitute a 
134 SSHD v BS (Zimbabwe CG) [2002] UKIAT 06461, paragraph 12. 
135 The issue of the Tribunals use of semantics to dismiss expert and other evidence is 
discussed in depth in the chapter on expert evidence. 
136 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 46. 
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particularly vulnerable group of the displaced population. In Kosovo, their 
security cannot be guaranteed137  does not form part of the actual 
recommendation, but is by way of introduction.138 Despite the Tribunals 
assertion to the contrary, the Parliamentary Committee was writing with specific 
reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on 
Human Rights  quite clearly the relevant tests.139
In SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214 there were 
divergent opinions between governmental and international sources. As such, 
the Tribunal was under a duty to explain why it preferred some material or 
sources over others. The UNHCR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe strongly indicated that minorities, particularly Serbs and 
Roma, faced what they considered a real risk of persecution in Kosovo. The 
selection of materials quoted in the CIPU report appeared to indicate some risk, 
but not a significant risk. This discrepancy itself, it could be argued, should have 
137 Recommendation 1633 (2003) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, paragraph 
3. 
138 The actual recommendation reads as follows: Therefore, the Assembly recommends that 
the Committee of Ministers: i. urge the member states of the Council of Europe who are hosting 
Roma from Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, to ensure: a. that any decision on a 
forced return of Roma to Serbia and Montenegro is taken on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances; in particular, humanitarian grounds should be 
considered as a sufficient justification for granting a residence permit; b. that every Roma who 
seeks international protection is given access to fair and effective asylum procedures; c. that 
there are no forced returns of Roma originating from Kosovo either to Kosovo or to Serbia and 
Montenegro, as long as the security situation in Kosovo does not allow for their return; d. that 
Roma representatives are given an opportunity to be involved, in an advisory capacity, at an 
early stage of preparation for a possible forced return of Roma; e. that forcibly returned Roma 
are in possession of appropriate documents which will enable them to be recognised as full 
citizens upon their return; f. that the procedures for deportation comply with international law 
and take into account recommendations included in Recommendation 1547; g. that they 
contribute financially to the setting-up and implementation of effective reintegration programmes 
for returning Roma. These programmes should also be supported by funding for the new wider 
Roma strategy. Recommendation 1633 (2003) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, paragraph 9. 
139 As concerns the decision itself, it is essential that in consequence it does not deprive 
foreigners of their rights as guaranteed by several Articles of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, in particularly Article 3 ; Article 5 , Article 8  and Article 14  Provisions 
related to (the need for) international protection, and particularly the non-refoulement principle, 
are contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees which is 
applicable to all Council of Europe member state as signatories of this instrument.  The 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights indicates that a state is to all extents and 
purposes responsible for the situation of a foreigner on his return to another state. Authorities 
have a real responsibility to ensure that a person they expel are treated with respect and dignity 
in the country of destination. Forced returns of Roma from the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, to Serbia and Montenegro from Council of Europe member 
states Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (31 October 2003), paragraphs 24-25. 
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been enough to indicate a risk of persecution on the lower standard of proof that 
is required in asylum appeals.140 The evidence from UNHCR was in the form of 
a January 2003 Position Paper and a March 2004 supplement which briefly 
described the events in March 2004, but stated that a full assessment was not 
yet available.141 The report from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe was just two months old at the hearing. The Tribunal chose to rely 
instead on the findings of CIPU, which selectively quoted UN material over two 
years old.142 Furthermore, both the UNHCR and the Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Demography, who drafted the recommendation of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, had on-the-ground 
experience in Kosovo. UNHCR write: 
The information contained in the respective UNHCR position papers 
were the results of intense and detailed information-gathering exercises 
by [the 120] UNHCR field staff [in Kosovo]. Information would have 
included that provided by members of the Kosovan minority communities 
themselves, with whom our Field Office staff work on a daily basis. 
UNHCRs main partners in the region, such as the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),143 the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and 
implementing partners would also have been consulted. However, any 
external information would also be cross-checked by UNHCR Field staff, 
in order to ensure that the final document accurately represented 
UNHCRs understanding of the situation.144 The final document then 
undergoes an authorisation process by UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva 
before it is released to the general public.145
140 [W]here there is a divergence of specialist opinion as to the objective situation in the country 
from which the asylum claimant is in flight, it is proper to give the appellant the benefit of the 
doubt. Anandarajay 18242 quoted in Symes, M. and Jorro, P., The Law Relating to Asylum in 
the UK (London 2000), p.728. 
141 See SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214. 
142 See above. 
143 OSCE and UNHCR produce publications concerning the assessment of the situation of 
ethnic minorities in Kosovo, the most recent having been published in March 2003 to cover the 
period May  December 2002. 
144 As an example, in relation to the comments in UNHCRs papers on the security situation in 
Kosovo, our colleagues would inter alia systematically go through all daily reports on security 
incidents (which are produced by UNMIK) plus any other incidents brought to UNHCRs 
attention, and would then conduct a through follow-up for each to assess the action taken by the 
Kosovan authorities. Our colleagues inform us that they also tried to focus upon incidents that 
are not reported to the relevant authorities, through interviews with community leaders and 
affected individuals themselves.
145 UNHCR Letter re SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214 dated 16 
December 2004. 
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The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography have been following 
the situation in the Balkans since the start of the conflict and the 
recommendation followed a fact-finding mission on the Roma in Serbia and 
Montenegro, which took place in March 2003. This was supplemented with 
more recent information from a range of national and international NGOs and 
relevant sources from the authorities in Kosovo.146 The draft report prepared by 
the Committees 83 members had to take into account dissenting voices after 
significant debate. It would then have been debated (in public) in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Council is required to 
vote on the recommendation and the text must be approved with a mandatory 
two-thirds majority. At least twenty representatives or substitutes of four 
nationalities and two political parties must sign a written declaration.147 The 
CIPU report, on the other hand, was compiled by a low-grade civil servant 
sitting at a desk in Croydon with no experience whatsoever in Kosovo or even 
the surrounding area. Editorial oversight is minimum and the report would have 
been checked briefly by only one pair of eyes before being released.148 IAS 
found errors in 94 of the paragraphs in the Kosovo section of the April 2004 
equivalent, which was released with the editing notes still in place and was the 
most poorly sourced of all the 23 reports examined.149
The Tribunal acknowledged UNHCRs superior position in relation to CIPU 
(although not that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe).150 It 
also considered that the position in the CIPU and the UNHCR were basically 
the same, with one key difference: UNHCR offered a clear recommendation 
about return whereas the CIPU contains no such conclusion; as is normal with 
such reports, it leaves the question of safety on return to those who have to 
146 Forced returns of Roma from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, 
to Serbia and Montenegro from Council of Europe member states Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (31 October 2003), paragraphs 1-3. 
147 Assembly procedure Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (undated), s.12. 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/AboutUs/procedure.htm
148 Report of Advisory Panel on Country Information consultation exercise on CIPU Country 
Reports October 2003 APCI 2.1 (2 March 2004) www.apci.org.uk
149 Carver, N. (Ed.) Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004). 
150 The UNHCR Paper is derived from its sources in the field and they must be well placed to 
provide sound information; it would then have been through a process of consideration through 
the UNHCR hierarchy, so it should be regarded as a responsible, well researched and 
considered analysis. SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 
43. 
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make the decisions.151 If the CIPU report was offering the same evidence as 
UNHCR  and UNCHR state specifically (as quoted by the Tribunal) members 
of all minority groups, particularly ... Roma ... should continue to benefit from 
international protection in countries of asylum  then the Tribunals conclusions 
that it is safe to return a Roma is essentially based on none of the reports 
before it.  
2.4 How?  Relationship between materials considered and 
conclusions reached 
The fifth aspect of an effectively comprehensive analysis is to explain clearly 
how conclusions were reached based on the evidence before the court.152 This 
point was recently reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Pisa v SSHD [2004] 
EWCA Civ1443, a case that was remitted to the IAT for failing to explain its 
conclusions with regard to the country of origin material that was before it. The 
Tribunals decision appeared to rest solely on the claimants personal narrative. 
Lord Justice Buxton commented:  
I do not think, therefore, with respect, that in the circumstances of the 
case the Tribunal's judgment was adequately reasoned. It may be that if 
they had set out their reasoning in more detail it would be clear that they 
had reached a conclusion that was not only justified but inevitable, but 
that is not shown on the face of this determination. I therefore see no 
alternative in this case but to allow this appeal to the extent of remitting 
the case for redetermination by a differently constituted body of the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal.153
Many of the cases that currently stand as Country Guideline cases remain 
challengeable on this basis. That they were not actually challenged reflects the 
weakness of the Country Guideline system rather than the soundness of the 
decision. The quality of the representative, the limitations of Legal Aid, and the 
Tribunals penchant for widening its decisions to include factual findings on 
151 SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 00214, paragraph 45. 
152 S & Others states that the IAT must explain what it makes of the substantial evidence going 
to each [major] issue. See S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 29. 
153 Pisa v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1443, paragraph 31. 
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issues that have little or no direct bearing on the claimants case, all contribute 
to this problem.154
In VD v SSHD [2004] (Albania CG) UKIAT 00115 it is not just the most recent 
and, arguably most relevant report that is overlooked (see above), but material 
is ignored that goes against the Tribunals findings within the reports that are 
considered. This decision makes findings on risk of being trafficked and 
sufficiency of protection for victims and potential victims of trafficking within 
Albania. There are many criticisms that can be made with regard to the analysis 
on risk of being trafficked, not least the Tribunals employment of its own 
amateur statistics skills which results in some very unmathematical 
conclusions.155 However, it is the analysis of sufficiency of protection available 
for victims and potential victims of trafficking which is the most lacking with 
regard to comprehensive analysis. When considering the risk of being 
trafficked, the Tribunal relied on information from three reports:  the CIPU report 
of October 2003, the US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for 2003 (dated February 2004), and a UN/OSCE report entitled 
Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe of November 2003. 
When considering sufficiency of protection, the Tribunal relied only on the first 
two. As well as overlooking the report of the European Commission, the 
Tribunal also chose to ignore the document produced by the US Department of 
State on the very topic under discussion: Trafficking in Persons Report: 
Albania of 11 June 2003. Furthermore, the UN/OSCE report is not quoted at all 
when considering sufficiency of protection. The evidence of the UN/OSCE 
report overwhelmingly suggests that there are serious protection problems for 
victims of trafficking.156 Indeed, it is the only report which gives any details on 
154 See inquisitorial quality chapter on the problems associated with an adversarial 
environment. 
155 This is a difficult point to explain concisely, but anyone with any training in statistical 
methodology would realise how absurd the Tribunals extrapolations are in cases such as VD
and GH Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248.
156 Despite the change in government policy and the well-developed NPA support for the 
victims of trafficking in Albania is still delivered by international organisations and GOS with a 
very limited (although growing) support from the government (p.41); According to NGOs, the 
new anti-trafficking legislation, although a step in a right direction, does not yet offer a final 
solution to the issue of trafficking. Firstly, judges and prosecutors do not understand the new 
articles in the Criminal Code and do not know how to use them. The law contains no definition 
of trafficking, so it is often confused with smuggling or illegal border crossing. Secondly, the 
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the witness protection programme and the capacity and workings of the shelters 
available to actual or potential trafficking victims.157 Whereas CIPU and the US 
Department of State mention these two aspects, they do so in brief form. 
Despite coming to the conclusion that there was sufficiency of protection in 
Albania for victims of trafficking, that the shelters were adequate and that risk of 
being re-trafficked was minimal, the Tribunal neither addressed nor assessed 
this detailed evidence.   
In SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057 the Tribunal made it clear 
which sections of the Danish Immigration Report that it was relying on, but, 
apart from the comment from the Afghanistan Womens Association examined 
above, information which went against the Tribunals findings was ignored. The 
determination makes selective use of several sections of the 
September/October 2002 Danish report regarding the position of women in 
Afghanistan who have no male relatives or social networks. The Tribunal 
comments: 
The Danish fact-finding report of September 2002/ October 2002 also 
refers to observations made to the mission about the situation of women 
without male relatives or without access to a network in their 
legislation does not include provision for confiscating assets derived from trafficking (p.39); In 
2002 150 family visits were conducted. In 90 cases the women were still at home. In 60 cases, 
however, the women were not at home and according to Vatra staff, these women had been 
re-trafficked. (p.43). Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe UN/OSCE
(November 2003). 
157 The Vatra shelter in Vlora should be seen and treated, for the clarity of the definition, as a 
transit place for women coming back after being deported or stopped when trying to migrate 
(potential victims of trafficking) rather than as a shelter for the victims of trafficking (p.41); The 
Vatra Shelter identified the police directorates in Berat, Durres and Gjirokaster as refusing to co-
operate. The police in those towns claim that women do not want to go to the shelter, but prefer 
to stay at the police station while their identity is verified, after which they are sent directly back 
home (p.41); The women and girls usually stay at the shelter only for a couple of days, long 
enough for them to be identified and for their families to be informed on their whereabouts. 
Standard procedure at the shelter is to contact the womans family and ask them to come to the 
shelter and take their relative home. The rationale behind this procedure is the fear that the 
women might be picked up by traffickers if left to go off on their own. [..] Women are not allowed 
to leave the shelter without proper documents, so they have to wait for their families to arrange 
and bring the papers. [..] Although staying in a friendly and safe environment with well trained 
and understanding staff is definitely much better than being detained at a police station, the 
legal grounds of such a procedure are unclear. [..] In this shelter women are not free to leave 
when they want, which is clearly a violation of their rights (p.43); According to NGOs, those 
women and girls who are sent directly home are often later re-trafficked (p.41); NGOs are also 
concerned about the absence of a witness protection law and the lack of legal assistance and 
representation for witnesses in trafficking cases. (p.39). Trafficking in Human Beings in South 
Eastern Europe UN/OSCE (November 2003). 
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neighbourhood to protect them. On page E146, an international source is 
quoted as advising that women who have no male relatives for protection 
have serious problems, that it is necessary in the cities to have a network 
in the neighbourhood in order to get protection. However, we are not told 
who this source is. We have already stated, in paragraph 14.10 above, 
that we considered that the observations of AWA are at odds with the 
rest of the objective evidence. In the absence of any information as to the 
identity of the international source cited, the weight we are able to attach 
to their advice is necessarily limited. We have noted that the UNHCR, 
Kabul, stated that women are unable to move without male relatives. 
However, this appears to be within the context of UNHCR's efforts to 
move female staff from other areas to a better job in Kabul. This 
paragraph also states that it is not possible for women to be a female 
breadwinner for a family. We are not sure if this is attributed to the 
UNHCR. We assume it is.158
There was no evidence before the Tribunal that women could live without male 
support. There was evidence from an unnamed international source that they 
could not. There was evidence from UNHCR Kabul  and the Tribunal has 
specifically praised UNHCR as a source159  that they could not. The Tribunal 
distorts UNHCRs position by claiming that the thesis that women are unable to 
move without male support is in the context of female employees of UNHCR 
attempting to move to better jobs in Kabul, but UNHCR actually state 
unequivocally that Women are unable to move without having male relatives. 
Even the UNHCR cannot move locally employed women from other areas to 
better positions in Kabul, unless they have male relatives in Kabul with whom 
they can live.160 The implication is clearly that if UNCHR cannot manage to 
move women without male support, then it is really not possible. Furthermore, in 
the same section of the same report, UNHCR gives extensive details as to why 
this is the case regarding womens vulnerability and lack of protection, and 
makes an absolutely clear case that women (especially returnees) cannot live 
without male protection or networks of relatives.161 After a detailed examination 
158 SSHD v K (Afghanistan CG) [2003] UKIAT 00057, paragraph 14.12. 
159 For example: The UNHCR Paper is derived from its sources in the field and they must be 
well placed to provide sound information; it would then have been through a process of 
consideration through the UNHCR hierarchy, so it should be regarded as a responsible, well 
researched and considered analysis. SSHD v FD (Serbia and Montenegro CG) [2004] UKIAT 
00214, paragraphs 43. 
160 Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, 
Pakistan 22 September - 5 October 2002 Danish Immigration Service (March 2003), s.4.5.1. 
161 UNHCR, Kabul said that fundamental protection is dependent on personal and social 
networks. The source advised that the availability of networks in the form of relatives is vital for 
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of this case it appears that the Tribunal had decided the outcome before 
reading the three reports and then selectively quoted from those reports to 
justify its finding. This certainly does not make for the comprehensive analysis 
required by Country Guideline cases. 
Another example of selective use of evidence on the part of the Tribunal is 
found in SSHD v DM (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00059 (Sufficiency of 
Protection  PSG  Women  Domestic Violence). Again, the Tribunal fails in 
the requirement to explain what it makes of the substantial evidence going to 
each issue.162 Here the Tribunal is referred by the Secretary of States 
representative to the CIPU report for Albania of October 2003, specifically to the 
sections which confirm that the police have been receiving training since 
September 2000 on issues of gender and have been provided with guidance 
under international conventions and domestic law on the treatment of women 
who are victims of domestic violence and trafficking.163 This is taken from 
section 5.32 of the CIPU report which is referencing an OSCE news article of 
September 2000.164 The important difference between the two is the use of 
a person's ability to live in a given areathe source stressed that generally speaking, it is 
necessary for Afghans to have relatives in the area where they wish to settle. This is even more 
so for women. Women are unable to move without having male relatives. Even the UNHCR 
cannot move locally employed women from other areas to better positions in Kabul, unless they 
have male relatives in Kabul with whom they can live. The source believed that it might be 
possible for large families with a number of males to move to places, where they do not already 
have relatives or clan members. For families, where the head of the family is female, this option 
does not exist. and An international source said that the old patterns, enabling families to 
protect each other, have been upset, because so many people have been displaced and 
because of the economic situation, which makes it impossible for them to provide protection due 
to poverty. This means that the families with a female sole provider - widows - or children living 
alone, now have no protectionIn the towns a network in the neighbourhood is necessary in 
order to get protection. As regards personal networks in the town, many of the people who have 
returned - and who do not have a network - are especially at risk of being raped and assaulted. 
But it is even worse in the rural areas - particularly for women. The source mentioned that there 
are particularly vulnerable groups who are the subject of injustices irrespective of their ethnicity, 
but where the actual reason appears to be the person's lack of network. In this connection the 
source pointed out that it is a misconception that there has been a change in this situation just 
because the Taliban has been defeated. and Concerning the importance of networks, 
DACAAR [Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees] said that persons/families without 
networks are extremely vulnerable and exposed. There is no judicial or police protection in the 
country, only personal networks. Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, 
Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan 22 September  5 October 2002 Danish Immigration 
Service (March 2003), s.4.5.1. 
162 S & Others [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 29. 
163 SSHD v DM (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00059, paragraph 15. 
164 Rights of Women to be included in police training in Albania OSCE Press Release (1 
September 2000). 
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future and past tenses  the OSCE article states that gender training will
become part of police training at an unspecified point in the future; the CIPU 
report states, without evidence of this, that it actually became part of police 
training in September 2000.165 The case was heard on 15 March 2004, some 
three weeks after the publication date of the 2003 US Department of State 
reports, but the Tribunal makes no reference to this or any other report being 
put before it. It is clear, however, that the Adjudicator (and hence the Tribunal) 
had the 2002 US Department of State report to consider. This 2002 report 
states clearly Most of the countrys 13,000-member police force remained 
largely untrained despite assistance received from foreign governments. The 
report goes on to specify that during 2002 only 462 police officers received such 
training of which respect for human rights was a part, although no mention is 
made of training on issues of gender or domestic violence in international or 
domestic law. It also specifies that the overall performance of law enforcement 
remained weak.166 The CIPU report itself quotes from this source commenting 
that a serious problem affecting public order and internal security is the fact that 
police officers are largely untrained, ill paid and often unreliable.167
Undoubtedly in this case, the Adjudicators determination was flawed, but the 
Tribunal also fails to follow the guidelines laid down in Horvath  whilst the 
technical legal position is examined in some detail, no assessment is made of 
the practical realities of law enforcement. The Tribunal quotes selectively from 
an inaccurate and unreliable CIPU report and fails to consider the evidence 
which goes against its desired conclusion, particularly as regards recourse to 
protection for victims of domestic violence, the very issue for which the case 
was designated a Country Guideline case. 
In DG v SSHD (Iraq CG) [2002] UKIAT 06874 (Due Process  KAA) only the 
April 2002 CIPU was adduced as evidence by both the Home Office and on 
behalf of the claimant. Heard on 21 November 2002, the Tribunal was happy to 
make a finding that prison conditions in Northern Iraq would not amount to a 
breach of Article 3 of the ECHR on the totality of the evidence. The totality of 
165 Ibid.; and Country Assessment for Albania CIPU (October 2003), 5.32. 
166 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002: Albania US Department of State (31 
March 2003), s.1c. 
167 Country Assessment for Albania CIPU (October 2003), 5.31. 
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the evidence before it was two paragraphs from the CIPU Assessment from 
April 2002. These in turn quoted  selectively  from two sources: a report from 
the Netherlands Delegation (from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
of April 2000 and the US Department of State report for 2001. Happy to elevate 
this case to Country Guideline status on the basis of two paragraphs, the 
Tribunal states: 
If he were to receive a custodial sentence, although we accept that 
prison conditions are poor, the objective evidence also suggests that 
prison conditions have improved over recent years owing to the 
intervention of the ICRC  Therefore, on the totality of the evidence, we 
find that were the appellant to be returned to Iraq, there are no 
reasonable grounds for believing that he would suffer ill-treatment in 
breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. Accordingly his appeal is dismissed.168
At paragraph 13 the Tribunal quotes the evidence that they rely on from the 
April 2002 CIPU Assessment of Iraq. The selectivity of its approach is quite 
astonishing. Both paragraph 13 and the final conclusion at paragraph 16 
comment on the improvement in recent years owing to the work of the ICRC. 
But the sentences in the CIPU Assessment immediately prior to the comment 
on the work of ICRC state categorically: 
Conditions in prisons in Northern Iraq do not meet international 
requirements as laid down in 1955 in the United Nations minimum 
standards for the treatment of prisoners. Human rights violations do 
occur upon arrest and during detention. Conditions of hygiene in the 
prisons leave much to be desired.169
The subsequent paragraph then states that both the PUK and the KDP 
reportedly maintain private, undeclared prisons, and both groups reportedly 
deny access to ICRC officials. There were reports that authorities of both the 
PUK and KDP tortured detainees and prisoners.170 It is difficult to see how the 
evidence relied upon is used to justify the conclusion in the individual case, 
never mind to set a factual precedent binding on future cases. 
168 DG v SSHD (Iraq CG) [2002] UKIAT 06874 (Due Process  KAA), paragraph 16. 
169 Country Assessment for Iraq CIPU (April 2002), 4.52. 
170 Country Assessment for Iraq CIPU (April 2002), 4.53. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
First-instance decision-making in the UK has been proved to be shockingly 
poor. In a report entitled 'Get it right: How Home Office decision making fails 
refugees' of February 2004, Amnesty International detailed the flaws of the 
system, including the failure by Home Office officials to use any country 
information whatsoever  at best, minimal reference to the CIPU report is 
made.171 This aspect of failure in first-instance decision-making was highlighted 
again by IAS and the Refugee Council in September 2004,172 and by IAS in 
December 2004.173 This has a significant impact on asylum claims both with 
regard to the stress of refusal caused to the applicant, and in relation to the 
subsequent increase in public cost due to the number of successful appeals. A 
comparison with France is instructive: in 2003, the UK recognised 1.2% of 
Afghani claimants as refugees at the first instance compared to France's 
recognition rate of 18.9%; the UK recognised 6.1% of Colombian claimants, 
compared to 28.2% in France; and only 4.3% of Iranian claimants were 
recognised at first instance decisions in the UK compared to 16.6% in 
France.174 The individual claimant  and indeed the entire system  relies 
heavily, therefore, on the appeal structure currently in place.175 This places a 
significant degree of legal and ethical responsibility on the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal to 'get it right' when analysing country conditions. Country Guideline 
cases determine not just one claim, but dictate whether similar cases will even 
reach the appeal courts. Such cases must therefore be thorough and 
comprehensive in the assessment of country conditions. The examples used 
above illustrate that the IAT is failing to examine country conditions in 
accordance with the safeguards recommended by the Court of Appeal, which 
has rapped the knuckles of the Tribunal over this point not just once, but on 
171 'Get it right: How Home Office decision making fails refugees' Amnesty International (9 
February 2004). 
172 Carver, N. InExile Issue 33 (September 2004). 
173 'Home Office tells foolhardy asylum seekers: Its your own fault youve been persecuted 
Glasgow Herald (26th December 2004), p.5. 
174 Figures from UNHCR. 
175 This was acknowledged in Karanakaran and Ravichandran; the appeal tribunal is 'best 
regarded as an extension of the initial decision-making process'. Karanakaran v SSHD IATRF-
990759-C (25 January 2000), paragraph 137. 
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several occasions.176 Of most concern is the repeated failure to give equal 
scrutiny to all material produced and to consider the evidence relating to country 
information in the round. Whilst on occasions it does seem that this is the 
result of preconceived ideas, in the majority of cases it appears to reflect a lack 
of the necessary enhanced diligence and application and lack of research and 
evaluation skills. An over-reliance on the material produced by the Secretary of 
State frequently leads to findings of fact on a country situation which do not take 
into account the most recent and most relevant evidence. Similarly, the 
favouritism towards the source which is most well-known by Tribunal members, 
that is to say CIPU reports, frequently means that other reports from respected 
bodies are little utilised or digested only to a shallow level. These failings show 
that it is not just at the first instance decision where the UK is failing in its duty to 
examine asylum applications with the 'most anxious scrutiny'.177 Asylum 
seekers coming to the UK after April 2005 are faced with a loss of appeal rights. 
Unless the new Asylum and Immigration Tribunal applies rigorous standards 
where the IAT has not, the asylum seeker will have even less chance of a 
considered hearing. The system of Country Guideline cases as it currently 
stands contributes to the denial of due process for many claimants. 
176 See S & Others, Shirazi, Karanakaran, Pisa, etc. 
177 Lord Bridge in Musisi [1987] Imm AR 250 at 263 
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-- CHAPTER THREE -- 
An Inquisitorial Quality: are Country Guideline cases 
appropriate in an adversarial legal system? 
Amanda Shah∗
In a case like the present  where conjoined appeals are heard together in 
order to produce a decision which is to be taken to be factually authoritative, the 
exercise upon which the IAT is engaged assumes something of an inquisitorial 
quality, although the adversarial structure of the appeal procedure of course 
remains. 
S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 15 
State parties to the UN Refugee Convention have chosen different ways to 
incorporate their international obligations into domestic processes for assessing 
asylum claims. In the UK the asylum appeals system is adversarial in nature: 
two parties advance their case and the judge decides between them. Other 
jurisdictions have adopted different legal models that utilise a more inquisitorial 
attitude. The importance of the legal model adopted at national level is 
heightened when those domestic agencies tasked with deciding asylum claims 
choose to issue cases setting precedents, as the Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
has chosen to do in Country Guideline determinations which are binding on the 
appellate authorities as to the factual state of affairs in a given country.178
This chapter examines the issues surrounding the adversarial background to 
the Tribunals Country Guideline system and the arguments in favour of the 
Tribunal assuming a more inquisitorial role, with a corresponding procedural 
duty of care and fairness, where the quality, quantity or relevance of material 
put before it in guidance cases is not sufficient. These arguments are assessed 
in the context of the key Court of Appeal case on Country Guideline cases, S 
and Others, in which the Court suggested that if the Tribunal was to set factual 
∗ Amanda Shah is Senior Research and Information Officer at the Immigration Advisory Service. 
She holds a Masters in Human Rights and International Human Rights Law from the University 
of London and has a background in human rights research and advocacy within the 
Commonwealth. 
178 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416, paragraph 1 
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precedents, its work must assume something of an inquisitorial quality179 to 
ensure just and fair decisions are reached upon a comprehensive examination 
of substantial evidence going to each  issue.180
The guidance of the Court of Appeal in S and Others has been inconsistently 
applied by the Tribunal when deciding Country Guideline cases and that this 
inconsistency has resulted in factual precedents on country conditions being 
based on insufficient, irrelevant or outdated information. These precedents are 
now being used across the country by the Legal Services Commission (LSC) as 
the basis for assessing merits tests, by Adjudicators in determining asylum 
claims, by the Tribunal in deciding permission to appeal and full appeals and by 
the courts in considering appeals and statutory review claims. The Tribunal has 
a clear duty, highlighted in S and Others, to ensure that if it is to continue to 
issue Country Guideline cases they are effectively comprehensive and 
address all the issues in the case capable of having a real, as opposed to 
fanciful, bearing on the result explaining what it makes of the substantial 
evidence going to each such issue.181 This requires a fundamental shift by the 
Tribunal towards a more pro-active and inquisitorial approach, especially where 
the information required properly to hear a Country Guideline case is not 
supplied by the two parties. 
Possible ways of seeking to achieve this shift are canvassed in this chapter: 
simply not designating the case as a Country Guideline one, the Tribunal 
adopting a more pro-active research role itself or the Tribunal appointing an 
independent assisting counsel to contribute research and submissions to the 
case.182
179 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 15 
180 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 29 
181 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 29 
182 Another possibility could be the use of UNHCR as an intervener, as is permitted by the 
procedure rules. However, this may well go beyond the UNHCR remit and funding and UNHCR 
itself is subject to certain constraints. 
77 
3.1 Reliance on material brought by the two parties of the case 
Unlike in Canada,183 in the UK there is no documentation centre independent of 
the two parties in a case to ensure that Adjudicators or the Tribunal have 
independent and researched country information.184 Instead the material 
analysed by the Tribunal in deciding a case is the material adduced by the two 
parties. If representatives fail to submit a bundle of material, the hearing can, 
and often does, continue on the basis of this inadequate information as the 
burden of proof is on the appellant to make out his or her case.185
In choosing to issue guidance through the prism of a particular case, the 
Tribunal is hostage to the competence of the two representatives in a given 
case and their ability to produce comprehensive submissions and evidence. 
This is the logical outcome of basing a factual precedent upon a particular case 
within a strictly adversarial legal setting  the Tribunal is not comprehensively 
analysing all relevant material in accordance with the directions of the Court of 
Appeal,186 merely the material that is presented before it on a particular 
occasion for a specific case by two particular representatives. For the claimants 
representatives, the quality of material produced is often reliant not just on their 
competence and ability but the strict funding requirements of the LSC. That 
said, the LSC has stated that additional funding is available for Country 
Guideline cases where the representative is notified in advance that the case 
may be designated a Country Guideline one and where the representative 
notifies the LSC.187 However, many Country Guideline cases are backdated and 
183 In Canada the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) has a research programme that makes 
available current, public and reliable information to all parties in the refugee protection 
determination system. What it is and how it works The Immigration and Refugee Board
(undated). This approach is explored later in the section on grounds for an inquisitorial 
approach. For further information see http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/index.htm
184 CIPU is mistakenly treated by some as if it approximates to the Canadian documentation, as 
is discussed in the effectively comprehensive chapter. 
185 Sivakumaran (18147) 20 August 1998 
186 See S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 29 
187 IAA stakeholder meeting, Taylor House, 25th January 2005. 
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representatives have often been given little or no warning by the Tribunal that a 
case might be elevated to Country Guideline status.188
If it is to set factual precedents the Tribunal has to take on its shoulders the 
additional responsibilities and procedural duties associated with issuing 
determinations which will impact on a significant number of other cases. These 
responsibilities mean that unlike in ordinary cases, in Country Guideline cases 
the Tribunal cannot dismiss bad representation as the fault of the parties and 
continue to hear the case as a guidance case. Instead if it chooses to determine 
a case as giving guidance on country conditions, the shortcomings of the 
material presented by the two parties becomes the responsibility of the Tribunal 
to overcome, either itself or by appointing an independent investigator. 
Worryingly there is ample evidence, as outlined in the following sections, that 
factual precedents have been created when the Tribunal has if anything cold-
shouldered its responsibilities to overcome poor, incomplete, non-existent, 
irrelevant or out of date sources.  
Absence of a party 
It is increasingly common for at least one of the parties to an appeal to be 
unrepresented or totally absent, even in the Tribunal.189 Decision makers are 
entitled to continue the hearing190 and have done so even when the case is 
188 One practitioner even reported that despite assurances that a Turkish case would not be 
designated a Country Guideline case while grounds of appeal were pending to the Court of 
Appeal, the case was subsequently so designated after permission was refused. 
189 Increased LSC contracting restrictions have driven some established practitioners to leave 
the field, especially outside London, resulting in a diminished range of practitioners available to 
take on asylum cases. It remains to be seen what effect the LSCs accreditation scheme will 
have on the quality and quantity of publicly funded asylum practitioners, but assuming a 
proportion of current practitioners will not be accredited, the sources of legal representation 
open to asylum seekers will again be curtailed. 
190 See BT (Former solicitors' alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004] UKIAT 00311 which concerned 
a case where neither party attended the Adjudicators hearing. The Tribunal found in those 
circumstances, the position under the Rules is quite clear. He [the Adjudicator] is to consider, 
first of all, whether notice of the time and the place of the hearing has been properly served on 
the parties. He is then to consider whether there is any satisfactory explanation for the absence 
of the parties. If there is no satisfactory explanation, he is obliged to proceed in the 
absence of the party in question. If there is a satisfactory explanation, he retains a 
discretion as to whether to proceed or not. [emphasis added]. 
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creating a precedent. This was the case in AR (Burundi  spoken language  
Kirundi) Burundi [2004] UKIAT 00225 where the appellant [sic, should read 
respondent] was in attendance but had no legal representation, she had only 
learnt English in the time since she had been in the UK (4 years) and had a 
fairly good understanding of the English language, which she also spoke fairly
well [emphasis added], but the Tribunal found that she was not prejudiced in 
any way by lack of representation.191 Lack of representation may not itself 
offend the principals of natural justice in an ordinary case as the presumption 
is upon the appellant to prove his or her case. However, it is a completely 
unsatisfactory basis on which to underpin a Country Guideline case which, due 
to its near binding status192, will go on to affect a significant number of other 
cases.  
Similar issues can arise if the parties are represented, but the representative is 
inexperienced or incompetent, had limited funding to research the case, or who, 
on instructions or for professional reasons, declines to address the Tribunal on 
issues considered irrelevant to the particular appeal. The Tribunal does not 
appear to allow for such representational deficits or constraints.
Poor factual matrix 
In seeking to examine Country Guideline issues through the lens of a specific 
case, the Tribunal embarks on a novel exercise in our adversarial system. The 
Tribunal decides a particular case but its focus is on other cases in or presumed 
to be in the appeal system. Any material submitted and discussed at the 
hearing will be limited to the facts of the particular case, so a decision on a 
factual precedent cannot be reached independently of these. However, issues 
of relevance to the parties of the case are not necessarily the same as the 
issues the Tribunal wishes to produce guidance upon. It is inevitable that not all 
the issues upon which the Tribunal is seeking to give guidance will be relevant 
to the claimant whose appeal is being determined. For example it would be 
improper for a case whose specific facts pertain to the return of a Christian to 
191 AR (Burundi  spoken language  Kirundi) Burundi [2004] UKIAT 00225 paragraph 6  
192 See the chapter on certainty. 
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be used to set a factual precedent for the return of all other religious minorities 
within that country. Moreover such a practice is likely to exclude the possibility 
of the case being appealed further as the findings no longer directly relate to the 
claimant. 
In correspondence with IAS regarding a complaint about the subsequent 
treatment of a case that had been listed to be a Country Guideline case, the 
President of the Tribunal, Mr Justice Ouseley, wrote as follows: 
There are difficulties which the Tribunal has experienced on offering 
obiter guidance when it has, as here, a poor factual matrix to work with. It 
is also difficult for the Tribunal in setting up cases for guidance to be sure 
that the facts will permit such guidance to be given. It is a hazard I would 
prefer we did not face but it is at times inevitable and often unpredictable 
for any particular case. The Tribunal did not feel that it could usefully 
assess risk hypothetically here.193
These comments accurately identify one of the major problems facing the 
Tribunal in designating individual appeal determinations as factual precedents. 
Often this has not been the approach adopted by the Tribunal, however, which 
has gone on to elevate cases to Country Guideline status despite what is 
undoubtedly a poor factual matrix. 
The problem is exaggerated in an adversarial system because of the nature of 
the interest of the different participants in an appeal. The two parties are 
interested only in advancing their own preferred version of the facts and law and 
the court or tribunal is interested only in deciding between the competing cases. 
The court or tribunal may make partial findings that favour one party in some 
respects but the other in other respects or may, more unusually, make 
independent findings based on a synthesis of the arguments presented, but this 
is not to be confused with a genuinely inquisitorial role where the court or 
tribunal acts on its own initiative (or appoints an independent person or body for 
this purpose) and commands the resources required to enable it to do so. 
193 Letter from Mr Justice Ouseley, President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to Immigration 
Advisory Service (10 January 2005).
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A case in point is NL (Mental Illness  Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] 
UKIAT 04408 where the Tribunal was not provided with any up to date medical 
evidence  we consider it to be lamentable that we are hearing this appeal 
nearly ten months later and no more up to date evidence of the appellants 
mental state has been provided.194 With no current information about the 
appellants mental health the Tribunal could not assess the claimants mental 
health needs and therefore the availability or otherwise of treatment in Pakistan. 
There is reference to an apparent upturn in the claimants condition which is 
dated 29 October 2000 but this is nearly two years before the hearing date. The 
Tribunal concluded that despite a significant lack of up to date medical 
evidence there would be no breach of her Article 3 or Article 8 rights on 
return.195
The Tribunal has signalled very clearly that not only did it have no recent 
information about the appellants mental health but also no information at all 
about mental health facilities in her country of origin. What is more the Tribunal 
has been unequivocal in its displeasure  we consider it to be lamentable.196
Nevertheless the case has been purposely backdated as a Country Guideline 
case. This is clearly not a satisfactory basis on which to pin a factual precedent 
which could go on to affect the outcome of human rights appeals for many other 
claimants. 
The poor factual matrix is particularly problematic where the Tribunal use a 
case to extrapolate findings on other, wider issues not relevant to the particular 
claimant. This occurred in the case of VD (Albania CG) [2004] UKIAT 00115 
(Trafficking), where the Tribunal decided to make findings about issues that 
were at best peripheral to the determination of the particular appeal and were 
certainly not raised in the grounds of appeal. Accordingly, neither evidence nor 
submissions would have been prepared by the representative on these issues  
a claimant is not interested in wider issues, nor, therefore, is the claimants 
representative. Nevertheless, the Tribunal goes on to determine these 
194 NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 10 
195 NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 13 
196 NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 11 
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peripheral issues and to elevate the findings to Country Guideline status. As is 
discussed in the effectively comprehensive chapter, the Tribunals conclusions 
in that case are seriously flawed.  
In a determination that combines extrapolation with use of a poor range of 
sources, the Tribunal in RM (Colombia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05258 (Internal 
Relocation  FARC), concluded on the basis of the US Department of State 
report alone that the Colombian government is able to offer adequate protection 
against non-state agents in urban conurbations and therefore that there exists 
an internal flight alternative for persons in this position.197 The individual in 
question feared persecution from FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia), a powerful anti-government group. The Tribunals application of this 
general proposition concerning all victims of non-state agents to the individual 
claimant is extremely questionable, never mind its use in other future cases. 
That the case can be cited as binding in other cases involving potential victims 
of FARC or other terrorist organisations, potentially including paramilitary 
groups with links to government, is a matter of grave concern. 
Where decisions are made on guidance topics beyond the scope of the case 
being heard, the Tribunal is creating factual precedents without a factual basis 
and without the benefit of submissions and research on the issue from an 
interested party. The system of Country Guideline cases is therefore under a 
double bind, at the mercy of the competence or otherwise of representatives in 
a particular case submitting sufficiently comprehensive material and of the facts 
and issues of that case allowing a thorough examination of the topics selected 
to set guidance. 
If the Tribunal aims to avoid or at least mitigate the poor factual matrix 
problem, one option is to follow an approach it has already adopted in some 
cases. In SSHD v S (01/TH/00632) 1 May 2001, the Tribunal joined several 
cases in order to present a range of factual situations to enable it to look at as 
many of the relevant issues as possible. This is common in the Court of Appeal, 
197 RM (Colombia CG) [2002] UKIAT 05258 (Internal Relocation  FARC), paragraph 11. 
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where cases raising similar legal issues are combined. This approach is 
followed in very few of the designated Country Guideline cases, even though 
the need is arguably far greater with country conditions than with legal 
issues.198
Poor range of sources 
Some Country Guideline cases have been decided in cases where 
representatives have not submitted any country information at all or where both 
parties have relied on a single source, often the Home Offices Country 
Information Policy Unit (CIPU) report. 
In NL (Mental Illness  Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408
the Tribunal was hampered in its examination of the issues because 
unfortunately, the appellants representative did not see fit to provide us with a 
bundle of any kind.199 Of the two parties only one (the Home Office) produced 
any country evidence and they relied exclusively upon CIPUs Pakistan Country 
Assessment (October 2001) and one other untraceable document.200 In DM 
(Sufficiency of Protection  PSG  Women  Domestic Violence) Albania CG 
[2004] UKIAT 00059 there is no indication that any report other than that 
submitted by the respondent (the Home Office who submitted CIPUs Albania 
Country Assessment from October 2003) had been considered, which suggests 
that those acting on behalf of the claimant failed to supply any country 
information. When IAS contacted the representatives of the claimant cited in the 
determination, S Osman Solicitors (now Osmans Solicitors), we were informed 
that they had stopped Legal Aid work in January 2004 and were highly unlikely 
198 Notable exceptions include AJH (Somalia CG) [2003] UKIAT 00094 (Minority group-Swahili 
speakers), VL (DRC CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007 and A et al (Turkey CG) [2003] UKIAT 00034. 
199 NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 10 
200 The second source is referred to in NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG 
[2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 4 as a document that had been put in concerning the National 
Commission on the Status of Women and paragraph  9 the document put in by Mr Pichamuthu 
concerning the National Commission on the status of women. From this information it has not 
been possible to ascertain the title, source or date of this document or to find the document to 
discover the type of material it might contain other than on the National Commission on the 
Status of Women. 
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to have represented in this case which was heard on 15 March 2004.201 Other 
examples include MG (Desertion - Punishment) Angola CG [2002] UKIAT 
07360, where the only material before the Tribunal appears to have been the 
CIPU Assessments of Angola for April and October 2002, and DG (Due 
Process - KAA) Iraq CG [2002] UKIAT 06874 where only the CIPU report for 
April 2002 was assessed in a decision which found that prison conditions in 
Northern Iraq would not amount to a breach of Article 3.202 In each of these 
cases the Tribunal has made findings of fact on the situation in a given country 
for a specific group which have gone on to be followed by Adjudicators and, 
perhaps even more crucially, by the LSC and yet these findings of fact have 
been based on scant information which is often, as we will see, out of date or 
not even relevant. 
The problem of a poor range of material being put before the Tribunal in cases 
that go on to set a factual precedent is compounded by the fact that very often 
the source in question is CIPU. CIPU reports are far from independent, as is 
discussed in detail in the effectively comprehensive chapter, and are simply 
the country evidence bundle for one side of an adversarial setting. In the last 
two years the quality of the CIPU reports has been strongly criticised both by 
IAS203 and the Advisory Panel for Country Information (APCI).204 Moreover 
CIPU itself inserts a disclaimer into the Scope of Document section of each 
report which makes it clear that they are not a complete record of material on 
the issues:  
The Report aims to provide a brief summary of the source material 
identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human 
rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or 
201 Osmans Solicitors further confirmed that if they had represented the claimant they would 
have submitted a bundle. According to the determination counsel instructed was Mrs C 
Charlton-Little. As Mrs Charlton-Little is not listed in the bar directory, IAS contacted the IAA for 
clarification of who acted in this case but was told that the IAA could not assist without the case 
reference number which IAS does not have. It has therefore not been possible to gain 
clarification as to the information presented in this case. 
202 See the effectively comprehensive chapter for further discussion of these cases.  
203 Carver, N (Ed), Home Office Country Reports: An Analysis IAS (September 2004); Carver, 
N (Ed), Home Office Country Assessments: An Analysis, IAS (September 2003) 
204 Report of Advisory Panel on Country Information consultation exercise on CIPU Country 
Reports October 2003 Advisory Panel on Country Information (March 2004) 
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comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant 
source documents should be examined directly. [emphasis added] 
Furthermore, as the CIPU reports follow a rigid standard format regardless of 
the country being examined,205 there are occasions where the core issue in a 
Country Guideline case is not even addressed by the submitted report.206
The Home Offices universal reliance on a generic bundle of material (CIPU 
reports and relevant Country Guideline cases) at Adjudicator and Tribunal level 
in every single case is extremely unhelpful. Any attempt by the Home Office to 
submit generic bundles for a case that has been pre-designated as a possible 
Country Guideline case could and should be deemed unacceptable by the 
Tribunal. The specific issues in a guidance case can not be addressed by a 
generic bundle which merely skims the surface of all the main asylum claims 
generated from a particular country rather than carefully and comprehensively 
examining relevant material to the guidance issues at hand. The Tribunals task 
would certainly be made considerably easier if the Home Office could be 
persuaded to conduct research in important cases  providing the Home Office 
also recalls and observes its duty to disclose material helpful to the claimant as 
well as unhelpful material. 
Lack of relevant sources 
The Tribunal frequently decides Country Guideline cases on the basis not just 
of a paucity of sources but also a startling lack of relevant sources. This flies in 
the face of the directions of the Court of Appeal in S and Others207 and it gives 
the determinations in question a degree of purported certainty they simply do 
not deserve or merit, the implications of which are discussed in the chapter on 
certainty and consistency. 
205 See criticisms made of this approach in Carver, N (Ed), Home Office Country Reports: An 
Analysis IAS (September 2004), pp. 10-11 and p.17 
206 See the further analysis of irrelevant material examined in NL (Mental Illness - Support for 
Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 below. 
207 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 29 exhorts that the Tribunals reasoning 
must be effectively comprehensive and address all the issues in the case capable of having 
a real, as opposed to fanciful bearing on the result explaining what is made of the substantial
evidence going to each such issue. [emphasis added] 
86 
The Country Guideline case of NL (Mental Illness  Support for Family) 
Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408, as its title suggests, gives guidance on 
mental illness and support for family. The only vaguely relevant source before 
the Tribunal was CIPUs Pakistan Country Assessment (October 2001), yet 
this report says nothing about mental health facilities. The only other source 
discussed in the determination reports related to the status of women and not 
either of the guidance topics. The paucity of both the breadth and the relevancy 
of information before the Tribunal are self evident. The determination states that 
the Adjudicator who previously heard the case had not been shown evidence of 
the medical treatment which the appellant required would not be available [sic] 
and so he proceeded on the basis that the medical facilities which she [the 
claimant] required, were available. Before the Tribunal it also remain[ed] the 
case that there is a lack of evidence in this regard. 208 The only guidance the 
case can give as to the extent of mental health facilities in Pakistan is that 
derived by the Adjudicator and approved by the Tribunal, which is, to 
paraphrase, I have no information on this matter but I think it will be alright. It is 
unfathomable why NL (heard before the Country Guideline system was 
introduced) was designated a guidance case or what value it adds to 
practitioners understanding of mental health treatment in Pakistan.209
NL exemplifies the problems associated with backdated Country Guideline 
cases, heard before the start of the Country Guideline system and designated 
as guidance cases posthumously. These cases were heard with no 
understanding that they would subsequently be used to set factual precedents 
and were simply heard as ordinary cases engaging none of the additional 
208 NL (Mental Illness - Support for Family) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 04408 paragraph 11 
reads in full We have been provided with no evidence as to the extent to which the appellant 
could be treated on return to Pakistan for her ailments. The Adjudicator, at paragraph 41, made 
it clear that he had not been shown evidence of the medical treatment which the appellant 
required would not be available for her in Pakistan and that therefore, he proceeded on the 
basis that the medical facilities which she required, were available to patients in her condition. It 
remains the case that there is a lack of evidence in this regard. 
209 This is in contrast to the approach of the Tribunal in VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) 
Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 which exhibits a more robust approach 
to the guidance it gives. Paragraph 1 clearly sets out the guidance issue covered  - this case is 
a country guideline (CG) case on the issue of whether failed asylum seekers per se face a real 
risk of serious harm upon return to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  and then goes 
on to examine it.  
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responsibilities this report proposes are appropriate to the hearing of guidance 
cases. As such, backdated guidance cases include cases which draw on a 
desperately poor range of sources. If NL passed the quality threshold to be 
designated a guidance case, that threshold is worryingly low. 
Even guidance cases heard since the Country Guideline system was instituted 
have suffered from a similar dearth of relevant information, even when it has 
been specifically requested by the Tribunal. SN & HM (Divorced women  Risk 
on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 saw the Tribunal request specific 
information when granting leave to appeal to one of two conjoined appeals: 
When granting leave, the Tribunal stated in terms: Evidence will have to 
be given as to what sort of influence or political importance this family 
has. Also evidence will have to be given as to the actual availability of a 
place to go for women who have been treated in the way this claimant 
has.210
The requested evidence was not supplied. The case proceeded and, despite 
the failure of the representative to submit the evidence the Tribunal considered 
necessary to determine the case and the broader issues (for which there could 
be many explanations), it was classified as a guidance case: 
No effort was made to tender any new evidence for the hearing on either 
of these points. The Tribunal has therefore dealt with the matter on the 
basis of the bundle before the Adjudicator and the single copy of the 
Tribunal bundle filed for us. We are however concerned that experienced 
immigration solicitors should fail to deal with such an obvious direction, 
and fail to file the required three copies of the documents upon which 
they seek to rely at the hearing.211
In designating SN & HM a Country Guideline case the Tribunal is clearly 
breaching the safeguards set out in S and Others regarding the necessity for a 
comprehensive examination of all material issues in setting factual precedents. 
210 SN & HM (Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283  para 5 
211 SN & HM (Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 para 6. The 
Tribunal makes a further three references to the representatives failure to file new evidence to 
deal with the concerns addressed in the grant of permission to appeal, paragraph 22, 28 and 
44. 
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In FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 both 
representatives were approached following the hearing to provide new 
information on the position in Kosovo for Roma following a fresh round of inter-
ethnic violence in March 2004:  
The above [determination] was written before the recent outbreak of 
inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo  We invited submissions from both 
parties and, following the publication of a UNHCR position paper of 30th
March 2004 on international protection needs in Kosovo as a result of 
those inter-ethnic confrontations, we invited further submissions explicitly 
addressing that paper. 
Neither party made any submissions.212
Despite the fact that neither party submitted any further material, the case 
proceeded as a guidance case with insufficient information as to the current 
country conditions. The Tribunal justified this approach by referring to 
comments made by UNHCR in its March 2004 paper which urged that up-to-
date information be taken into account and concluding this we have done.213
Considering the Tribunal only read one 4-page report on the March 2004 
violence and received no submissions from either party upon it, it is impossible 
to see how it could reasonably have considered itself well appraised of the 
situation for minorities in Kosovo in the light of the March violence. 
Outdated material  
The issue of changing country situations and fixed factual precedents was 
discussed in the certainty, consistency and justice chapter but it is important to 
note here that this problem is exaggerated by the Tribunals passivity in 
proceedings. In an adversarial system where the Tribunal is entirely dependent 
on the material placed before it by the two parties, and therefore on the 
competence, funding and approach to the case of the two parties, it is inevitable 
that the Tribunal will find itself limited to outdated material on occasion. Again, 
this may be unfortunate and inevitable in some ordinary cases, but it is very 
212 FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 paragraphs 57-58 
213 FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 paragraph 63 
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clear that elevating any such findings to Country Guideline status is detrimental 
to justice and damaging to future claimants. The Tribunal must either adopt a 
more inquisitorial role or accept that a case in which potentially obsolete 
material has been presented is not suitable as a factual precedent. 
3.2 Grounds for an inquisitorial approach 
Whilst the legal model adopted in the UK to hear asylum appeals is adversarial 
in approach, some state parties to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees have adopted much more inquisitorial methods of obtaining 
the information required to determine asylum claims.214 A variety of different 
models have been established, probably the best known of which is that used in 
Canada. Here full hearings of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) are usually non-adversarial although it becomes adversarial when a 
representative of the CIC [Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the equivalent 
of the UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate] participates in the case to 
argue against the claim.215 As the procedures for the hearings are relatively 
informal, evidence presented and accepted is not restricted by technical or 
legal rules of evidence216 and IRB decision makers are assisted in obtaining 
relevant evidence by a refugee protection officer employed by the IRB who is 
neutral; i.e., they have no interest in the outcome of the case and their role is 
not to oppose, or to support, the refugee protection claim.217 The Spanish 
authorities have adopted a different approach. Spains UNHCR representative 
has to be informed and given the opportunity to express an opinion on cases 
before the authorities make a decision as to the admissibility of a case.218 Whilst 
UNHCRs position is not binding, the Asylum and Refugee Office (Oficina de 
Asilo y Refugio or OAR) normally follows it when applications are lodged at the 
214 For information on how country information is produced in other jurisdictions see The 
Structure and Functioning of Country of Origin Information Systems Comparative Overview of 
Six Countries Commissioned by the Advisory Panel on Country Information International 
Centre for Migration Policy Development (August 2004)  
215 What it is and how it works The Immigration and Refugee Board (available in hard copy 
from the IRB) (undated), p.6. 
216 What it is and how it works The Immigration and Refugee Board (undated), p.3. 
217 What it is and how it works The Immigration and Refugee Board (undated), p.6 and p.21. 
218 Since the 1994 Asylum Act there has been no automatic right of entry for asylum seekers in 
Spain. Legal and Social Conditions for Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe: Spain 
ECRE/Danish Refugee Council, (2003), p.4 
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border.219 In this way UNHCR has an integral role within the decision-making 
system to the supply of information upon which a determination is based. In 
France, the appeal system is explicitly inquisitorial in nature. A rapporteur
investigates the case and makes a recommendation to the appeal tribunal. An 
increasing number of claimants are legally represented but there is no party 
present to argue against the grant of asylum.220
UNHCRs Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status (January 1992) strongly suggests that an inquisitorial approach is 
actually required of those deciding asylum claims. It states, in paragraph 196, 
that: 
It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person 
submitting a claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be able to 
support his statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in 
which an applicant can provide evidence of all his statements will be the 
exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from 
persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very 
frequently even without personal documents. Thus, while the burden of 
proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and 
evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the 
examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all 
the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support 
of the application. 
This imparts a shared duty upon the Tribunal to assist in the production of 
evidence necessary to hear an asylum case, something which has been 
described by Symes and Jorro as the need to take an active part in the 
information gathering process.221 If this shared duty applies in individual cases, 
it must surely apply all the more strongly in a Country Guideline case where 
tens, hundreds or even thousands of claims could be affected by the outcome. 
219 On the other hand it appears that the OAR does not necessarily follow the UNCHRs 
recommendation in in-country cases. Legal and Social Conditions for Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees in Europe: Spain ECRE/Danish Refugee Council, (2003), p.6 
220 These examples are intended purely to be illustrative of the different approaches in different 
countries and are not intended to be exemplary. It is important to note that there are major 
concerns about the refugee status determination and appeal procedures in both Spain and 
France and that Canadian practitioners have expressed similar concerns about the system 
there. It is commonly felt that too inquisitorial a system forces the deciding authority to become 
prosecutor as well as judge. An appointed assisting counsel system in Country Guideline 
cases could avoid this problem. 
221 Symes, M and Jorro, P, Asylum Law and Practice, (London, 2003), s.14.46 
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By comparison, asylum decision-makers in the UK are extremely reluctant to 
adopt an inquisitorial role, even where the quality of information before them is 
deficient. Typically the courts have stepped back and reviewed information put 
before them rather than proactively seeking information which they feel would 
aid them in their decision-making and which has not been provided by the two 
parties of a case. However this does not have to be so and when setting factual 
precedents, as with Country Guideline cases, there are compelling reasons why 
this is inadequate and inappropriate.  
It has long been accepted that where an erroneous decision may result in the 
claimants torture or death, a more proactive approach by the decision maker 
may need to be adopted in order to give the case the most anxious scrutiny it 
deserves.222 This enhanced duty applies in cases where the claimant is badly 
represented, where the decision maker must avoid reaching adverse findings as 
a result of poor representation.223 It must also apply where the claimant is not 
represented at all. As the Tribunal made clear in the Surendran (19197) 25 
June 1999 guidelines, Adjudicators should take an active role in assisting 
unrepresented appellants as it is the duty of the Special Adjudicator to give 
every assistance, which he can give, to the appellant.224
Although the current Practice Direction on country evidence and trial bundles 
(CA1 of 2003) revoked the earlier Practice Direction which indicated that 
Adjudicators would take judicial notice of certain country reports, the Tribunal 
clearly considers itself and Adjudicators to have some expertise with regards to 
country information. For example, in SK (Return - Ethnic Serb) Croatia CG 
[2002] UKIAT 05613 it was noted that the tribunal builds up its own expertise in 
relation to the limited number of countries from which asylum seekers come.225
Again in Balachandran (20262) 17 December 1999 the Tribunal commented 
222 Lord Bridge in Musisi [1987] Imm AR 250 at 263 
223 See Symes, M and Jorro, P, Asylum Law and Practice, (London, 2003), pp. 689-690 s.14.48 
224 The Surendran Guidelines are also reproduced in the starred determination of MNM v SSHD
(00/TH/02423) 1 November 2000. 
225 SK (Return - Ethnic Serb) Croatia CG [2002] UKIAT 05613 paragraph 5 
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that it has its own expertise in the sense that it is familiar with the situation in 
many countries from which asylum seekers regularly come. Consequently: 
the Tribunal has in mind, because it has referred to it in other cases, 
the up-to-date material and is conscious that if there is anything which 
should be taken into account in favour of an appellant, even though, 
through incompetence, that appellant has not put the matter before the 
Tribunal, it will have regard to that matter. 
In other words whilst the asylum appeals system remains adversarial in nature, 
because of the experience built up by the appellate authorities through hearing 
numerous cases with similar facts, claimants who are badly represented could 
still benefit from the acquired knowledge of the Tribunal on prevailing country 
situations. However, a line must be drawn between decision-makers adopting a 
more proactive approach to introducing material within a proper procedural 
framework and them acting as experts based on their own knowledge.226  As 
Newman J cautioned in the Administrative Court in R v The Immigration 
Appellate Authority, ex p Mohammed (CO/918/00), the latter approach involves 
the introduction of information which is, in essence, personally stored and is 
therefore difficult to challenge by the parties. The Tribunals use of its own 
knowledge of country information also raises the question of how complete a 
picture the Tribunal really does hold in its mind of a country situation and how 
wedded the Tribunal might become to its own view on country conditions. If the 
Tribunal is to undertake research, it will need a research staff or an assisting 
counsel or other investigator. 
In Ravichandran the House of Lords held that the Immigration Appellate 
Authority is part of the asylum decision making process, rather than simply an 
appeals mechanism for decisions already made. The Tribunal as an agency for 
administrative decision making has an obligation to consider the most recent 
material available on the issues under consideration in asylum cases. To 
interpret this obligation as merely consideration of the most recent material put 
before the Tribunal by the two parties (which should be a given in itself) is an 
unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the Ravichandran principle, which obliges 
226 The importance of this distinction is discussed further in the chapter on expert evidence. 
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decision makers to consider country situations as of the date of hearing. There 
is no caveat within Ravichandran that allows only the material produced by the 
parties to be considered even if that material is a year or two years out of date, 
and the same can be said of the statutes which have incorporated 
Ravichandran into black letter law.227 As Sedley LJ stated in Karanakaran, the 
Tribunal is required to take everything material into account.228 Not to do so 
also wilfully ignores paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook. In considering 
material not presented before them, the Tribunal would not be acting outside 
the statutory scheme or the case law, nor would it be exhibiting signs of 
mandate creep, it would be fulfilling its legal obligations. 
The logic of the Tribunal making these interventions, within what is still an 
adversarial process, is reinforced in Country Guideline cases where the 
outcome of the case will go on to affect a significant number of other cases at 
multiple levels of the asylum system. The Tribunal has been given a very strong 
steer by the Court of Appeal that it is not sufficient merely to review the 
information presented by the representatives of the two parties where the case 
will go on to be determinative in the outcome of future cases. In S and Others, 
the Court of Appeal gave guidance to the Tribunal on the safeguards it must 
employ when deciding Country Guideline cases and a more proactive 
inquisitorial quality to the Tribunals work within the framework of the 
adversarial system was endorsed: 
In a case like the present  where conjoined appeals are heard 
together in order to produce a decision which is to be taken to be 
factually authoritative, the exercise upon which the IAT is engaged 
assumes something of an inquisitorial quality, although the 
adversarial structure of the appeal procedure of course remains.229 
[emphasis added] 
The Court of Appeal has since re-iterated its views on the centrality of the 
Tribunals inquisitorial role in Shirazi [2003] EWCA Civ 1562 which was remitted 
227 Currently s.85(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
228 Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271 paragraph 137 
229 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 15 
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to the Tribunal as the issues canvassed  have not been adequately 
addressed230. Sedley LJ stated: 
In a system which is as much inquisitorial as it is adversarial, 
inconsistency on such questions [as the Tribunals reading of the 
situation in a country] works against legal certainty  It means that in 
any one period a judicial policy (with the flexibility that the word implies) 
needs to be adopted on the effect of in-country data in recurrent classes 
of cases.231 [emphasis added] 
Shirazi categorically endorses an inquisitorial approach by the Tribunal and 
even describes the asylum process in the UK as as much inquisitorial as it is 
adversarial in nature.  
Notably there is evidence that some Tribunal panels have paid heed to the 
Court of Appeals advice. Just as we have seen examples of where the Court of 
Appeals guidance has been blatantly ignored, there are also examples of a 
more inquisitorial approach being adopted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal panel 
in VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00007 accepts the advice of the Court of Appeal in S and Others and 
Shirazi and clearly demonstrates how it believes the Court of Appeals guidance 
should be implemented. In the first paragraph of its determination, the Tribunal 
makes its position clear: 
Having been tasked with reaching an authoritative decision on this 
issue, we saw it as essential to ensure we took cognisance of all 
materials having a bearing on the issue.232 [emphasis added] 
The Tribunal goes on to demonstrate its commitment to this approach by 
reconvening the hearing in order to hear further submissions from the parties 
on material which had come to hand since the original hearing.' 233 These 
materials included reports that were introduced by the Tribunal itself rather than 
either of the two parties. In particular these were materials brought together by 
230 Shirazi [2003] EWCACiv1562 paragraph 33 
231 Shirazi [2003] EWCACiv1562 paragraph 29 
232 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 1 
233 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 1 
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Bail for Immigration Detainees which became known to other Tribunal panels in 
cases heard since the original hearing234 and an expert report by Dr Erik 
Kennes which the Tribunal became aware of  in the course of dealing with 
another case which had to be remitted and which it considered it right to refer 
to235. 
The Tribunal acknowledges that its steps are unusual but believes they are 
fully justified in our view by the task we were set of reaching a decision to be 
treated as a country guideline case.236 In other words, as guidance cases set 
precedents that will impact on significant numbers of subsequent cases at all 
stages of the asylum process, the Tribunal is required to assume a more 
proactive attitude than it might otherwise do in an ordinary case, to ensure it 
considers all relevant material. The Tribunal panel in VL reiterates this thinking, 
stating: 
Once, therefore, the Tribunal embarks upon the task of making a 
country guideline decision, in the sense identified by the Court of Appeal 
in S and Others, it is not only valid but also in everyones interest that it 
does all in its power to ensure it has before it all known materials having 
a material bearing on the relevant issues. It would defeat the object of 
the exercise if the Tribunal were to confine itself to the body of evidence 
adduced by the parties even when it is aware that that body of evidence 
omits potentially material evidence.237
Clearly, for the Tribunal to consider in a Country Guideline case only the 
material before it, when it is obvious that other relevant materials have not been 
provided by the two parties, makes a mockery of the entire system. 
A more inquisitorial approach is also evident in some other cases, including AL
(Article 3  Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2003] UKIAT 00076. Here, unhappy that 
the claimants representative had failed to provide satisfactory evidence to 
234 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 7 
235 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 6 
236 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 8 
237 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 10 
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show the proximity of the claimants home to Kabul, the Tribunal determined 
this is most unsatisfactory and after the hearing, in fairness to the Appellant, 
we consulted the very substantial Times World Atlas.238 Also, in MS & Others 
(Risk on Return  Deplete Uranium) Kosovo CG [2003] UKIAT 00031 the 
Tribunal identified and supplied to both parties a report which had been 
mentioned by the SSHD and by an expert but which had not been provided to 
us by the parties.239 Similarly, the Tribunal in AF (Warlords/commanders  
Evidence expected) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00284, which is of 
importance as it gives guidance on evidence expected, criticises the 
determination of an Adjudicator for failing to back up a contention with any 
confirmatory evidence. Acknowledging the adversarial nature of the UKs 
asylum system the Tribunal reinforces the obligation of fact-finders in the 
asylum system to obtain and check all available evidence: 
Adjudicators, like other fact-finders in the asylum system, are subject to 
the double obligation expressed in 203-4 of the UNHCR handbook: by 
203, they must be prepared to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt 
(and particularly on his individual history) where no evidence is available 
after a genuine effort to obtain it; but by 204, they should only do so, not 
only when satisfied of his general credibility, but after obtaining and 
checking all available evidence. [emphasis added] 
The responsibility for obtaining evidence under our adversarial system is 
of course that of the parties; but that in our view does not absolve the 
adjudicator from considering what evidence might reasonably be 
required in a given set of circumstances to confirm a given fact or 
situation.240
Whilst the adversarial nature of the system is not in doubt, decision makers are 
not absolved from a responsibility to consider all materials that might 
reasonably be expected to be obtained. This duty must surely be reinforced 
when the material considered in a case and the conclusions reached by the 
Tribunal set precedents that will impact on future cases. 
238 AL (Article 3  Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2003] UKIAT00076 paragraph 21 
239 MS & Others (Risk on Return  Deplete Uranium) Kosovo CG [2003] UKIAT 00031 
paragraph 5 
240 AF (Warlords/commanders  evidence expected) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00284 
paragraphs 5-6 
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3.3 Procedural care in introducing own research 
As we have seen, the introduction of material by the Tribunal in Country 
Guideline cases is a practice endorsed by the Court of Appeal, the UNHCR 
Handbook and certain Tribunal panels. However the adoption of a more 
inquisitorial approach to decision-making brings with it certain challenges, not 
least the importance of decision-makers ensuring materials they introduce are 
handled with sufficient procedural care. Naturally this responsibility is incumbent 
upon decision makers as part of the principal of natural justice in an ordinary 
case. This duty must be heightened where the outcome of the case will affect a 
significant number of others. The effect of any dereliction of procedural duty on 
the part of the Tribunal could go on to have a profound effect on subsequent 
cases with similar facts. For this reason, if a Tribunal panel is to rely on 
information adduced from their own research, it is imperative that it allows both 
parties the opportunity to comment on this new material either pre- or post- 
hearing. 
The correct approach was taken, as has been discussed, in VL (Risk  Failed 
Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007. 
Here, when the Tribunal proposed to introduce two new sources not included by 
either of the parties to the case, the hearing was reconvened and both parties 
given the opportunity to make submissions as to the relevance of the new 
materials to the core issues of the case.241 Importantly, the representatives do 
seem to have specifically addressed and made submissions on that evidence. 
However, VL is far from the norm. For example, in FG (Risk  Single Female  
Clan Members  Article 3) Somalia CG [2003] UKIAT 00175 the Tribunal 
criticised the Adjudicator for exercising an inquisitorial approach incorrectly and 
not disclosing material to the two parties as she had referred to website 
information examined by her  and not identified in the determination.242 The 
outcome of the Tribunals determination was that the Adjudicator did not make 
241 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraphs 6-7 
242 FG (Risk  Single Female  Clan Members  Article 3) Somalia CG [2003] UKIAT 00175 
paragraph 4 
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it clear to what objective material she was referring and she also referred to web 
based material which was not made available to the parties. This should never 
be done.243 In AM (Risk  Warlord Perceived Taliban) [2004] UKIAT 00004, 
the Tribunal further cautions against Adjudicators use of case law which is not 
well-known without warning both parties as the position with an unfamiliar case 
is akin to that in relation to a piece of evidence that has not been adduced at the 
hearing but relied on by an Adjudicator nonetheless as a result of his research 
afterwards.244 The Tribunal found that the use of the case in question was 
inappropriate: 
We do not consider that the 2002 case of No. 14 fell into the category of 
a well-known case  We are fortified in that view by the fact that the 
Adjudicator relied on this case not for any proposition of law but as 
a source of general country guidance. While the Court of Appeal in S
has properly identified a role for country guideline cases which are to be 
followed as far as possible, it remains that recourse to such pre-PD10 
[Practice Direction 10] cases, especially ones (like No. 14) which were 
not set down as country guideline cases, without warning the parties, is 
quite close to using evidence not adduced at the hearing.245 [emphasis 
added] 
If parties are not given the opportunity to make submissions upon all material 
considered in the determination of a Country Guideline case, recourse to justice 
could be limited not just for the claimant in question but also for all those whose 
cases subsequently fall into the remit of the guidance case. 
The Tribunal is far from innocent, however, and itself fails to observe the proper 
enhanced procedural duties that should apply in a Country Guideline case. In 
FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 the 
Tribunal attempted to deal with important country situation developments arising 
after the hearing. It stated that the UNHCR  thought it likely that detailed 
reports would be published in April 2004, though none had been published by 
mid-late May 2004.246 The comment regarding the lack of reports as of mid-late 
May 2004 is from the Tribunal, not the UNHCR source quoted, which has a 
243 FG (Risk  Single Female  Clan Members  Article 3) Somalia CG [2003] UKIAT 00175 
paragraph 23 
244 AM (Risk  Warlord Perceived Taliban) [2004] UKIAT 00004 paragraph 24 
245 AM (Risk  Warlord Perceived Taliban) [2004] UKIAT 00004 paragraph 26 
246 FD (Kosovo Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 paragraph 63 
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publication date of March 2004. However reports that analysed the inter-ethnic 
violence in March 2004 were published between March 2004 and May 2004, 
not least a report from the UN Secretary General published on 30 April 2004 
that found: 
The violence in March has completely reversed the returns 
process. Minority areas were targeted, sending a message that 
minorities and returnees were not welcome in Kosovo. In less than 
48 hours, 4,100 minority community members were newly displaced, 
more than the total of 3,664 that had returned throughout 2003. The 
majority of those who fled were in the Pristina and southern Mitrovica 
regions (42% and 40%, respectively), but displacement affected all 
regions of Kosovo. Of the displaced, 82 per cent are Kosovo Serbs and 
the remaining 18 per cent include Roma and Ashkali displaced. It is 
estimated that 350 Kosovo Albanians were displaced from the northern 
section of Mitrovica.247 [emphasis added] 
In paragraph 63 of its determination, the Tribunal makes it clear that it had 
canvassed reports written up until May 2004 and found them not to be of 
relevance. While the Tribunal may have attempted to do so, it clearly failed to 
do a very thorough job, never mind an effectively comprehensive one. The 
careless methodology contributed to the SSHDs successful appeal against the 
decision of an Adjudicator to allow the claimants asylum and human rights 
appeals. Fundamentally, as this case is a Country Guideline case, any future 
claimant whose case is based on the return of Roma to Kosovo will be left 
battling to overcome the hurdle of this decision which, regardless of the merit or 
otherwise of the facts of this particular case, is based on seriously flawed 
research.  
In VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00007 the SSHD was granted leave to appeal partly on the basis of the 
Adjudicator announcing shortly prior to the hearing that he would be relying on 
Mozu [2002] UKIAT 05328 and not allowing submissions post-hearing. The 
Tribunal found not only that this was unfortunate but that the case relied upon 
as the result of the Adjudicators own research was not representative of the 
Tribunals position on the issue: 
247 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo UN Security Council (30 April 2004)  
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However, given that the Adjudicator e [sic] himself invoked Mozu as 
authority, it is most unfortunate he did not allow the parties a short time 
after completion of the hearing to submit any more recent cases. The 
fact of the matter was that at the date he heard this case (10.3.03) there 
were several reported Tribunal decisions postdating Mozu and, since it 
was his own research which had located Mozu, that same research 
should have taken care to check whether Mozu was representative of 
the current position of the Tribunal on this issue. In this regard we would 
emphasise that since the issue was plainly one which potentially affected 
a significant number of cases, the procedural duty of care on the 
Adjudicator was even greater.248
In criticising the Adjudicator for the introduction of outdated case law, the 
Tribunal flags up another procedural duty incumbent upon decision makers 
when adopting a more investigative approach. Material introduced by decision 
makers, whether case law or objective evidence, must be current. This is a 
matter of common sense as well as legal obligation for all those involved in the 
hearing of an asylum case. The use of outdated material is particularly 
dangerous when an Adjudicator or Tribunal relies upon their own research 
without allowing the parties an opportunity to comment upon it or to expose the 
inadequacy of the new materials. If the outcome of a Country Guideline case is 
derived in part or in whole from an outdated document researched by the 
Tribunal without employing sufficient procedural care, the impact of this injustice 
would be felt by significant numbers of people. The same principle applies to 
reliance on the personal experience or expertise of the decision-maker. The use 
of such information must be properly disclosed and both parties must be 
allowed the opportunity to respond or object.249 However, the Tribunal should 
also recognise that if representatives in an adversarial system themselves fail to 
disclose up-to-date and relevant information, this failure does not absolve the 
248 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 16 
249 As examples of reliance on personally acquired knowledge see Balachandran (20262) 17 
December 1999: the Tribunal has its own expertise in the sense that it is familiar with the 
situation in many countries from which asylum seekers regularly come.; KK (evidence  late 
filing  proper notice) Afghanistan [2004] UKIAT 00258 Reported: However we saw this 
claimant present in court, and have no doubt (from many years joint experience of hearing both 
Afghan and Punjabi cases) that, without the veil, she could be identified as either a Sikh or 
Hindu, and not an indigenous Muslim lady.;  BA (Perceived bias  Israel  Gaza) Israel [2004] 
UKIAT 00118 Reported considers whether an Adjudicator wrongfully failed to recuse himself 
given his recent personal contact with the Israeli army and Israeli government officials and 
historians and finds in this instance that he did not. 
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Tribunal (or the Adjudicator) from its responsibility to rely on current information. 
If the Tribunal is forced to rely on its own knowledge or information that it is 
already aware of, it is doubtful that the determination concerned should be 
elevated to Country Guideline status, however. The danger of imposing artificial 
and incorrect certainty on subsequent cases is too great. 
3.4 Conclusion  
Despite the pioneering efforts of some Tribunal panels to implement the advice 
of the Court of Appeal in S and Others, there is ample evidence that too many 
Country Guideline cases are still being decided on poor, irrelevant or no country 
information. The Tribunal is declining to adopt a more inquisitorial approach to 
bridging the information gap and where it does introduce material of its own 
volition, it sometimes fails to observe necessary safeguards and persists in 
elevating the ensuing determinations to Country Guideline status. According to 
S and Others, the raison dêtre behind the setting of factual precedents is to 
ensure a measure of consistency to decisions emanating from the Tribunal on 
similar factual situations by bringing together all relevant evidence: 
There have been a very large number of appeals relating to ethnic 
Serbs and many have been adjourned by the Tribunal pending the 
outcome of these appeals, which have been described as test cases  
While the results have varied, the approach has been consistent, but the 
Tribunal has had to rely on whatever material has been put before it. 
This has meant there has been a degree of apparent inconsistency and 
so it was thought desirable that there should be an authoritative decision 
as to what the current situation is to enable consistent results to be 
achieved because this Tribunal has been able to consider all 
relevant evidence.250 [emphasis added] 
All relevant evidence is not limited to all relevant evidence placed before the 
Tribunal by the parties to the appeal in question. If all the relevant material 
pertinent to the issues of a guidance case is not canvassed, then inconsistent 
decision making will continue or, worse, consistently bad decision making 
ensues, as many practitioners legitimately fear is currently the case. The 
purpose of factual precedents is to eradicate the anomalies of decision making 
250 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 3. See also Shirazi. 
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on similar situations of fact, yet the Tribunals efforts have suffered from 
precisely this failing.  
The burden rests with the appellant to prove his or her case, not the court nor 
the respondent. If the claimants representative is badly prepared or not at 
court, the Tribunal is justified in continuing with the hearing, disastrous as that 
might be for the individual concerned. However, this course of action should be 
contingent on two considerations. Firstly, the Tribunal should in all cases 
consider the shared fact-finding duty suggested by the UNHCR Handbook and 
the duty to consider up-to-date evidence imposed by Ravichandran and 
subsequent statutory provisions. Secondly, the Tribunal, in light of this and the 
additional, enhanced duties that accompany the setting of a factual precedent 
affecting other claimants, has to recognise that it cannot designate a case as a 
Country Guideline case unless it is satisfied that all the relevant material has 
been considered. This will be all but impossible where the representative fails in 
some way. 
So, what action is required? The Tribunal should remove Country Guideline 
designation from cases where it has been critical of the quality of evidence 
presented to it.251 Clearly there is a very strong possibility that a different 
Tribunal panel or an Adjudicator would reach a different conclusion on a case if 
presented with no bundle by the claimants representative as opposed to a full 
and comprehensive bundle on the relevant issues. It is in nobodys interests to 
run a Country Guideline case with insufficient material upon which to weigh the 
guidance issues252 and if the Tribunal judge it inappropriate to adjourn the 
hearing, the case should be run as an ordinary case and not used to set a 
factual precedent. In several Country Guideline cases the Tribunal has as much 
as admitted that it has insufficient evidence on the issues at hand and invited 
251 In KK (evidence  late filing- proper notice) Afghanistan [2004] UKIAT 00258 the appeal was 
given on the basis that the Tribunal needed to give general guidance on the situation facing 
Sikhs in Afghanistan but the decision is not a country guidance case (paragraph one) 
because key evidence had not been authoritatively confirmed or disproved from some official 
source and it would be wrong to give our decision  the status of a country guidance case 
(paragraph 36). 
252 VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007 
paragraph 10 
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further submissions from the representatives, either when granting leave to 
appeal, pre- or post- hearing. However, where representatives have failed to 
comply with these directions, the Tribunal has carried on regardless.253 If the 
Tribunal continues to be ineffective in securing compliance with directions and 
is incapable of bridging the information gap itself with good quality, up-to-date 
and independent research, as at present, it has to be accepted that it is 
inappropriate to designate affected cases as Country Guideline cases. A further 
option is to adopt a more inquisitorial approach and try to bridge the gap. If the 
Tribunal or the new AIT does decide to follow this path, care has to be taken to 
observe procedural safeguards on the use of new material, as has been 
exhibited in cases such as VL (Risk  Failed Asylum Seekers) Democratic 
Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007. 
The Court of Appeal in S and Others accepts that the notion of factual 
precedents is foreign to common law254 and exotic255 but concludes it to be 
benign and practical256 subject to a set of caveats. Too often S and Others has 
been misinterpreted as conferring an unrestricted legitimacy to the system of 
Country Guideline cases because of Laws LJs phrase, benign and practical. 
The Courts actual position, and arguably the ratio decidendi, is that if the 
conception of a factual precedent has utility [i.e. is benign and practical] in the 
context of the IATs duty, there must be safeguards [emphasis added], these 
being the application of the duty to give reasons with particular rigour, to take 
special care to see that its decision is effectively comprehensive and to 
address all the issues in the case capable of having a real, as opposed to 
fanciful bearing on the result explaining what is made of the substantial 
evidence going to each such issue.257 Without these caveats being observed, 
Country Guideline cases cease to be a benign and practical aid for decision-
makers and degenerate into obstructions to justice in individual cases. A more 
active and inquisitorial role is required, and whilst this might appear at odds with 
the traditional judicial approach, if the Tribunal wishes to expand its remit into 
253 See FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 and SN & HM 
(Divorced women - risk on return) Pakistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00283 
254 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 26 
255 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 28 
256 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 28 
257 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 29 
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areas previously seen as foreign or exotic to common law, it stands to reason 
that a corresponding shift in responsibilities is required.  
At present, claimants are subject to a lottery as to whether the facts of their 
case fall under the authority of a guidance case which has been decided on the 
basis of a comprehensive analysis addressing all the issues having a real 
bearing on the result and explaining the substantial evidence going to each 
issue. This lottery is further loaded against the claimant if the guidance case is 
one which has been backdated, and where the standard of material canvassed 
is even more questionable. The obvious danger is that unless the directions of 
the Court of Appeal are applied uniformly by different panels of the Tribunal, 
some factual precedents will continue to be set on the basis of insufficient 
material and will go on to affect a significant number of claimants either at court 
or in seeking to pass the merits test to gain LSC funding. The only way to 
ensure Country Guideline cases are truly benign and practical is for every 
Tribunal panel to assume something of an inquisitorial quality in every Country 
Guideline case.258 Not to do so, as we have seen, is to risk breaching the UKs 
international legal obligations by denying due process to significant numbers of 
claimants. 
258 S and Others v SSHD [2002] INLR 416 paragraph 15 
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-- CHAPTER FOUR -- 
The treatment of expert evidence 
Jonathan Ensor∗
4.1 Introduction 
The body of law that circumscribes the function of experts does so for the main 
part by defining the difference between lay and expert evidence.259 Hodgkinson 
suggests that whilst lay witnesses may only give evidence of fact, experts are 
privileged in being able to assist the court through a broader range of evidence 
including opinion; explanation of technical meaning; and evidence of facts, the 
observation, comprehension or description of which require expertise.260 In the 
asylum context, expert evidence is most commonly offered on matters of 
medical or country knowledge. Medical evidence more normally relates directly 
to the physical or mental health of the asylum seeker. Frequently, this will be by 
establishing past ill-treatment, explaining reticence or difficulties in recounting 
events, or by explaining the physical or mental impact that would result from 
removal. Country experts, who form the focus of this study, provide evidence 
relating to credibility and future risk, based on their specialised understanding of 
country conditions. This evidence may extend to, inter alia, political, social, 
cultural, economic, linguistic or geographic knowledge; informing on issues 
such state and non-state risk, protection and obstacles to resettlement; and 
establishing the plausibility of claimed political, social or ethnic status and 
associated persecution. The nature of asylum claims are such that these 
categories cover a range of expertise, delineated not only by territory or region, 
∗ Jonathan Ensor holds an MA in Human Rights and International Law from the University of 
London and also a PhD from the University of York, where he previously worked as a Lecturer 
in engineering. He currently works as Research and Information Officer at the Immigration 
Advisory Service and is the joint editor of a forthcoming book on the relationship between 
human rights and development. 
259 In the Immigration Appellate Authority any evidence that is relevant may be considered, even 
if it would be inadmissible evidence in a court of law (r.48(1) of Immigration and Asylum Appeals 
(Procedure) Rules 2003). Several references are made in this chapter to academic works 
addressing questions of admissibility, which within the context of the IAA can be translated into 
questions of how much weight should be attributed to evidence and the proper role of an expert. 
260 Hodgkinson T Expert Evidence Law and Practice (London 1990) p9. Note that the lay 
witness may also give opinion evidence as a mechanism for relaying fact or where opinion is 
itself at issue in the case. 
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but also by the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, it may fall to the 
expert to guide the tribunal or court through cultural nuances that are alien to 
western thinking and may inhibit an accurate understanding of the claimants 
motives or vulnerability. 
In the analysis that forms the main body of this paper, the treatment of the 
specialist institutional knowledge of UNHCR will be considered alongside that of 
individual experts. The evidence on country conditions provided by UNHCR has 
repeatedly been acknowledged to be of significant importance in asylum claims. 
As the main body dealing with refugees throughout the world,261 reports from 
UNHCR will be given significant weight262 and deserve the highest respect.263
The determination in Kurmarlingham (14685; 1997) underscores the undoubted 
impartiality of UNHCR whilst Ragavan (15350; 1997) emphasises the 
significance of UNHCR reliance on in-country observers. Moreover, in FD 
(Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 the Tribunal 
note that UNHCR sources must be well placed to provide sound information 
and that their papers go through a process of consideration through UNHCR 
hierarchy and therefore should be regarded as responsible, well researched 
and considered analysis.264 Thus, as with many of the country experts who 
appear before the Tribunal, the contribution of UNHCR is important due to their 
close association with the complex issues on which asylum claims turn. Indeed, 
Henderson has noted the nature of asylum claims is such that the issues before 
the Tribunal are frequently beyond the ordinary experience of those charged 
with fact finding.265 Accordingly, it would be expected that the recourse to 
experts should in many cases be a matter of good practice. This understanding 
was confirmed in the Court of Appeal in the case of Es Eldin:266
It must be extremely difficult for special adjudicators to form their view of 
credibility in relation to somebody who comes from a culture different 
from theirs and from a political background different from theirs. In those 
261 Pasupathipillai (14057; 4 November 1996) 
262 Symes M and Jorro P Asylum Law and Practice (London 2003) p724 
263 Pasupathipillai (14057; 4 November 1996) 
264 FD (Kosovo  Roma) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00214 paragraph 43. 
265 Henderson M Best Practice Guide to Asylum and Human Rights Appeals (Immigration Law 
Practitioners Group in association with the Refugee Legal Group London 2003) p192. 
266 Es Eldin v Tribunal (C/2000/2681) 29 November 2000 
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circumstances a special adjudicator always needs all the help that can 
be given by those who know more about such matters than he or she 
necessarily does. 
The broad recommendation of all the help that can be given is reflected by the 
use of experts in the provision of not only country facts, but also in the 
interpretation of country conditions and the offering of opinion. The importance 
of this function in asylum cases  and in Country Guideline cases in particular  
has been affirmed in the Court of Appeal in S and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 
539:267
In this field opinion evidence will often or usually be very important, 
since assessment of risk of persecutory treatment in the milieu of a 
perhaps unstable political situation may be a complex and difficult task in 
which the fact-finding Tribunal is bound to place heavy reliance on the 
view of experts and specialists. 
However, this view is not uncontested. In SK Croatia CG [2002] UKIAT 05613, 
in which the Tribunal considered the remitted case of S and Others, the 
understanding of the role of expertise expressed in the Court of Appeal was 
directly challenged:  
We note but respectfully are unable to accept the view of the court [of 
appeal] of the importance of opinion evidence  the Tribunal builds up 
its own expertise in relation to the limited number of countries from which 
asylum seekers come. Naturally, an experts report can assist, but we do 
not accept that heavy reliance is or should be placed upon such reports. 
All will depend on the nature of the report and the particular expert.268
The professed reason for the scepticism expressed by the Tribunal in SK and 
other cases examined in this chapter is the Tribunals opinion that the expert 
evidence placed before it is often or even routinely deficient in some way.269
The number of expert reports that are deficient because of a lack of expertise 
or knowledge on the part of the expert is in fact very small  the problem is 
more likely to lie in the way in which the expert was instructed (failure to explain 
267 S and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 539, paragraph 29 
268 SK Croatia CG [2002] UKIAT 05613, paragraph 5 
269 This is clear from many if not all of the Tribunal determinations referred to in this chapter and 
is also a view expressed by John Barnes in Expert Evidence  The Judicial Perception in 
Asylum and Human Rights Appeals (2004) IJRL vol. 4, no. 3, 349 at paragraph 15. 
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the nature of the legal context in which the report would ultimately be used or 
the issues that the expert should address) or in other communication issues, 
such as the use of language. This paper recognises that some expert reports 
do not properly deserve that descriptor. However, there are in fact other, deeper 
causes influencing the Tribunals approach, at the root of which is the Tribunals 
unnecessary anxiety that it retain ultimate discretion over the outcome of a 
given appeal or, more specifically, discretion to reject a case even though 
compelling expert evidence has been presented. The anxiety is unnecessary 
because it will always be the function of the court or tribunal to make the final 
legal judgment  the Tribunal at times appears to be suffering from a type of 
institutional inferiority complex. As will be seen, this sometimes leads the 
Tribunal to adopt conflicting positions of convenience, for example in one case 
expressing the view that experts should confine themselves strictly to opinions 
on the factual situation but in another rejecting evidence not couched in the 
correct legal terminology. 
The contrasting approaches to the treatment of expert evidence in the Court of 
Appeal and the Tribunal form the context within which the analysis in the main 
body of this paper is situated. More specifically, the disputed importance of 
expert evidence is examined through the lens of three key themes that 
determine the impact of expert evidence in the Tribunal. Deconstructing the 
Tribunals approach in this way not only provides a framework for analysis, but 
also plays a productive role by offering insight into how and where the 
Tribunals approach may be adapted to ensure decision making is founded on 
the securest possible footing. 
The first theme, at what may be considered the lowest level of the analysis, 
considers how the interpretation of language constrains the role that experts are 
able to play within the Tribunal. Interpretation is a challenging phenomenon in 
all disciplines and the legal lexicon is no different to that of any other profession 
in imbuing common language with a highly developed meaning. Interpretation of 
particular words or phrases across the boundary of different professions is 
critical to ascertaining the meaning  and importance  of expert evidence. 
Simultaneously, the understanding that the Tribunal adopts from evidence that 
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is uncertain or cautious in tone or silent on a particular issue is fundamental, 
offering a choice that may be determinative in the decision making process.  
The second theme examines how the reliability of experts is determined. Whilst 
ensuring that an expert is not an advocate rightly has recognised importance,270
the mechanism that is adopted for such an assessment defines the criteria for 
independence and thus establishes which experts will have weight in the eyes 
of the Tribunal. Ultimately, this mechanism defines the role of expert evidence, 
and is therefore subject to considerable scrutiny below. Finally, the third theme 
considers the use of the Tribunals own expertise. Related to both interpretation 
and the assessment of independence, the assumption of the Tribunals 
knowledge of country conditions is frequently an important element in 
determining the understanding of and weight applied to expert opinion. The 
review of Country Guideline cases in the third section below highlights the trend 
for the Tribunal to rely on its own expertise to the point of displacing alternative 
evidence. The conclusion draws out how this theme in particular is instrumental 
in defining and ultimately undermining the Tribunals view of the importance of 
experts and, moreover, demonstrates how the Tribunal has adopted a 
procedure and mindset that allows questionable findings and then elevates 
them to Country Guideline status. 
4.2 Role of the expert and the use of language 
The problems associated with the meaning of language are addressed directly 
in GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248
in relation to risk. Here, the Tribunal states the weight applied to evidence will 
be substantially diminished if not altogether eroded271 when opinions 
expressed as to whether risk to an applicant engages either Convention unless
the evidence makes it clear that the witness understands and is applying the 
concepts as to what is required to amount to persecution272 (emphasis added). 
270 Ikarian Reefer (National Justice Compania Naviera S. A. v Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd) 
[1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 68 
271 GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248 para 48 
272 GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248 para 49 
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The Tribunal therefore believe, first, that the expert should express risk in terms 
that address the legal concept understood by the courts; and, second, that the 
weight to be attributed to the expert evidence is dependant on adherence to this 
understanding. The analysis of the Tribunal then moves forward on this basis, 
assessing in the next two paragraphs the contribution of each of the experts:
51. Whilst in his principal report dealing with the situation of the 
appellant, Dr Rashidian concluded that in the KAZ 'There is a serious 
risk that [the appellant] would be targeted and his life can be in danger', 
this reference to 'serious risk' must be read in the context of his earlier 
statement as to sufficiency of protection on the basis that his safety 
'cannot be guaranteed by the KDP or the PUK' and that 'Neither the KDP 
nor the PUK can provide full protection to any suspect who has been 
targeted by Ansar-al Islam'. This misplaced approach was reinforced in 
his letter of 10 May 2004 where, on being asked about internal flight, he 
concluded that as a result of animosity between Iraqi Arabs and the 
Kurds 'the life of no Kurd in the Iraqi Arabs regime can be guaranteed if 
the life of he or she is not safe in the Iraqi Kurdish regions.  
Here, the Tribunal seek to develop an understanding of Dr Rashidians meaning 
as to serious risk through an analysis of earlier documents relating to 
sufficiency of protection. The fact that Dr Rashidian states that safety cannot be 
guaranteed; that full protection is not available; and that a Kurd life cannot be 
guaranteed in the Iraqi Arabs regime, is taken by the Tribunal as a misplaced 
approach. At no point does Dr Rashidian claim that legal sufficiency of 
protection does or does not exist; he instead quite properly offers his expert 
opinion on the level of available protection. Doubtless it would be misplaced for 
an Adjudicator to rule insufficiency of protection on the basis of this evidence 
alone, but it is hard to understand why this language cannot be taken at face 
value rather than being used to reject the Dr Rashidians entire evidence out of 
hand for not addressing a specific legal concept. 
A similar approach is adopted towards the evidence of Mr Joffe: 
52. In Mr Joffe's case, in his summary at the end of his first report, he 
said 'It seems that, generally, conditions in Iraq are not such that 
individual security and safety can be assured'. A similar approach 
appears at paragraph 13 of the third report where he says 'It is difficult to 
argue that, even in apparently secure areas, there is a situation that 
approximates to genuine stability and security'. In re-examination when 
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he was asked about security levels in the part of Iraq administered by the 
PUK, he was asked whether the PUK operated a security system 
generally to guard against attacks and replied: 'They do with mixed 
success - probably not blanket control to allow guarantee of security'. 
In his development of a more nuanced understanding of the security situation, 
Mr Joffe appears to have been penalised for attempting to give a fuller picture 
than Dr Rashidian. However, by not addressing the issue of whether there is 
sufficiency of protection both experts suffer the same fate, as explained in the 
Tribunals summary of paragraphs 51 and 52: 
53. In our judgment, therefore, neither witness can be regarded as 
expressing opinions as to risk based on the concept of real risk which it 
is the duty of Adjudicators and this Tribunal to apply and to that extent 
such expressed views must be approached with considerable caution as 
to the evidential weight to be given to them. 
It is important to reiterate where both experts have erred in the view of the 
Tribunal: neither offered an opinion on whether the legal test has been passed. 
This point is made clear at paragraph 50: although both expressed views as to 
potential risk, neither witness demonstrated such an understanding of the legal 
concepts to be applied in evaluating risk. Because of this, considerable 
caution must be adopted when attributing evidential weight. Rather than 
seeking to assimilate the information offered by experts and then deploy it in an 
assessment of whether the legal test is met, the Tribunal uses alleged 
shortcomings in the language and conceptual legal understanding of the 
experts  language and understanding the experts cannot reasonably be 
expected to possess  to reject that information and prefer other, indirect 
sources that do not directly speak to the issue in question. 
In the view of S and Others, the experience and knowledge of the expert should 
be brought to bear in assisting the Tribunal with understanding the risk of 
persecutory treatment.273 Through Sivakumaran and subsequent decisions, the 
Tribunal has developed a refined understanding of real risk and it is their 
function as a decision making body to establish whether this standard is met. 
However, such a decision requires first that the Tribunal is cognisant of the 
273 S and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 539, paragraph 29
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environment within which the asylum seeker has claimed to be at risk. It is at 
this level at which the expert is invited to speak. Whilst it may be within the 
natural language of the expert to refer to risk within such a context, it remains 
for the Tribunal in the second stage of analysis to address whether such 
comments amount to real risk in the legal sense. As Henderson points out, the 
modern view, as appears from Stockwell, is that so long as the court 
remembers that final decision is for it, the expert is called to give his opinion 
and should be allowed to do so.274 Similarly, John Barnes writes that: 
it will almost always be wrong in principle for expert witnesses to seek 
to pronounce on the effect in United Kingdom law of the expert 
conclusions or opinions which they seek to draw either from the 
information within their expertise or that specifically provided to them for 
the purposes of their evidence in a given case.275
Views within the Tribunal appear to be divided but the Stockwell point appears 
to have been abandoned in the reasoning in GH Iraq insomuch as the Tribunal 
has failed to remember that it is for the court to make the final decision and that 
the expert should be allowed to give his or her opinion. Worse, there appears to 
have been an inversion, with the Tribunal in fact expecting the expert to 
consider the legal test. The effect of this is that the fact-finding Tribunal is 
unable to place the heavy reliance on the view of experts and specialists 
recommended in S and Others, as reduced weight prevents the evidence from 
ever reaching the decision making process.  
The unreasonable expectations of the Tribunal also extend to the treatment of 
UNHCR country information. Whilst UNHCR may justifiably be assumed to be 
familiar with legal terminology, the information that it provides is framed in the 
language of its mandated area of expertise: the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
However, in K (Risk - Sikh - Women) Afghanistan CG [2003] UKIAT 00057, the 
Tribunal states at 14.14: 
274 Henderson M Best Practice Guide to Asylum and Human Rights Appeals (Immigration Law 
Practitioners Group in association with the Refugee Legal Group London 2003) p220 quoting 
Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260. 
275 Barnes J, Expert Evidence  The Judicial Perception in Asylum and Human Rights Appeals 
(2004) IJRL vol. 4, no. 3, 349 at paragraph 7. 
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In any event, the UNHCRs advice falls short of saying that women who 
fall within either or both of these categories are at real risk of treatment 
which amounts to persecution. It is inconceivable that if they are at such 
risk, the UNHCR would not say so. We therefore conclude that the mere 
fact that a woman would be returning to Kabul without a male and/or 
community support does not, of itself, means [sic] that she faces a real 
risk of treatment amounting to persecution. 
In fact, UNHCR is quoted at 14.13 as stating that women in the categories 
outlined above would be at risk and exposed to possible persecution, if they 
return to Afghanistan. In finding it inconceivable that the UNHCR would not 
refer to real risk if it felt that a Convention reason were engaged, it would 
appear that the Tribunal is unaware, or needs to remind itself, that the 
UNHCRs specific remit is to deal with issues in relation to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and that UNHCR is an international agency providing the same 
wording of its positions to courts around the world. Moreover, as with other 
experts, UNHCR is not obliged to follow the preferred terminology of the 
Tribunal.276 As UNHCR comment, it is in fact entirely conceivable that we would 
provide a comment on risk on return that is intended to signify that such 
categories fall within Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention without expressly 
stating this in a vocabulary specific to UK jurisprudence.277
The absence of reference to real risk in the example above leads to an 
understanding by the Tribunal that is damaging to the case of the asylum 
seeker. This preference for developing a negative inference (negative from the 
perspective of the asylum seeker) or restrictive inference (by assuming the 
narrowest possible meaning) from the use of the language, phrases or indeed 
silence of UNHCR is by no means unique. In AZ (Risk on return) Ivory Coast 
CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 the Tribunal goes so far as to elicit the conclusion that: 
276 Indeed, real risk is itself terminology particular to the Tribunal and not that expressed by the 
House of Lords in Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958. However, the Tribunal maintains the assertion 
that UNHCR comments can be interpreted through the particular lens of their own conceptual 
framework. In reality the majority of UNHCR country information is not even directed at the UK, 
much less at the Tribunal, but at an international audience. Even if the Tribunal believes that the 
higher courts do or should adopt the concept of real risk, the international aspect of UNHCRs 
reach should be sufficient in itself for the Tribunal to understand that the concept has not be 
adopted by UNHCR. 
277 Letter from UNHCR London to Immigration Advisory Service, 3 December 2004.  
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In the present case, if UNHCR considered that anyone who is internally 
displaced in Abidjan faces such a real risk of treatment that would violate 
Article 3 of the ECHR or any similar international instrument, they can be 
expected to say so. They have not.278
This apparent statement is in fact an assumption based on the silence of 
UNHCR on this matter. Not only does the Tribunal suggest once again that real 
risk would be the accepted formulation, it also infers that the UNHCR has and 
should be expected to provide a position worded specifically in relation to 
potential Article 3 violations  a position which is entirely imagined. Further, the 
Tribunal has once again ignored or failed to understand the remit of UNHCR, 
and the fact that the agency primarily focuses on the Refugee Convention. 279
Although advice provided by UNHCR may be relevant to other human rights 
instruments,280 the Tribunal have not taken into account that UNHCRs practice 
has consistently been to provide comments limited in their wording to the 
implementation of the Refugee Convention and has not usually sought explicitly 
to provide guidance on or interpretation on behalf of other, more general, 
human rights instruments including the European Convention on Human 
Rights.281 Whilst there may be an overlap in circumstances that give rise to a 
likelihood of engaging both conventions, it is totally wrong of the Tribunal to 
expect the UNHCR to frame any of its comments in the language or Articles of 
any instrument other than the Refugee Convention. 
The preference for negative inference is further evidenced in VK (Risk  
Release  Escapes  LTTE) Sri Lanka CG [2003] UKIAT 00096, in which the 
278 AZ (risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 paragraph 63 
279 UNHCR is specifically mandated by the United Nations General Assembly under its statute 
to: provide international protection ... to refugees (Article 1); and promote the conclusion and 
ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their 
application and proposing amendments thereto (Article 8). In addition, under Article 35 of the 
Refugee Convention, State Parties (including the United Kingdom) are under an obligation to: 
... co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... in the 
exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of 
the provisions of this Convention. 
280  UNHCRs refugee protection mandate will inevitably involve issues that fall within the scope 
of other international instruments and indeed UNHCR encourages the scrupulous use by States 
of all human rights instruments that contribute to the protection of refugees to complement the 
use of the Refugee Convention.  In fact in certain instances it may even be that country 
information provided by UNHCR  for example of humanitarian conditions for the return of failed 
asylum-seekers  is more relevant to an ECHR issue than to the Refugee Convention. 
281 The Court of Appeal reminds the Tribunal of this fact in Djebari v SSHD [2002] ECWA Civ 
813 
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similarity of language between two UNHCR letters produced nine months apart 
is inferred to mean that there is nothing to show that UNHCR have taken any 
account of the developments which have occurred in the meantime.282 The 
possibility that, backed up by a process of in-country assessment and head 
office review of all published statements, UNHCR in fact consider the 
circumstances not to have changed appears to have been totally ignored by the 
decision maker. In VL Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00007
the Tribunal again uses an alleged failing or omission to undermine the 
evidence: 
[UNHCR] does not state that persons falling into this category are 
necessarily at risk, only that they were likely to be at risk and 
therefore deserved to receive particular and careful consideration 
[emphasis in original]283
Rather than highlighting a similarity between necessarily at risk and likely to 
be at risk, the Tribunal is able to emphasise a distinction  and one which is not 
favourable to the asylum seeker. Moreover, the Tribunal create a new test of 
necessarily at risk when faced with this evidence, setting aside its own 
preferred real risk test and enabling the language employed by UNHCR to be 
clearly distinguished. This approach is not unique. Faced with the same 
evidence in CI-B (Link to Mobutu) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00072, the Tribunal again employ the novel necessarily at risk 
category, enabling a negative inference to be drawn: 
[n]or did the UNHCR letter state that persons in that category were 
necessarily at risk but rather that they were likely to be at risk and 
therefore deserved particular and careful attention.284
In AN (Risk  Failed asylum seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2003] 
UKIAT 00050 UNHCR  is quoted as being aware of instances of interrogation 
and subsequent detention and serious ill-treatment of failed asylum seekers at 
Kinshasa airport. In response the Tribunal note that guarantees against 
persecution cannot be given and state:  
282 VK (Risk  Release  Escapes  LTTE) Sri Lanka CG [2003] UKIAT 00096 para 14 
283 VK (Risk  Release  Escapes  LTTE) Sri Lanka CG [2003] UKIAT 00096 para 100 
284 CI-B (Link to Mobutu) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2004] UKIAT 00072 para 24 
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The fact that there are instances where interrogation at the airport has 
been followed by arbitrary detention and serious ill-treatment simply is 
not sufficient to discharge the low standard of proof.285
Whilst on the face of it a reasonable conclusion, the Tribunal has once again 
failed to consider the role of UNHCR. Indeed, by focussing on instances and 
thus the use of language that can be contrasted against real risk, the Tribunal 
has failed to take cognisance of the fact that UNHCR has no remit to and 
generally does not monitor failed asylum seekers, and therefore their 
awareness of these instances is of itself significant. A decision to a focus 
instead on UNHCR being aware of such treatment could lead to an alternative 
conclusion: the interrogation and serious ill-treatment must reasonably be 
assumed to be more frequently occurring than can be directly inferred from the 
number of instances that come to the attention of UNHCR staff. Whilst this 
may or may not on its own be sufficient to alter the conclusion of the Tribunal, it 
is an extremely dubious foundation on which to base a Country Guidelines case 
that purports to be authoritative on the issue of returns. Moreover, this 
reasoning highlights how the anxiety of the Tribunal to differentiate between the 
language used and the preferred formulation (which itself sometimes appears to 
have been developed to specifically contrast with the evidence that the Tribunal 
wishes to reject) distracts the focus of the decision-maker away from a proper 
consideration of the overall country circumstances upon which UNHCR have 
provided comment. 
UNHCR employs nuanced language. This is a reflection of its detailed 
understanding of the circumstances on which it comments. However, the 
Tribunal, rather than reading this language as appropriate to describe complex 
situations that are not amenable to establishment as fact, instead uses the 
nuances as an opportunity to demonstrate or infer a lack of real risk. In so 
doing the Tribunal ignores its obligation to not artificially narrow the concept of 
risk,286 reduces the likelihood of those in danger of persecution gaining 
285 AN (Risk  Failed asylum seekers) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2003] UKIAT 00050
paragraph 10.6 
286 Asuming (11530; 11 November 1994): It makes little sense to base the establishment of 
future risk on the existence if a serious possibility that an event may occur but exclude from 
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protection, and considers the statements of UNHCR for their particular choice of 
language rather than their overall meaning.287
4.3 Expert evidence or independent and reliable evidence? 
AZ (risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 is concerned about the 
perceived tendency of claimants representatives to confuse expert evidence 
with independent and reliable evidence.288 The Tribunal outlines its approach 
for dealing with this issue:  
In order to test the independence of the person put forward as an 
expert, the Tribunal will generally compare the opinion with information 
contained in other reports. 
Whilst this is doubtless an essential element in a process of balancing 
evidence, the comparative technique for establishing independence (and 
therefore weight) is inherently problematic due to the definitional necessity of 
expert opinion being in some sense different from the general understanding.289
Moreover, a focus on difference rather than similarity serves to provide reasons 
that highlight the presumed shortcoming of the expert and offers the opportunity 
for any evidence, save only those reports that are identically similar, to be found 
partial. The difficulty that the Tribunal has created for itself is in requiring expert 
opinion to in some sense be proved correct before being allowed, for fear that 
the Tribunal may place reliance on inferences drawn by someone with a certain 
perspective rather than inferences drawn by someone who is objective.290
consideration of that issue all events save those more likely than not to have occurred, and, 
that, it seems to the Tribunal, artificially narrows the concept of risk lying at the heart of the 
asylum claim (see Kaja); Symes M and Jorro P Asylum Law and Practice (London 2003) p64: 
given the nature of the issues, the low standard of proof and the evidential difficulties face be a 
genuine refugee applicant, there is a requirement that the decision-maker engage in a certain 
degree of rational speculation in favour of the asylum seeker. 
287 See also the paper on effectively comprehensive analysis in this volume regarding the over 
attention of the Tribunal to particular forms of language. 
288 AZ (risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 paragraph 49 
289 Hodgkinson T Expert Evidence Law and Practice (London 1990) p14: The expert is not 
present in order to decide the matter in issue, but to assist the Tribunal in so deciding. The 
evidence is not admissible, certainly in so far as it consists of expert evidence of opinion, unless 
it treats of matters that are beyond the knowledge and experience of the Tribunal 
290 AZ (Risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 para 49 
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GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248, 
similarly, is concerned with impartiality and objectivity of the experts, and adopts 
a similar approach to AZ in attempting to verify the expert evidence through 
comparison. Moreover, the criteria for attaching weight to such evidence is also 
set down:  
If the witness is partial, or shows a lack of objectivity in his approach to 
the body of evidence on which he draws to forms his opinions, then the 
weight to be given to his opinion as an expert will be substantially 
diminished if not altogether eroded.291
Following an impressive dissection of the experts evidence, their academic 
credentials are set down and the Tribunal assesses their suitability as 
witnesses. Apparently ignoring their professional qualifications and experience 
in Iraqi affairs, both are found to be partial due to their evidence being selective, 
lacking in objectivity, and seeking to promulgate opinions on matters which 
neither reflect a proper appreciation of the stated and accepted evidence of the 
applicant, nor the full range of objective evidence, nor the legal nature of the 
issues for decision.292 Taking the last three quoted points, it is hard to see how 
any are relevant to the business of the expert: it would be quite wrong to expect 
the expert to pre-empt credibility findings or usurp the risk-finding role of the 
Tribunal itself; an acknowledged expert should not be required to agree with 
alternative objective evidence; and, as already discussed, the expert should be 
free to offer opinions without having to make a legal judgement. However, on 
this basis their evidence is substantially diminished if not altogether eroded. 
As with all evidence, the Tribunal in GH Iraq rightly assesses the weight to be 
attached to that offered by an expert. However, the fact that fundamental rights 
are at issue in asylum claims lowers the threshold before which evidence 
should be excluded from consideration. Brooke LJ expands on this necessarily 
cautious approach in Karanakaran:  
it would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration 
in the balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on 
291 GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248 para 48 
292 GH (Former KAZ  Country Conditions  Effect) Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248 para 75
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what may sometimes be somewhat fragile evidence, that they probably 
did not occur.293
Thus, everything capable of having a bearing on the case has to be given the 
weight, great or little, due to it.294 Significant implications flow from an approach 
predicated in this manner, manifested as a web of circumstances within which 
evidence should not be discounted. The Tribunal, for example, has stated that 
we do not see our task as excluding evidence which taken of itself would well 
be credible simply because it conflicts with other evidence,295 whilst the Court 
of Appeal has noted that when an acknowledged expert offers uncontradicted 
evidence it would be completely wrong to dismiss it from consideration296 and 
moreover, that such evidence may, as in Gupreet Singh, be sufficient in an 
asylum claim to establish the facts.297 Rather than assuming bias and seeking 
to discount contradictory evidence, which appears to be the starting point of the 
modern Tribunal, this body of opinion suggests that Symes and Jorros 
conclusion regarding human rights reports should be extended to all expert 
evidence: 
[t]here is a respectable argument to be made that the task of a decision-
maker faced with conflicting reports from reliable sources is not to 
identify preferred documents and to exclude others from consideration 
altogether, but rather to approach the material collectively, taking into 
account the possibility that each is deserving of some weight.298
However, the sceptical approach to experts is common to many cases. In BK 
(Blood Feud) Serbian and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156 the expert is a 
Fellow of the Royal Institution and of the Royal Anthropological Institute, a tutor 
at Durham University, and chairman of the board at the Centre for Research 
into Post Communist Economies: by any measure an outstandingly eminent 
academic and considered by the Tribunal as one whose opinions must be 
assessed seriously.299 This apparently benign phraseology is in fact very 
revealing of the underlying mindset. Firstly, the Tribunal finds itself capable of 
293 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 271 
294 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 271 
295 Hassan (15558; 3 October 1997)
296 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 271  
297 Gupreet Singh v SSHD [2001] EWCA Civ 516
298 Symes M and Jorro P Asylum Law and Practice (London 2003) p727. 
299 BK (Blood Feud) Serbian and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156 paragraph 7 
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seriously assessing the opinion of an expert who has been acknowledged to 
the point of being raised to high standing by his peers. Second, the phrase 
assessed seriously is straightforwardly different from taken seriously, where 
the latter accepts the important contribution that is offered by an individuals 
extensive experience and knowledge, whilst the former commences from an 
assumption that an experts opinion should be, of itself, open for assessment. In 
IK (Returnees  Records  IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 evidence is 
received from nine different individuals, all of whom have experience in Turkish 
and/or Kurdish issues. In considering this variety of sources, the Tribunal states 
at paragraph 27 (names of experts have been replaced with ()): 
we have only heard oral evidence from () but have taken the written 
evidence from all these people into account along with the other material 
documentary evidence before us. In so doing we have recognised that 
they all (() apart) are human rights activists. This is not intended in any 
derogatory sense, as Mr Grieves at one point suggested it might, but it 
does reflect potentially on their objectivity and the difference between an 
expert and an independent expert. In that light we have carefully 
assessed the merits of the opinions they have offered. 
The last two sentences of paragraph 27 are an outstanding admission of 
prejudice by the Tribunal. A distinction is explicitly drawn between human rights 
activists and others. The category human rights activist covers, from amongst 
the nine people listed at paragraph 26, a Turkish human rights lawyer who is on 
the Turkish Board of Amnesty International; a Turkish human right lawyer of 13 
years standing and a board member of the Human Rights Association in 
Turkey; and a Turkish academic, specialising in political science and 
international politics, who has written a number of books and received a variety 
of awards for human rights activities. By suggesting the activities of this group 
does reflect potentially on their objectivity and the difference between an expert 
and an independent expert the Tribunal is in effect stating that if you have 
evidence pertinent to human rights and persecution and keep it to yourself, then 
you are suitable as an expert witness; however if you act on that evidence by 
campaigning to prevent persecution and abuse, then you have distinguished 
yourself as partial and lacking in independence. The insertion of potentially as 
a caveat is unimpressive and in no way mitigates the view stated, as the view 
itself would otherwise be superfluous. The suggestion that the distinguishing of 
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this group in this way is not derogatory is simple nonsense: the clear 
suggestion is that these individuals lack the professionalism and/or intellectual 
and/or moral rigour to observe their duty to the Tribunal. By stating that in light 
of this we have carefully assessed the merits of the opinions they have offered 
the Tribunal is not only endorsing its own ability to assess the opinion of experts 
but also effectively reserving the right to disregard those elements of expert 
testimony which do not accord to the view that it wishes to endorse. 
In each of above examples a major concern is the assumption by the Tribunal 
that it is able to assess the quality of an expert though a comparative 
examination of their evidence. However, in IK Turkey it is critical to note that the 
Tribunals scepticism about the group of experts is not borne out of an 
assessment of the academic or professional record of each individual, but out of 
a supposition that human rights activists as such have particular axes to 
grind.300 This notion is akin to suggesting that doctors have their own axe to 
grind when expert medical evidence is required, insomuch as doctors work 
tirelessly to cure and prevent disease, disablement or trauma rather than merely 
filing notes of clinical observations in the hope that they may one day be 
required by the Tribunal. The difference with medical experts, however, is that 
their expertise is taken to be established by their experience and knowledge.301
300 SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 05613 para 5: We were fortunate in S to have had called before us 
two experts who were truly knowledgeable and who had no particular axes to grind. 
301 Parallels can also be drawn with the point discussed above in the effectively comprehensive 
chapter in relation to the treatment of primary source evidence. 
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4.4 The Tribunal as expert 
The previous section illustrates a tendency for the Tribunal to imbue itself with a 
significant degree of expertise, enabling it to make an informed, comparative 
judgement on the independence of expert witnesses on the basis of their 
evidence. Indeed, this approach is explicitly stated in SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 
05613: the Tribunal builds up its own expertise in relation to the limited number 
of countries from which asylum seekers come.302 From this understanding it is 
a short step for the Tribunal to displace expert opinion on the basis of its own 
expertise, and these two steps are regularly combined in Country Guidance 
cases.  
In AZ (Risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170, the experts view is 
found to be in disagreement with existing country information. This conflict is 
resolved by recourse to the Tribunals own expertise: 
53. We also noted Miss Griffiths response to our question as to whether 
the authorities in the Ivory Coast would infer that the Appellant had 
simply been trying to make a better life for himself abroad. She said that 
this would be the rationale of a country at ease with itself, whereas, in 
the case of the Ivorian authorities, the situation was one of paranoia. 
Miss Griffiths perception that it is only in the case of a country at ease 
with itself that security officials would think that a failed asylum seekers 
motive for leaving his country was economic betterment was not one that 
accords with the Tribunals general experience of hearing and 
determining appeals involving a very wide range of countries. To take 
one example, we know from CIPU Reports that the Turkish authorities 
are aware that many of their citizens who leave Turkey do so in order to 
make a better life for themselves abroad and not because they genuinely 
fear persecution. 
For this reason, the Tribunal is unable to accept Miss Griffithss views as 
evidence that compels the conclusion that returning RDR members are at real 
risk of persecution.303 There are difficulties with this reasoning on a number of 
levels: the reliability of CIPU is assumed and not subject to scrutiny, whilst the 
similarity of the conditions in Turkey and post-coup Cote dIvoire in terms of how 
at ease the authorities are is not addressed in the brief comparison. Most 
302 SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 05613 paragraph 5.
303 AZ (Risk on return) Ivory Coast CG [2004] UKIAT 00170 paragraph 54 
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pertinently for the purposes of the present discussion, however, is the 
invocation of the Tribunals own expertise: the general experience of the 
Tribunal is used to refute the specific knowledge of the expert that the Ivorian 
authorities are in state of paranoia. Indeed, this is the entire basis for 
discounting  not attaching less weight, even, but outright discounting  the 
experts evidence on this point, evidence that is in fact uncontradicted as the 
alternative country information, quoted at paragraph 52, is in fact silent on the 
issue.304 This should be compared with the approach adopted in MN (Town 
Tunis regarded as Bravanese) Somalia CG [2004] UKIAT 00224, in which the 
Tribunal do not find it in the slightest bit significant that the other background 
material does not comment on the issue in question, or with the Court of 
Appeals assessment that it would be completely wrong to dismiss 
uncontradicted expert evidence from consideration which moreover may be
sufficient in an asylum claim to establish the facts.305
In BK (Blood Feud) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156 the 
Tribunal also engages in a critical assessment of the experts evidence. Mr 
Standish, an expert of some standing, states: 
[quoting from  the US State Department] UNMIK arrested three of the 
alleged assailants; however, because the case involves a family feud, no 
charges were filed against the assailants because the case was settled 
out of court through traditional Albanian feud mediation methods. 
In my view this statement raises legitimate questions about the extent 
which UNMIK and its police effectively collude in such informal out-of-
court settlements in order to avoid provoking tension between the ethnic 
Albanian majority population and UNMIK police, an increasingly large 
number of whom are ethnic Albanian recruits. Intervention in blood feuds 
by other ethnic Albanians  even police officers  tends to be avoided 
owing to the potential risk to the individuals and their own families.306
The analysis in the second paragraph is an illustration of the role and purpose 
of an expert. The opinion explains the meaning of the raw facts provided by the 
US Department of State by reference to the wider socio-political environment in 
304 The Tribunal in fact infer a contrary position from the silence of UNHCR on the issue. The 
significant problems with this approach dealt with in the second section of this paper. 
305 Gupreet Singh v SSHD [2001] EWCA Civ 516
306 BK (Blood Feud) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156  paragraph 10 
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which they are situated. It is an interpretation that is not available to the lay 
person as it relies on the application of specialised knowledge about a particular 
region. However, the Tribunal do not consider that this quoted report bears the 
interpretation he places on it.307 Rather than accepting the expert interpretation, 
the Tribunal reiterate the facts and conclude the parties in the dispute resolved 
it between themselves and did not want to pursue it any further and did not file 
charges. No prosecution can succeed in the absence of evidence.308 This may 
be a conclusion that is open to be drawn on the basis of the facts alone; 
however, the role and purpose of the expert is to bring additional knowledge to 
the Tribunal in order to assist it in coming to the correct understanding of the 
facts that would otherwise be outside of its capability. The only explanation of 
the Tribunals actions is an assumption of an equal or better ability to interpret 
the facts, and thus an implicit refusal to accept the need for country experts or 
an assumption that the expert is neither impartial nor independent. The level of 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the expert is reinforced in the straight-faced 
conclusion of the Tribunal that the Adjudicator had an unexplained preference 
for Mr Standishs report which is unsustainable on the evidence.309
A similar situation arises in OM (Cuba returning dissident) Cuba CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00120 in which the straightforward evidence of the expert is rejected 
outright by the Tribunal. At paragraph 26, the determination notes: 
It was suggested in a letter written by a Cuban law expert Mr Wilfred 
Allen, who is a practicing Attorney based in Miami and who assists 
Cuban exiles, that the fact that the claimant has stayed in Britain without 
permission would lead the government of Cuba to assume that he 
claimed asylum and punish him accordingly. 
This is a to-the-point judgement made by an individual who has established 
experience of dealing with Cuba. The Tribunal, however: 
cannot see why the authorities in Cuba should assume otherwise than 
that the claimant was abroad, perhaps seeking work and failing to find it 
or that he simply overstayed, taking the opportunity to travel which 
otherwise he might not have. His return to Cuba would have all the 
307 BK (Blood Feud) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156  paragraph 11 
308 BK (Blood Feud) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156  paragraph 11 
309 BK (Blood Feud) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2004] UKIAT 00156  paragraph 18 
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appearance of being voluntary and it is implausible, to put it no higher, 
that he would volunteer the information that in fact he was an 
unsuccessful asylum seeker. We do not follow the reasoning behind Mr 
Allens suggestion.310
In other words, the Tribunal prefers its own version of the reality in Cuba, 
rejecting the expert opinion and even going as far as to suggest how the Cuban 
authorities would interpret the return of an overstayer. Once again, the 
Tribunals alternative explanation is not necessarily unreasonable; however, this 
is the direct insertion of the Tribunals opinion in place of that of an expert, the 
explanation for which is that the Tribunal do not follow the reasoning of the 
witness. The reasoning in this instance is based on experience of dealing with 
Cuban exiles and knowledge of Cuban law. Indeed, reasoning is not even 
called for as the experts view is presented as a statement of fact. However, in 
the absence of alternative expert evidence on this issue, the Tribunals distaste 
for either the expert or his opinion forces it to assume a greater knowledge of 
Cuba than it can possibly be equipped with. 
4.5 Conclusion: misplaced expertise? 
Hodgkinson points out that there is an inherent dilemma within expert evidence. 
Given that experts deal with matters that are beyond the knowledge and 
experience of the Tribunal the contradiction within expert evidence311 arises 
when differing opinions are placed before the decision making body. In this 
case, the necessity to reach a judgement requires that, in effect, greater weight 
is placed on the opinion of the Tribunal than on the expert whose evidence is 
rejected. Clearly, this problem becomes particularly acute when the conflict is 
between the opinion of the expert and the Tribunal, as is the case when the 
Tribunal relies on its own expertise in assessing the independence of or actually 
displacing expert evidence. In the former the problem is indirect, arising when 
the Tribunal finds itself able seriously to assess the evidence and therefore 
assuming competency in the field to which the expert is talking. When 
displacing expert evidence, the problem is much more immediate, with a clear 
310 OM (Cuba returning dissident) Cuba CG [2004] UKIAT 00120 paragraph 27 
311 Hodgkinson T Expert Evidence Law and Practice (London 1990) p14. 
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preference shown for the Tribunals opinion over that of the expert. Thus, 
particularly in the latter case, it effectively falls for the Tribunal to prove itself 
correct in order to resolve Hodgkinsons contradiction between its own 
knowledge and that of the expert. Whilst not denying that the Tribunal may over 
time gain experience in many matters common to asylum claims, a serious 
problem results.312 Compounded by the desire to compare existing country 
information with expert evidence to demonstrate objectivity, the process of 
assessment of experts and evidence is effectively immune to any corrective 
mechanism or external input, as a closed system is formed that is resistant to 
penetration by new information at each stage. The reliance on the existence of 
supporting country information or Tribunal experience reduces the chances of 
alternative informed opinion being given weight. Critical here is the notion of 
Tribunal experience rather than expertise: in the absence of its own research 
skills and resources, the Tribunal is only able to build experience based on the 
reports it sees before it, with the same sources appearing repeatedly and the 
Home Offices CIPU country reports making a disproportionate contribution as 
they are relied on in almost every case that is heard.313 Most worryingly, expert 
witnesses will by definition from time to time present evidence that is 
exceptional or represents a near unique insight into practices that are otherwise 
successfully concealed by abusive governments. It is these insights that the 
Tribunal should be most seeking but instead, under the reasoning found in 
Country Guidelines cases, to which it is most immune. Thus, the Tribunals 
predisposition towards attributing weight on a comparative basis rather than on 
an assessment of the experience and professional competence of the witness 
has severely undermined asylum seekers access to justice. The procedure 
adopted by the Tribunal systemically undermines the contribution of experts on 
312 The Tribunal does itself no favours in this regard by failing to appreciate the mandate of 
UNHCR, as illustrated in the second section of this chapter, or demanding recourse to the most 
recent CIPU reports (see the Introductory paper in this volume). Attention is also draw to the 
advice of R v IAA ex parte Mohemmed (CO/818/00) Reliance on such personally acquired 
information gives rise to significant risk to the about fairness to an Appellant who will be in no 
position to test the reliability of the matters being held against him. It [personally stored 
knowledge] should invariably, in my judgement, be avoided. Hodgkinson, on this issue, notes: 
[the court] ought to draw the attention of the witness the experience which seems to them to 
suggest that the evidence given is wrong, and ought not to prefer their own knowledge or 
experience without giving the witness an opportunity to deal with it. Hodgkinson T Expert 
Evidence Law and Practice (London 1990) p 27.  
313 See the critique of the treatment of CIPU reports in the effectively comprehensive chapter.  
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the basis of fragile evidence, ignoring the approach laid down in 
Karanakaran.314 The failings that result subsequently escalate in significance 
due to the authority afforded to Country Guideline cases, with the conclusions 
drawn from this dysfunctional approach to experts and the questionable 
rejection of relevant evidence then applied in other similar cases. 
The Tribunals approach appears to be directly influenced by the thinking in the 
determination of SK Croatia CG [2002] UKIAT 05613. Despite being a case 
remitted to the Tribunal by a superior court whose judgments are binding on the 
Tribunal on the basis of country reports that vindicated the opinions of two 
experts who, in original Tribunal hearing, considered the evidence preferred by 
the Tribunal to be too optimistic,315 SK Croatia reflects a deep scepticism 
towards expert opinion. The understanding promulgated in SK Croatia is that 
many [experts] have their own points of view which their reports seek to justify, 
a rejection that heavy reliance should be placed upon [expert] reports and, 
finally, that the court in S is fortunate in having experts who had no particular 
axe to grind.316 Moreover, the Tribunal builds up its own expertise in relation to 
the limited number of countries from which asylum seekers come.317 This 
mindset has recently been reaffirmed in IK Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 in 
which the weight to be given to the evidence of each of the experts [is] in line 
with the approach described in SK Croatia CG [2002] UKIAT 05613 and GH 
Iraq CG [2004] UKIAT 00248, thus combining SK Croatias negative attitude to 
expert opinion and confidence in the Tribunals own expertise, with GH Iraqs 
important distinction between an expert and an independent expert, in 
which the weight accorded to evidence depends upon demonstrable impartiality 
and objectivity.318 The unspoken message in this approach to country experts 
appears summarised by Heydon and Ockelton, who describe a general feeling 
314 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 271: it would be 
quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the balancing process simply 
because the decision-maker believes, on what may sometimes be somewhat fragile evidence, 
that they probably did not occur. 
315 S and Others v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 539 paragraph 9, quoting the Tribunals original 
judgment at paragraph 32. 
316 SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 05613 paragraph 5 
317 SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 05613 paragraph 5 
318 IK Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 paragraphs 21-23, and, almost incidentally, preferring the 
Tribunals approach over that of the higher courts. 
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that  expert witnesses are selected to prove a case and are often close to 
professional liars.319 Viewed from this perspective, the overtly negative 
treatment of expert evidence described in this paper acquires a foundation. The 
supposition of the need to assess the evidence of acknowledged experts and 
the derogatory view of human rights professionals can both be directly 
understood from the mindset established in SK Croatia. It takes a further step, 
however, to explain the persistently restrictive inferences drawn from the 
analysis of UNHCR evidence and the finding of partiality of the experts in GH 
Iraq on the basis of their failure to address the required legal test. The 
consistently negative approach across these decisions leaves the Tribunal open 
to an accusation of having allowed a general scepticism to develop into a 
tendency to negate the impact of experts via restrictive interpretation. This 
accusation is sharpened by understanding that in each of these cases the 
Tribunal had a real choice: the evidence in each case was capable of attracting 
a spectrum of interpretation, but in each case the most negative was selected. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the legacy of SK Croatias refusal to 
acknowledge the importance of expert evidence is a procedure that is resistant 
to acknowledging expert opinion and a Tribunal mindset that matches. 
Specifically, the analysis in this paper has documented the displacement of 
expert opinion, a tendency to undermine the credentials of experts through 
findings of partiality, and the adoption of a restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of expert statements. The decisions in the Country Guideline 
cases analysed in this paper suggest that the result is a reduced quality of 
decision making that has moved a long way from the presumption in favour of 
the asylum seeker that is outlined in decisions such as Kaja, Asuming, 
Karanakaran and Sivakumaran320 and in the UNHCR Handbook.321
319 Heydon J D and Ockelton M Evidence: Cases and Materials (London 1996) p384. 
320 Asuming (11530; 11 November 1994): It makes little sense to base the establishment of 
future risk on the existence if a serious possibility that an event may occur but exclude from 
consideration of that issue all events save those more likely than not to have occurred, and, 
that, it seems to the Tribunal, artificially narrows the concept of risk lying at the heart of the 
asylum claim (see Kaja); Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 
Imm AR 271: when the decision maker is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, or 
finds that although the probabilities are against it, the event may have occurred, it may be 
necessary to take into account the possibility that the event took place in deciding the ultimate 
129 
In seeking an alternative mechanism for addressing expert evidence, it is 
important to acknowledge that elements of the Tribunals approach exist out of 
necessity. The need to test expertise is paramount in this regard, as is the 
necessity for the expert to remain obliged by his or her duty to the court and 
therefore to explain, reference and justify the opinions given and not to act as 
an advocate. Moreover, the Tribunals work to this end is not assisted by the 
absence of experts appearing for the Home Office. If the Tribunals role were 
restricted to deciding between expert evidence their difficulties would be 
restricted at worst to the original formulation of Hodgkinsons contradiction and 
at best would yield reinforcing images of country conditions. However, for the 
present the Tribunals approach remains predicated on a sceptical view of the 
function and independence of experts that is bound to yield the institutionalised 
tendency to discount or degrade evidence demonstrated in the previous three 
sections. Alternative views on the value and professionalism of experts are 
abundant and a consistent call for a more positive approach are found in a 
number of Court of Appeal judgments. S and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 539, 
presented in the introduction, contrasts sharply with the reasoning of the 
Country Guidance cases analysed here, as well as with the comments in SK 
Croatia considered above: 
opinion evidence will often or usually be very important, since 
assessment of risk of persecutory treatment in the milieu of a perhaps 
unstable political situation may be a complex and difficult task in which 
the fact-finding Tribunal is bound to place heavy reliance on the view of 
experts and specialists.322
Es Eldin, also already quoted, reinforces this view, whilst a number of cases 
before the Court of Appeal have expressed concern over the treatment of 
experts in the Tribunal. In Nirmalanathan v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1380, for 
question. Sivankumaran, moreover, reinforces the view of Kaja that decision makers should 
award a positive role to uncertainty in establishing facts. 
321 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva 1992) 
paragraph 196: Even such independent research may not, however, always be successful and 
there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant's 
account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given 
the benefit of the doubt. 
322 S and Others v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 539, paragraph 29 
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example, the court examines a case in which the Tribunal had overturned a 
decision on the basis that the Adjudicator had misled herself by concentrating 
her attention entirely upon the report of Dr Good [the expert].323 The Court of 
Appeal, however, finds the Tribunals reasons unconvincing and states that the 
Tribunal appear to have water[ed] down the factual basis of the appellants 
case accepted by the Adjudicator in order to justify their conclusion that she 
was wrong.324 Similarly, in Koci v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1507 the 
enthusiasm of the Tribunal to overturn the view of an expert is exposed to have 
forced the Tribunal to take a narrow view of the facts of the case, to find a 
nonexistent inconsistency between the evidence of the expert and the CIPU 
country report, and to sideline the evidence of both Amnesty International and 
the US State Department.325 In Djebari v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 813, the 
Court of Appeal finds that the Tribunal offered a restrictive view of the evidence 
of the expert.326
These examples are cited to highlight how the different mindset of the Court of 
Appeal, demonstrated in the quote from S and Others, above, leads to a quite 
different treatment of expertise. By accepting all the help that can be given by 
those who know more about such matters327 and acknowledging that it may be 
necessary to place heavy reliance on the view of experts,328 the Court of 
Appeal has freed itself to examine all the available evidence without the prior 
encumbrance of demonstrating that the expert has a particular axe to grind.329
The lesson for the Tribunal is clear: expert evidence can and should play a 
valuable role in assisting the Tribunal to reach the legal judgments necessary to 
determine a case if the Tribunal will recognise that experts are versed in 
different and non-legal academic disciplines, cannot be expected to usurp the 
role of the decision-maker by making legal judgments and that the proper 
approach is to seek to assimilate expert evidence into an overall assessment, 
not discard it with the disingenuous language of weight.  
323 Nirmalanathan v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1380 paragraph 13 
324 Nirmalanathan v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1380 paragraph 21 
325 Koci v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1507 paragraph 29-31 
326 Djebari v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 813 paragraph 27 
327 Es Eldin v Tribunal (C/2000/2681) paragraph 18 
328 S and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 539 paragraph 29 
329 SK Croatia [2002] UKIAT 05613 paragraph 5 
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Recommendations
(i) There should be greater transparency and consultation over the 
criteria for designating, or not designating, Country Guideline cases 
and over major issues such as the country groups re-organisation of 
the Tribunal. Stakeholder groups exist but are not utilised by the 
Tribunal. 
(ii) The Tribunal must observe the requirements for an effectively 
comprehensive analysis set out by the Court of Appeal in S and 
Others. 
(iii) Country Guideline cases must be fully and properly referenced so 
that the evidence considered in a guidance case can be identified 
and challenged. 
(iv) Additional research resources are required if an effectively 
comprehensive analysis is to be achieved. The deficiencies in many 
of the cases examined indicate that Country Guideline cases cannot 
be left to the vagaries of the adversarial system. An assisting 
counsel system would be beneficial. 
(v) Greater efforts should be made to link related cases to afford a 
better opportunity for a genuinely comprehensive analysis of all the 
relevant issues, based on a firmer factual foundation. 
(vi) Greater caution should be exercised in designating Country 
Guideline cases. The Tribunal must show greater willingness not to 
designate a case as a Country Guideline one and to de-designate 
when appropriate. All backdated Country Guideline cases should be 
removed and all cases over one year old should also be removed. 
(vii) The Tribunal must be explicit and specific about the issues that are 
designated as guideline issues to avoid case-specific findings being 
elevated to guideline status. 
132 
(viii) The Tribunal should review and consider its approach and attitude to 
expert evidence and seek to assimilate expert evidence rather than 
distinguish, isolate and reject it as at present. 
(ix) The Tribunal should recognise that it may possess experience of 
country information but it does not possess research skills and 
cannot, for example, make judgments about what types of evidence 
may or may not be available. 
